Rise of regions after reforms : late development strategies for the software industry in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala in India by Kumar, Rajendra, 1967-
Rise of Regions after Reforms: Late Development Strategies for the Software Industry in Tamil




Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, 1988
M.Tech. Management and Systems
Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, 1992
Indian Administrative Service, 1992
M.C.P.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International Economic Development and Regional Planning
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 2007
@ 2007 Rajendra Kumar. All Rights Reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and
electronic copies of the thesis document in whole or in part.
Author






NOV 0 1 2007
LIBRARIES
Professor Alice H Amsden




Department of Urban Studies and Planning
ROTCH
2
Rise of Regions after Reforms: Late Development Strategies for the Software Industry in
Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala in India
By
Rajendra Kumar
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
On July 12, 2007 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International Economic Development and Regional Planning
ABSTRACT
Emergence of India as a major center in the world for software production since the early
1990s has been a remarkable success story of economic development. However, within the
country, the growth in this industry has been concentrated in mainly the southern and the
western parts. Regional growth of this industry has been driven by the policies of the regional
governments, especially after the early 1990s when the central government initiated wide-
ranging economic and policy reforms. In this dissertation, I examine the development
strategies pursued by three states in southern India for development of this industry within an
overall neo-liberal policy framework of the central government. Two of these states (Tamil
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh) have been highly successful in attracting software firms since the
mid 1990s, while the third state (Kerala) has lagged behind. I argue that the success of these
states in establishing a technologically sophisticated industry within a short time is based on
four critical factors: availability of adequate skilled labor and specialized infrastructure, pro-
employer labor and policy reforms, ethnic linkages of immigrant professionals abroad who
returned to establish firms in their native states, and their existing technological capabilities
at the beginning of reforms. In a liberalizing economy, these states provided specialized
infrastructure and skilled labor; implemented pro-employer policy reforms; attracted
expatriate professionals; and facilitated production and marketing linkages between the local
firms and foreign markets. This allowed the local firms to exploit the opportunities due to
increasing vertical specialization by firms in the developed economies. While the influence
of dominant class coalitions consisting of industrialists and professionals in Tamil Nadu and
Andhra Pradesh ensured the success of these policies, the relatively autonomous nature of the
state in Kerala, its lack of genuine labor and policy reforms, its distrust of large private
enterprises, and its focus on redistribution rather than growth prevented it from achieving
similar success. Contrary to common explanations in the literature, the state has not played a
significant role in providing specialized R&D or finance to the industry. This research shows
that developing regions have multiple options available to them to promote hi-tech industries
even within an overall neo-liberal policy framework.
Dissertation Supervisor: Prof. Alice H Amsden
Title: Barton L Weller Professor of Political Economy
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1.1 Rise of Regions after Reforms: The Puzzle
Developing countries around the world have tried to promote high-technology
industries, such as information and communications technology (ICT) based industries, in
a bid to catch up on industrialization. The boom in the ICT industry in the Silicon Valley
has sparked renewed interest in using it as a tool to accelerate regional development in
developing countries around the globe. However, efforts to establish ICT based industries
in developing countries have met with mixed results. India is one of the few developing
countries that have successfully established an internationally competitive software and
software services industry during the last two decades, especially after the start of the
economic reforms in the early 1990s.
The rise of India as a leading center for software production and exports in the
world has been an unexpected development. A very poor and technologically and
industrially backward country that remained largely isolated from the world till the early
1990s has suddenly risen to become one of the world's leaders in software development
(Saxenian, 2004). The rise of India in this industry is puzzling as it challenges two central
ideas in the contemporary economic development literature. First, it shows that
industrially backward economies can become global players in a hi-tech industry within a
short span of less than two decades, something that the existing literature does not
consider feasible. Second, it focuses sharply on the role of the state in such leapfrogging
by developing economies in hi-tech industries within an overall neo-liberal policy
regime, an aspect that the contemporary economic development literature is mostly
pessimistic about.
India's success story becomes more interesting and complicated when we
consider the regional variations in the growth of this industry within the country. The
growth of this industry has been geographically highly uneven across the different
regions within the country. Particularly the southern region of the country has become the
leading region in this industry (Ramachandran & Ray, 2005). Within this region,
Karnataka, with its Bangalore cluster, has been the leading state in this industry in the
entire country. However, three other southern states have achieved remarkable success in
promoting this industry during the 1990s and later, though in different and contrasting
ways. These states are: Tamil Nadu with its Chennai cluster, Andhra Pradesh with its
Hyderabad cluster and Kerala, with its Trivandrum and Kochi clusters. Though Kerala
did not perform well during the 1990s, it has achieved considerable success during the
current decade. It is important to note here that all these latecomer states achieved this
success after the central government initiated wide-ranging economic reforms in the
country in 1991. These reforms resulted in the abolition of central government controls
on investment and industrial location decisions and in market oriented reforms in trade
and foreign exchange policies (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999; Chakravorty, 2000; Srinivasan,
2005).
The story of India's success in software development thus presents us with
multiple puzzles that can help us in advancing the current state of the literature. First, it
can help us in understanding how the state (the central and the regional governments) can
play a role in industrial leapfrogging in knowledge intensive and innovation based
industries, especially within a neo-liberal policy framework when the state becomes
much less interventionist in directing and controlling industrial investment. Second,
examining the contrasting ways in which the three different states in the country have
established their software industries can provide us with an understanding of the multiple
pathways that are available to developing regions for industrial development and how
they affect the type and structure of the industry that evolves. Finally, examining the
relationships between the local software industry and the global IT production networks
presents us with an opportunity to understand how vertical fragmentation and firm
specialization offer new opportunities for industrial development of the backward
economies.
In this dissertation, I examine the above issues with respect to the development of
the software industry in three southern states in India. These states are: Tamil Nadu,
Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala. In particular, I examine the role of the regional governments
in these three latecomer states in establishing a successful software industry within their
regions within an overall neo-liberal policy framework. How have these three latecomer
states succeeded in attracting software firms and in establishing themselves as successful
centers for software production and exports within a relatively short time of less than two
decades? What were the macro and micro level policies adopted by these states to attract
these industries? How did these policies affect the type and structure of the industry that
evolved within their regions? Can the growth of this industry be catalyzed in developing
regions? If so, how and under what conditions? What are the implications of success of
these states for the regional development of lagging regions within an overall neo-liberal
policy framework? In this research. I examine the late development strategies adopted by
these three states in a comparative framework to answer these questions. In framing these
questions and laying out the theoretical framework, I draw partly upon Breznitz (2005).
The main literature on role of the state in industrial development in developing
countries has focused on two central themes: timing of industrialization and learning and
technology transfer based catching up. However, these arguments do not apply to
knowledge based industries such as software as the technologies are constantly evolving
and markets are not well-defined. Hence strategic planning by the state for large scale
investments in manufacturing capabilities is not helpful. A more recent variant of this
literature is the neo-developmental statist argument that stresses the "flexible
developmental state" or "networked state" as the main explanation for the rapid
advancement of some emerging economies in hi-tech industries in a system of global
production networks and vertical specialization. However, this model calls for an
extremely flexible bureaucracy with deep knowledge of industrial domains that can
respond very quickly to the fast changing needs of the industry. This feature is missing in
the classical Weberian style bureaucracies, such as the one in India, with its separation of
general and technical wings, long and stable career patterns, and little involvement of
outside experts in policy making. Hence, even this framework is unable to explain the
Indian advance in this industry.
Current explanations for the advancement of the Indian software industry focus
mainly on the economic liberalization policies of the central government during the
1990s, availability of abundant skilled labor and resulting cost advantages, and cross-
national linkages with the Indian-origin diaspora in the US. These explanations are
certainly helpful, but they mostly take the whole country as a unit and are unable to
explain why only certain regions within the country have succeeded in establishing this
industry and not others. This is especially relevant considering the fact that the central
government policies have been the same for the entire country. There is very little
investigation of how the macro and micro level policies adopted by different states within
the country have affected the differential development of the industry across these states.
They also do not explain how the different policies at the sub-national level have affected
the type and structure of the industry that evolved within those regions. In this
dissertation, I seek to fill a portion of this gap in the literature.
In this research, I focus on the role of the regional (sub-national) governments in
promoting this industry within their regions. The approach that I adopt here is to present
and examine arguments about the role of the regional governments in the development of
this industry within their regions. My focus here is to examine the systematic linkages
between state policies and the growth of the software industry in these states within a
comparative framework. The central argument that I examine here is that in a liberalizing
economy, the regional governments influenced the industry-wide factor conditions by
providing specialized infrastructure and increasing the availability of skilled labor;
implemented pro-employer policy reforms; and facilitated the production and marketing
linkages between the local firms, foreign firms, and foreign markets. This allowed the
local firms to exploit the opportunities thrown up by increasing vertical specialization by
firms across a wide range of industries in the developed economies. While the influence
of the dominant class coalition consisting of industrialists and professionals in the
political economy of decision making in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh ensured the
successful implementation of policies to attract the industry, the relatively autonomous
nature of the state in Kerala prevented it from implementing these policies due to its
distrust of large private enterprises, failure to carry out genuine labor and other policy
reforms, and its focus on redistribution rather than growth.
The strategies adopted by these states are also in sharp contrast to the prevailing
thinking in the regional development literature which places emphasis on four related
factors as the sources of national or regional industrial competitiveness. These factors
are: supply of specialized factors of production; influencing the demand conditions in the
domestic market; presence of related and supporting industries; and firm structure and
rivalry (Porter, 1990, 1998). The states in India influenced the factor conditions in a big
way by providing industry-specific infrastructure and increasing the availability of skilled
labor. However, they did not try to influence the demand conditions at home except in a
very limited way'. Also the competition among the local firms was mainly for specialized
labor (Dossani, 2005) and not for the local market as the main markets for firms were
exports and not domestic.
As the discussion in the preceding paragraphs indicates, the existing analytical
frameworks are unable to fully account for the success of these states in developing this
industry. The success of these industrially backward regions in a technologically
sophisticated industry calls for new thinking on the role of the state in industrial
development. This dissertation seeks to explain how these states succeeded in developing
an innovation based industry in a relatively short period of time.
My goals in this dissertation are three fold. First, I hope to contribute to our
understanding of the role of the state (specifically at the sub-national level) in the
Some attempts were made by these states to attract firms to their region by initiating e-government
projects. However, these had very limited impacts as I discuss in the chapters six to eight.
development of high technology based industries such as software. As noted before, the
existing literature does not adequately explain the role of the state in the development of
such industries. My aim is not only to explain the role of the state in the development of
this industry in these specific regions, but also to go further and propose a new theoretical
framework for regional development strategies for hi-tech industries in developing
regions. My second goal in this dissertation is to examine how the different policies of
the three states influenced the development path of this industry within their regions and
how it affected the type and structure of the industry that finally evolved. My third goal
here is to examine the institutional and the political economy reasons behind the specific
macro and micro level policies that these states adopted.
1.2 Plan of the Dissertation
I use both quantitative and qualitative techniques for this research. First, I analyze
the data for software exports from all the 14 major states in India using a multivariate
time-series regression model to examine the factors associated with the growth in
software exports from these states. Then I examine the three states (Tamil Nadu, Andhra
Pradesh, and Kerala) in detail using a comparative multiple case study approach. This
method focuses on inductive-iterative theory building (Eckstein, 1975; Ragin, 1987; Yin,
1994, 2003). This research tradition aims at building the theory based on empirical
evidence through a close and intimate examination of the empirical reality. The selection
of the three states as cases is based on replication logic where cases are picked up based
on either a literal replication or a theoretical replication or both (Yin, 2003). The
selection of cases in this case is guided by the initial theoretical framework developed.
The criteria in this case are to select cases that help in building up a theoretical
framework for examining the role of the state in promoting the development of high-
technology industries in developing economies under an overall neo-liberal policy
framework. These three states are selected as they fit well within these criteria. While I
use Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh as successful cases to build a theoretical framework
for successful regional policies for development of hi-tech industries such as software, I
use the relatively unsuccessful case of Kerala as the shadow case to help generalize the
findings.
As the scope of research in the area covered here is vast, it is important to note the
specific areas that I do not cover in this research. For example, I do not specifically
analyze the role of the central government in India in the development of this industry,
though I discuss how these policies formed an overall national framework within which
these regions formulated their own policies. I take the national policy framework as given
and then analyze the differential impacts of the policies of the three states. I also do not
cover the development of the electronic hardware industry in these regions.
The data for this research comes from both primary and secondary sources. The
primary sources of data include detailed interviews with senior government officials
concerned with policy formulation and implementation in the IT sector and the firms
engaged in software production and exports in these states. A total of 57 interviews were
conducted between September 2006 and May 2007. These included interviews with 43
different software firms in the three states and 14 interviews with officials in the three
state governments and their agencies concerned with formulating policies for the
industry. The interviews with the firms were conducted with CEOs and senior level
managers while the government officials included the senior civil servants in-charge of
policy making and senior officials of government agencies. All interviews with the
government officials were conducted face-to-face while most of the interviews with the
software firms were conducted over phone as the interviewees found it to be more
convenient for them.
The secondary sources of data include official documents published by the three
state governments and the central government regarding their IT policies; published
studies and scholarly research done on the IT industry in India and other countries;
statistical data and reports published by the government and other governmental agencies,
the industry associations, and the firms; and reports and analyses published by the
multinational private consulting firms, newspapers, magazines, etc.
The dissertation is structured as follows. After the first introductory chapter, the
second chapter presents a comprehensive review of the literature and discusses how the
current literature is unable to fully explain the role of the regional governments in
development of this industry in India. This chapter also presents a brief description of the
three cases and the main arguments that I examine in this research. Chapter three
discusses in detail the research design and methodology that I adopted for this research. It
also explains the sampling technique followed for choosing the firms in detail and also
explains how interviews were conducted in each state. Chapter four discusses the
evolution of the software export industry in India and examines how the policies of the
central government influenced its development. Chapter five presents a simple
multivariate time-series regression model that analyzes the factors associated with
regional variation in the growth of software exports in the country since the start of the
reforms. Chapters six to eight present the three empirical case studies of the three states
examined in this research. These case studies closely examine the role of the regional
governments in the evolution of the software industry in their respective states and
examine how it affected the type and structure of the industry that finally evolved in each
region. They also explain the reasons why the existing analytical and theoretical
frameworks within the literature are unable to fully explain the reasons for the success of
these states. Chapter nine synthesizes the research findings from the three case studies
using a comparative multiple case-study framework. Finally, the chapter ten presents a
new analytical framework for regional development for hi-tech industries in developing
countries and presents the conclusions.
2 Literature Review and the Main Arguments
2.1 Late Development Strategies: A Conceptual Framework
To explain the reasons for the remarkable growth of the software industry in the
three Indian states examined here, we need to draw on multiple strands in the literature as
no single framework is adequate to fully explain this phenomenon. There are five major
features of the success of these states that need to be explained: first, the role of the state
policies in catalyzing the growth of this industry; second, the institutional peculiarities in
these regions that offered distinct incentives for learning and innovation; third, the
linkages that the local industry formed with the global production networks to exploit the
opportunities thrown up by vertical specialization by firms in the advanced economies;
fourth, the institutional and political economy reasons that allowed Tamil Nadu and
Andhra Pradesh to successfully implement policies that attracted these firms while Kerala
lagged behind; and last, the specific sources of regional competitiveness that allowed
these states to develop this industry far more successfully relative to others within the
same overall national policy framework. We need to draw on insights from the literature
on each of these areas to form a coherent conceptual and analytical framework to explain
the success of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh and the relative failure of Kerala.
The first major body of literature that I draw on focuses on the late development
and the developmental state theories. This literature seeks to explain the role of the state
in industrialization and economic development in developing countries. The second body
of literature that I draw on is the literature on Asian innovation systems that emphasizes
the institutional peculiarities in these economies that offer distinct incentives for learning
and innovation. The third major body of literature that I draw on is that of innovation
economics and the role of institutions in promoting innovation. This literature argues that
policies are needed for innovation due to market imperfections and inherent uncertainties
in innovations. Competition policy, public support for R&D, and regulatory reforms can
provide such incentives to promote innovations. The fourth major strand of literature that
I draw on focuses on the global networks of production, international geography of
innovations, and mobility of knowledge through vertical specialization. This literature
focuses on how the systems of production and innovation have changed in the post-
Fordist era due to vertical specialization and how it is affecting the mobility of
knowledge internationally. The fifth major body of literature that I discuss is that on the
political economy of development in India. This literature discusses how the state actions
in India are influenced by the dominant class interests and how it has affected the
industrial development in the country. This literature is important here as there are
regional variations due to the extent of worker and social mobilization and organization
in different regions. For example, the state actions seem to be relatively more
autonomous of the dominant class interests due to greater peasant and worker
mobilization and organization in Kerala. The last major strand of literature that I draw
upon is that on regional development of lagging regions under the post-reforms policy
framework. This literature focuses on the sources of regional industrial competitiveness
and how regional governments can play a role in enhancing such competitiveness.
I discuss below how these major bodies of literature are relevant in building a
conceptual framework for examining the late development strategies adopted by the three
Indian states. The discussion in the first section below on the late development and
developmental state theories draws partly upon (Breznitz, 2005).
(i) Late Development and Developmental State Theories
The concept of late development started with the work of (Gerschenkron, 1962),
who argued that latecomer countries needed to adopt different strategies for economic
development when compared to those of the developed economies. These strategies are
dependent on the degree of 'backwardness' or distance from the technological frontier of
the latecomer countries when they start to develop. Theorists in this area have further
argued that more economically backward states need more state intervention to grow and
that the timing of industrialization matters as states have different paths of industrial
development built around different institutions (Gerschenkron, 1962), and that the
latecomer states need to compensate for the lost time and lack of resources (Abramovitz,
1986). They have also argued that backward economies enjoyed certain advantages due
to the fact that the product markets were already developed and defined by the pioneering
economies that had already invested in research and development. Thus the backward
economies can 'leapfrog' by investing in the latest technologies instead of going through
the same stages of industrial development as experienced by the pioneering economies.
Other scholars have also advanced the idea that backward countries have specific
paths of development that depend on the timing of their industrialization. For example,
(Amsden, 1989) has argued that late industrialization occurs through learning rather than
inventions or innovations and that this learning has been based on a similar set of
institutions (Amsden, 1989, p.4).
A more recent version of the late development theory argues that it is a specific
state structure combined with a capable bureaucracy that enables backward economies to
build an export-oriented industrial structure based on technology-transfer based catching
up (Johnson, 1982). Other researchers have applied similar arguments to the cases of
South Korea and Taiwan (Amsden, 1989; Amsden, 2001; Amsden & Chu, 2003; Cheng,
1990; Fields, 1997; Park, 2000).
Another variant of this theory is the neo-developmental statist argument that
stresses the "flexible developmental state" or "networked state" as the main explanation
for the rapid advancement of some emerging economies in hi-tech industries in a system
of global production networks and vertical specialization (Ansell, 2000; Calder, 1993;
Chibber, 2003; Evans, 1995; O'Riain, 2004). This framework calls for an extremely
flexible bureaucracy with deep knowledge of industrial domains that can respond very
quickly to the fast changing needs of the industry. Contrary to the earlier developmental
state theorists, this model does not call for long-term national planning and control and
power over the industry and the developmental process, but a flexible state structure that
responds quickly to the changing needs of the industry and allows it to grow on its own
as it develops.
It is helpful to examine how far the late developmental and neo-developmental
state theories apply to the Indian case. It can be seen that the assumptions of the earlier
late developmental state theories do not apply to the case of knowledge intensive and
innovation based industries such as software. This is because of several reasons. First, in
these industries the market is not well defined and thus strategic planning by the state for
large investments in manufacturing capabilities is not useful. Second, the technologies
are constantly evolving and thus development of industrial capability based on
incremental innovations to products developed by the pioneering firms elsewhere is
difficult. Third, vertical specialization or outsourcing by the multinational firms provides
an important opportunity for learning for the latecomer firms, especially those with
advanced human capital (Athreye, 2005b; Ernst, 2004; Soubbotina, 2005). Finally,
several firms engaged in software development in India have become pioneering firms
internationally through development of process and project execution capabilities on their
own (Athreye, 2005b). Thus the arguments for an industrial strategy based on
technology-transfer based catching up do not apply to the Indian case.
Even the more recent variants of the theory, such as the neo-developmental statist
argument, do not apply fully to the Indian case. As noted before, this framework calls for
extremely flexible bureaucracies with deep knowledge of industrial domains that can
respond very quickly to the fast changing needs of the industry. This feature is missing in
the classical Weberian style bureaucracies, such as the one in India, with its separation of
general and technical wings, long and stable career patterns, and little involvement of
outside experts in policy making. Hence, even this framework is unable to explain the
Indian advance in this industry.
As discussed above, the existing literature on late development and
developmental state theories is unable to fully explain the role of state intervention in the
development of innovation based industries such as software and is not applicable fully to
the Indian case.
(ii) Asian Innovation Systems
The second major body of literature that I draw on is the literature on Asian
innovation systems that emphasizes 'learning by interaction'(Lundvall, 1993) and the
institutional peculiarities in developing economies that offer distinct incentives for
learning and innovation (Amsden & Chu, 2003; Lall, 2000; Segal, 2003; Yusuf, 2003).
As the latecomer countries faced substantial barriers to innovation, they developed and
adopted their own specific approaches and policies to promote innovation. This literature
also points out that as latecomers, they also had certain advantages, such as in learning
from the mistakes of the leading firms and from the problems of the earlier latecomer
firms. It also provides a framework to understand how the state-industry interactions
affect the development of industrial capabilities within states. This literature primarily
focuses on the domestic (local, regional, and national) linkages and interactions among
local firms, and private and public institutions as key sources of industrial upgrading and
competitiveness (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002; Scott, 1996).
Unfortunately, this research is largely confined to the East Asian countries and
does not include the Indian experience, which is different in several aspects. First, while
the East Asian countries focused on assimilation of new technologies from advanced
nations through imitation and then innovated through improvements in process and
product technologies (Cardoza, 1999; Kim, 1997; Nelson & Kim, 2000; Nelson & Pack,
1999; Pack & Westphal, 1986), India had a more inward looking strategy focused on self-
reliance in key technologies (Krishnan, 2003). In fact, the protectionist government
policies adversely affected the growth of the software industry in the country till the
1980s by limiting imports of advanced hardware and software (Dossani, 2005). Second,
the East Asian countries focused on diffusion of technologies after making improvements
in process and product technologies (Cardoza, 1999), while the technologies developed in
India remained localized in isolated research laboratories with little diffusion among the
industrial production system (Dedrick & Kraemer, 1993; Krishnan, 2003; Kumar, 2001).
Third, while the corporate sector contributed a large share of the national R&D efforts in
the East Asian economies, in India it is largely the public sector that has been engaged in
R&D (Kumar, 2001). The interactions among the public R&D and academic institutions,
and the industry have been very weak in India leading to poor diffusion and
commercialization of the new technologies developed (Kumar, 2001), with the possible
exception of the pharmaceutical industry (Krishnan, 2003). Thus, the innovation system
in India has been different in several aspects when compared to those in the East Asian
economies and hence requires to be examined closely as to its role in the development of
the software industry in India. While there are some studies with respect to the role of the
innovation system in the development of the software industry in India at the national
level 2, research on their role at regional level is almost completely lacking.
(iii) Innovation Economics and the Role of Institutions
Third, I draw on the literature on innovation economics and the role of institutions
in promoting innovation. The broad framework is that of (Arrow, 1962a, 1962b) who
argued that policies are required to correct for 'market imperfections' due to the
uncertainties inherent in innovations. Thus polices are needed to provide incentives for
innovation. Researchers have pointed out the role of competition policy and regulatory
reforms in providing such incentives (Mowery & Nelson, 1999). These policies include
2 see for example, (Krishnan, 2003; Kumar, 2001).
incentives for innovation and 'public goods', such as infrastructure, education, protection
for intellectual property rights, etc. (Lundvall, 2001). This body of literature is relevant
in the Indian case, as trade and industrial policy reforms by the central government have
played a significant role in boosting software exports from the country (Dossani, 2005;
Parthasarathy, 2004).
(iv) Global Systems of Production and International Geography of Innovations
Fourth, I draw on the literature on global systems of production, international
geography of innovations, and mobility of knowledge through vertical specialization. The
literature on global value chains emphasizes the importance of international linkages
among firms in global production and distribution systems in industrial upgrading and
improving technological competitiveness (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi & Kaplinsky, 2001;
Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994). This is especially important for local producers who are
relatively new to the international market as they learn significantly from global buyers
about improving their production processes and achieving high quality (Piore & Ruiz
Duran, 1998; Schmitz & Knorringa, 2000). The knowledge required for such upgrading
flows through the global value chains (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002, p. 1020). For
example, the role of vertical specialization (or outsourcing) and contract manufacturing in
the development of technological capabilities in the east Asian electronics manufacturing
firms is well-recognized (Ernst, 2004; Sturgeon & Lee, 2001).
The emphasis in this literature on knowledge flows through cross-border linkages
in global value chains is in contrast to the innovations systems literature, which
emphasizes local linkages among firms and public and private institutions as the major
sources of competitiveness. This literature is important in understanding the sources of
competitiveness in the Indian software industry, where the firms are focused mainly on
the export market and vertical specialization by multinational firms has played a major
role in the expansion of the industry and in the development of project execution and
technological capabilities within the Indian firms (Patibandla & Petersen, 2002).
However, it is important to point out here that this literature largely ignores the role of
two additional factors that have played an important role in knowledge transfer across
geographical boundaries: ICT-enabled information exchange and cross-national networks
of immigrant communities. Scholars have pointed out the role of these two factors in
knowledge transfer in the case of the Indian software firms (Saxenian, 2004; Taeube,
2004). Though the role of cross-national networks with Indian-origin diaspora in the
Silicon Valley in the growth of Indian software firms has been recognized, there is
inadequate research on the implications it has for the role of the state in formulating
appropriate development strategies.
To understand the implications of this phenomenon for the development strategies
of emerging economies, it is necessary to understand the reasons behind the growing
fragmentation or vertical specialization in production. This process has been driven by a
number of factors: lower transportation and telecommunications costs that allow
leveraging the lower costs of labor and production in developing economies and decrease
the cost of remote coordination and supervision; codification of the design that allows
production off-site without the offshore firms necessarily having design capabilities; de-
linking of the various stages of the product life cycle, such as innovation, design,
production, and marketing; and deregulation of trade in emerging economies that has
allowed them access to advanced equipment and has lowered the cost of production and
exports. In the case of software, growing 'modularization' that made coding independent
of the hardware platform for which it was being written, was one of the major reasons
that allowed fragmentation in the production process and outsourcing to outside firms
(Dossani, 2005). This development, that started in the 1970s and grew massively in the
1980s and 1990s, provided a great opportunity to the Indian firms to specialize in
customized software development (Athreye, 2005b; Dossani, 2005).
Another development that is relevant in the Indian case is the growing
fragmentation and offshoring even in the R&D activities that the multinational firms rely
on. Researchers have found that large MNCs in advanced economies increasingly rely on
R&D done outside their home regions (Dunning, 1994; Pearce, 1999; Reddy, 2000;
Reddy & Sigurdson, 1994). Though scholars have pointed out that such R&D activities
by the MNCs in developing countries may be happening mainly in non-core and
peripheral areas (Amsden et al., 2001), such relocation nevertheless presents an
opportunity for developing countries to build up their R&D capabilities and innovation
systems and facilitate linkages between the domestic firms and the multinationals
(UNCTAD, 2005). This phenomenon holds important implications for development
policy that are yet to be examined fully.
(v) Political Economy of Development in India
For examining why the state governments took actions that they did to promote
the software industry in their regions and how it affected the differential development of
the industry, it is helpful to understand the political economy of development in India in
the post-independence period and particularly after the economic reforms in the early
1990s. The dominant line of thinking in this area has been to focus on the class character
of the state in India. This literature discusses how the dominant classes influenced the
actions of the state and in turn benefited by it. The main argument is that the state actions
in India can be understood as a result of bargaining by a few dominant classes to protect
and advance their interests (Bardhan, 1984, 1998; Byres, 1994; Chaudhuri, 1995; Datta-
Chaudhuri, 1990). These dominant classes are: industrialists, rich farmers, and the
'professionals' consisting of bureaucrats, military and white-collar workers. These
classes are not homogeneous, but are heterogeneous and fragmented by regional
differences (Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990). They exert collective influence over the state and
influence its actions to protect and advance their own interests. Datta-Chaudhuri (1990)
explains how these dominant groups influenced policy-making by the state in India
during the pre-reform period. For example, the rich farmers in India ensured that land
reforms were not pushed beyond a point, the agricultural income and wealth was not
taxed, and the state provided high prices for agricultural outputs and low prices for the
major inputs forcing the government to provide heavy subsidies for agriculture.
Similarly, during the pre-reform period, the industrialists extracted concessions to protect
their domestic market from foreign competition and forced the public sector to subsidize
intermediate goods. The business associations sought favors from the government in
exchange for supporting it and the politicians (Sinha, 2005). It was a classic rent-seeking
arrangement (Krueger, 1974). The working or the professional class ensured that their
employment was protected making it difficult for the firms to reduce surplus and
inefficient labor. Pressure from backward regions ensured that the central government
allocated public sector investments in those regions. Provision of heavy subsidies and
protection of an inefficient industrial sector reduced the resources available for public and
private investment and slowed down the growth rate (Bardhan, 1998).
There has been fragmentation and realignments in the dominant coalition after
reforms. While one section of industrialists supported the reforms, others sought state
support to protect their inefficient production. The rich farmers have diversified into
trade, small industry, and real estate and the bureaucracy has accepted that the reforms
were necessary (Bardhan, 1998). Support for reforms has mainly come about due to these
realignments.
It is helpful to examine whether the above framework is applicable to the actions
of the regional governments in India during the post-reforms period. While the class
character of the state can be seen in almost all the states in India, in Kerala the state was
relatively autonomous of the dominant class coalitions (Cairo, 2001; Dre'ze & Sen,
1995). In Kerala, politics has been marked by mobilization and organization of
traditionally marginalized castes and social groups as a result of many caste and social
movements during the pre-independence era (Cairo, 2001; Desai, 2001). The communist
party in the state played an active role in this mobilization and organization. The
empowerment of these groups exerted pressures on the state for distributing the economic
and social benefits widely. This has resulted in the state focusing on distribution rather
than capital accumulation and growth (Cairo 2001). The model of governance in Kerala
thus has been relatively more autonomous of the dominant class interests unlike in the
other parts of the country. The state was also perceived to be a hotbed of trade union
activities and hostile to private enterprise (Dayasindhu & Pradeep, 2003;
Tharamangalam, 1998).
The above analysis indicates why Kerala failed to show comparable progress in
the growth of this industry as compared to the other two states. While the influence of
dominant class interests in the policy-making process in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh
ensured the successful implementation of policies for the growth of the software industry,
the relatively autonomous nature of the state in Kerala prevented it from implementing
these policies due to its deep suspicion of large private enterprise, failure to carry out
genuine labor and other policy reforms to support the growth of the industry, and its
focus on redistribution rather than growth.
It is also useful to analyze how the interests of the rapidly growing software
industry since the early 1990s influenced the state policies in these regions. The software
industry in India has been dominated by domestic entrepreneurial firms, which were not
part of the traditional dominant business and industrial elites of the country. Till the late
1980s, most of the firms in the industry were small and had little influence with the
government for lobbying for policy changes for the industry. The founding of the
National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) in 1988 bridged
this gap in the institutional capacity of the industry to influence policy making by the
government. Though it was a very small association in the beginning with just 38
members, it grew in influence rapidly as the exports of software boomed during the
1990s and its membership grew. During this period, NASSCOM played a key role in the
evolution of government policies for the software industry (Athreye & Chaturvedi, 2007).
(vi)Regional Development under the Post-Reforms Policy Framework
Lastly, I draw on the literature on comparative regional development under the
post-reforms policy framework. This literature is important in the Indian context as the
three states have achieved remarkable success in late development after the central
government embarked upon wide-ranging economic, industrial, and trade policy reforms
in 1991. These reforms resulted in the abolition of industrial licensing and controls on
location and size of private investment, privatization of state owned industrial enterprises,
encouragement of multinationals and foreign direct investment, a market determined
exchange rate, and devolution of more powers to the states for framing their own
economic and industrial policies (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999; Chakravorty, 2000). We may
expect these policy changes to lead to greater competition among regions to attract
investments (Cook & Hulme, 1988). With abolition of controls on size of investment and
location, it can also be expected that regions having better infrastructure, better labor
skills, and more industry friendly policies would attract greater industrial investments in
the post-reforms period (Ahluwalia, 2001). Researchers have found evidence to support
the argument that more reform oriented states performed relatively better during the post-
reforms phase, including in attracting investments in high-technology areas such as
software (Ahluwalia, 2001; Bajpai & Sachs, 1999). I discuss below why this should be
expected in the post-reforms phase.
The literature predicts different roles for the state under the pre- and the post-
reforms phases. While the state tries to control the path of industrial development in the
pre-reforms or nationalist phase through industrial licensing and location decisions and
state ownership of heavy industries and infrastructure, the post-reforms or neo-liberal
state encourages private ownership of industries, abolishes licensing and location
controls, and encourages foreign direct investment and entry of multinationals
(Chakravorty, 2000). The policies under both phases have different implications for
regional development. I discuss these implications below in brief.
In the pre-reforms phase, as noted before, the central government tried to spread
investments evenly across the different regions of the country through industrial
licensing, subsidies for lagging regions and controls on size of investment. This led to
sub-optimal allocation of resources, fragmentation of capacities and lack of economies of
scale (Ahluwalia, 2001). Under the post-reforms phase, with the abolition of industrial
licensing and location controls, we may expect the investments to be decided on
economic efficiency grounds and thus favor those regions that have better infrastructure,
better labor skills, and more industry-friendly policies (Ahluwalia, 2001). Thus we may
expect the regions focusing on these policies to be able to attract a greater share of private
investments, including in high-technology areas.
Another major body of literature that is relevant in examining how nations and
regions become technologically competitive is the framework presented by (Porter, 1990,
1998) on how industrial clusters form and become a source of competitive advantage for
nations. This model suggests that competitive advantage of nations arises due to the
presence of four interlinked advanced factors: demand conditions, factor conditions,
related and supporting industries, and firm structure and rivalry. The key demand
conditions he emphasizes are the presence of demanding consumers in an economy who
force the firms to innovate constantly; the key factor conditions are the availability of
specialized factors of production, such as skilled labor, capital, and infrastructure;
presence of related and supporting industries enhances the exchange of ideas and
promotes innovation; and direct competition between firms forces them to increase
productivity and become innovative. Porter also suggests that the government can play a
pro-active role in making the nation or the region competitive by influencing these
factors. However, this model is also not able to explain the rise of countries like India in
advanced innovation based industries such as software. This is due to the fact that in
these industries, innovation occurs not merely as a result of direct competition, but often
through collaboration and specialization in different stages of production. It is also often
difficult to influence the demand conditions in these industries as the major market is
international and not domestic. Moreover, the related and supporting industries may not
necessarily be present in the same spatial location or region. Hence, the phenomenon of
vertical specialization and a globalized and networked form of production in these
industries call for new research to enhance our understanding of the sources of
competitiveness of emerging regions and nations. In this research, I propose to provide
explanations for this phenomenon.
Conclusion on the Review of Literature
It is clear from the discussion in the preceding sections that the existing literature
only provides partial explanations for the rise of emerging economies in high technology
and knowledge based industries. The reasons for this lie in several key differences in the
methods and organization of production between traditional manufacturing based
industries, with which the existing literature is predominantly concerned, and the post-
Fordist production that characterizes knowledge based industries such as software. I
outline these key differences in the Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1 Key differences in organization and methods of production between traditional and Post-
Fordist industries
Area Traditional Production Post-Fordist Knowledge-
based Production
Type of Firm Vertical Integration Vertical Specialization
Type of Innovation Sequential (imitation to Concurrent
innovation)
Mode of R&D Mainly internal Increasingly collaborative
Technology Mature and comparatively Constantly changing
static
Technological competitiveness Relatively much below the Closer to the technological
technological frontier frontier
Technology Upgradation Incremental improvements to Process improvements to
borrowed technology generic technologies
(routines/modules in software)




Location of Production Lowest cost for mature Cost and competitiveness
products
Labor Low skilled Highly skilled
Finance Large capital requirements Comparatively lower capital
requirements for the software
industry
Market First domestic then exports Mainly exports
Main reason for state Lack of international Lack of highly skilled labor,
intervention competitiveness in the local and appropriate international
industry production and marketing
linkages for the local firms
Mode of state intervention Artificial exchange rates, Market exchange rates,
(Macro) protection from foreign encouragement to competition,
competition, facilitate facilitate linkages, relatively
technology transfer, lax strict IPR
intellectual property regime
(IPR)
Mode of state intervention Subsidies for production based Subsidies for developing
(Micro) on performance standards, production and marketing
R&D linkages, R&D
Source: Author's compilation based on literature review
Thus, though the existing literature is helpful in understanding the development of
industrial capabilities within emerging economies in the traditional manufacturing based
industries, it is not very helpful in explaining why latecomer states adopt innovation
strategies for developing knowledge-based industries and what macro and micro level
strategies are appropriate for building technological capabilities within sub-national
regions within an overall post-reforms policy framework of the national government. As
mentioned before, it is also not very helpful in explaining the role of the state in the
development of knowledge and innovation based industries such as software. Innovations
in policies by latecomer states to promote these industries have also not been researched
adequately. With respect to the Indian case, research is almost completely lacking on how
the different strategies adopted by the sub-national regions influenced the specific
development path of the industry in their regions. In this research, I hope to fill a portion
of this gap in the literature by developing a theory on the role of the sub-national
governments in the development of knowledge and innovation intensive industries within
an overall post-reforms policy framework at the national level.
2.2 A Brief Historical Description of the Three Cases
Before laying out the main arguments for examining the three case studies in
detail, it is helpful to discuss the three cases in brief. In the following sections, I briefly
discuss the development of the software industry in the three states and discuss how the
specific policies adopted by each of them affected the development of the industry within
their regions. The three cases are discussed in detail in the chapters six to eight.
2.2.1 Tamil Nadu
Software industry in Tamil Nadu started much later after it had taken roots in
Bombay in the 1970s. Among the member firms of the National Association of Software
and Service Company (NASSCOM) as on January 2007, only six software companies
were founded in the state before 1990 (NASSCOM, 2007b). Their share in the total
software exports from the country was negligible. However, the industry has shown very
remarkable growth in the state during the post-reforms period. Total software exports
from the state grew from a mere US$ 0.6m in 1993 to US$3,188.4m in 2005, registering
an average annual growth rate of over 50%. During the same period, the number of
software exporting firms in the state increased from only 10 in 1993 to 1,427 during 2005
(ELCOT, 2006).
It is important to point out here that Tamil Nadu had an important advantage at the
start of the reforms as it already had an internationally recognized advanced academic
and R&D institute, the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), in Chennai. The state had
also taken a significant policy initiative in 1984 to allow the private sector to open
engineering colleges imparting undergraduate engineering education. The state thus had a
significant pool of highly skilled labor within the state. Many of the graduates from the
IIT and other engineering colleges in the state had emigrated to the US and other
countries during the 1970s and 1980s. This immigrant community with ethnic roots in the
state was a very significant resource which the state could rely upon later to invest in the
software industry in the state. While the IIT graduates with advanced technical skills
provided the leadership for the industry, the graduates from the state level engineering
colleges formed the bulk of the skilled labor force.
Type and Structure of the Industry
The growth in the software industry in the state has been led by the Indian
entrepreneurial and the foreign-expatriate Indian3 firms, though multinational firms
entered the state in a big way after 1995. While the proportion of multinational firms in
this industry in the state was only 11% in 1995, it had increased to a little over 22% by
January 2007 (NASSCOM, 2007a). As on January 2007, Indian entrepreneurial, foreign-
expatriate Indian, and multinational firms comprised 44%, 21% and 22% respectively of
the total number of firms in Chennai that were members of NASSCOM (NASSCOM,
2007a). Majority of the leading firms in the state are Indian entrepreneurial and foreign-
expatriate Indian firms. Most of the Indian entrepreneurial and foreign-expatriate firms
are engaged in the customized software development and IT enabled services business,
while most of the MNC subsidiaries cater to the software development and R&D
requirements of their parent firms. The industry is focused mainly on the export market.
State Policies for the Software Industry
The state had no specific policy for the industry until the mid 1990s. The first
major policy initiative in the state came from the central government in 1995 when it set
up a dedicated software technology park in Chennai under the national Software
Technology Parks of India (STPI) scheme. This was five years after the first three parks
had come up at Pune, Bangalore, and Bhubaneshwar in 1990.
3 Foreign-expatriate Indian firm refers to firms that have been started by expatriate Indians or are
subsidiaries of foreign firms in other countries founded by expatriate Indians in those countries.
The first major direct policy initiative for the software industry came from the
state government in 1997 when it announced its first state-wide IT policy for the industry.
Before this policy was announced, the software firms could avail of only the general
incentives available for all the industries in the state. These incentives included
investment and tax subsidies for mega and super mega projects involving an investment
of over US$ 15m and US$1500m respectively. IT policy of 1997 marked the first major
attempt by the state to specifically target the software industry for development.
The 1997 policy addressed several major concerns of the industry. These included
creation of dedicated infrastructure facilities such as IT parks in association with the
private sector, establishment of an advanced technical institute and upgradation of
curricula in universities to provide skilled labor for the industry, exemption to IT firms
from several state laws such as the Pollution Control Act and subsequently from some
intrusive labor laws such as the Factories Act and the Shops and Establishments Act,
'single window clearance' to ease the process of granting approvals for starting a new
firm, etc. The state also facilitated the opening of a large number of private engineering
colleges in the state that provided undergraduate education to meet the growing
requirement of skilled labor for the industry.
During this period, the state also took a number of initiatives to build up
institutional capacity within the state structure to acquire domain expertise and formulate
appropriate policies for the industry. These included involving outside experts from
academia and the industry in the policy making process of the state, creation of a separate
department for exclusively dealing with the IT industry, and designating a state
government agency (ELCOT) as the nodal agency for interacting with the industry and
providing inputs for formulating appropriate policies.
While the focus of the state upto the end of 1990s was to provide specialized
infrastructure, skilled labor, and to involve the industry in policy making, there was a
distinct change in its strategy after 2000. The focus during this period distinctly shifted to
attracting big MNCs and facilitating linkages between the local firms and the
international market. The focus on attracting MNCs was partly due to the success of the
neighboring state of Andhra Pradesh in attracting large MINCs to the state during the late
1990s. To facilitate linkages with the international market, the state government started
organizing an annual series of mega conferences, called 'Connect', in association with
the industry associations and the local firms. In addition to these, the local firms,
particularly, the small and medium enterprises (SMEs), were encouraged to participate in
national and international conferences and exhibitions to showcase their abilities. The
state government itself started participating in these conferences to promote investments
in the state, particularly by the MNCs and large national firms. This was one of the main
policy objectives announced by the state in its second IT Policy in 2002. During this
period, the state also actively encouraged the professional expatriate community from the
state to actively invest in the state. The expatriate community, with deep ethnic linkages
in the state and looking for a profitable economic opportunity to invest, responded
positively by opening new firms or subsidiaries of existing firms in foreign countries.
Another major initiative during this period included efforts by the state
government to promote e-governance in its various departments and agencies. All
departments and agencies were asked to formulate action plans for computerization and
e-governance. However, these efforts had very limited impact on attracting software
firms to the state as these firms were focused much more on exports than the domestic
market.
It is important to note here that the state (including both central and the state
governments) did not take any major initiatives to provide R&D or venture capital to the
industry. This is in sharp contrast to the development strategies for hi-tech industries
adopted by some other developing countries such as Israel and Taiwan (Breznitz, 2006).
This was due to the unique nature of this industry in India. The software firms in India
were focused on exports right from the beginning and had developed expertise in custom
software development on their own through in-house development of process and project
execution capabilities (Athreye, 2005b). They were also internationally competitive at
prevailing market rates. In such circumstances, the states never felt a pressing need for
providing R&D and finance to the industry.
2.2.2 Andhra Pradesh
Like in Tamil Nadu, the industry has grown spectacularly in Andhra Pradesh too.
The total software exports grew from a mere US$7.1m in 1994 to US$ 2,828.3m in 2005.
The share of the state in the country's total software exports grew from only 1.5% in
1994 to 11.9% in 2005, only slightly behind that of Tamil Nadu. The number of firms in
the state increased from seven in 1992 to 1,186 as on January 2007g.
Similar to Tami Nadu, Andhra Pradesh also had an advantage at the start of the
reforms in the form of a strong R&D base in Hyderabad. The city was home to a network
of defense R&D labs established by the Defense Research and Development
4 Number of companies counted as per the list of registered companies at
http://www.hyd.stpi.in/ehouses/ehouses.html (accessed in January 2007).
Organization (DRDO) of the central government. It was also home to a number of
pharmaceutical companies at that time. The state also had a large pool of skilled
engineers as it had permitted the private sector to open undergraduate technical
institutions much earlier (in 1977). The state also had a sizable immigrant community
living abroad as a large number of engineering graduates from the state had migrated to
the west in the 1970s and 1980s in search of better career prospects. These immigrant
professionals, with deep ethnic roots in the state, contributed significantly to the growth
of the industry after the reforms.
Type and Structure of the Industry
Till the early 1990s, structure of the industry in Andhra Pradesh closely resembled
that of Tamil Nadu. The number of firms was seven in the state in 1990 compared to six
in Tamil Nadu and none of them were significant players in software exports at that time.
However, the industry expanded very quickly in the state after 1995. The number of
firms, particularly the multinational firms, grew sharply after 1995. Among the firms in
Hyderabad that were members of NASSCOM as on January 2007, 39.3% were MNC
subsidiaries, 34.8% were Indian entrepreneurial firms, and 19.6% were foreign-expatriate
Indian firms. Thus the multinational firms have played a much larger role in the growth
of the industry in the state. This is in contrast to Tamil Nadu where the industry is
dominated by Indian entrepreneurial and foreign-expatriate Indian firms. However, it is
relevant to note here that though MNCs comprise the largest share of the industry in
terms of number of firms, there are only two MNCs among the top ten leading firms in
the state in terms of number of employees. Most of the MNC subsidiaries function as
captive units of their parent firms for software development or R&D. Relatively much
bigger presence of the MNCs in the state has happened due to specific policies pursued
by the state government as I explain in brief below.
State Policies for the Software Industry
Like in Tamil Nadu, the government in Andhra Pradesh also had no specific
policies for the software industry till the mid 1990s. The first specific policy initiative for
the industry in the state came from the central government in the form of a software
technology park in 1991 under the Software Technology Parks of India (STPI) scheme.
The first specific policy initiatives by the state came after the election of a new
Chief Minister of the state, Chandrababu Naidu, in 1995. He started two mega projects in
the city to build infrastructure and provide dedicated 'plug and play' facilities for the IT
firms. The government provided land and ready built space at concessional rates to attract
the IT firms. During this period, the government took a conscious decision to target the
large multinational firms by offering them incentives such as land and investment
subsidies on a case by case basis. The chief minister himself displayed entrepreneurial
leadership by personally contacting the senior management of MNCs and offering them
huge incentives to invest in the state. He succeeded in persuading Bill Gates to open a
development center of Microsoft in Hyderabad in 1998. Entry of Microsoft into the state
attracted a large number of other MNCs and Indian firms to the city.
Another initiative taken by the state during this period was to increase the
availability of skilled labor in the state. Besides facilitating the opening of a large number
of engineering colleges in the private sector providing undergraduate engineering
education, the state established an advanced post-graduate academic and research
institute in collaboration with major private firms in the industry. The industry supported
R&D at this institute was a unique initiative by the state government as a similar
initiative in Tamil Nadu failed to take off due to apathy by the state government5 .
Another major initiative by the state government during this period was to involve
the industry and outside experts in policy making for the industry. The government
created a separate department dealing exclusively with the industry and incorporated
industry representatives in newly created advisory bodies headed by the chief minister to
provide inputs in policy making.
During this period, the state also promoted e-governance in various government
department and agencies in a big way. However, though these projects helped in creating
a local demand for software solutions in government departments to some extent, it had
only a limited impact on the growth of the industry in the state as most of the firms were
focused on the lucrative export market and not on the domestic market.
After 2000, the state turned its attention to promoting linkages between the local
firms and the international market. It started an annual series of mega international
exhibitions in the state for the industry aimed at providing a forum for the local firms to
showcase their capabilities and facilitating interactions with the leading multinational
firms. The state also provided subsidies to the small and medium sized firms to
participate in international exhibitions. The government also actively encouraged the
professional expatriate community from the state to invest in this industry in the state.
5 This was the establishment of TANITEC (Tamil Nadu Institute of Information Technology) by the state
government in 1998. However, this institute failed to take off and was later merged with the state funded
Anna University in Chennai.
It is relevant to note here that the state did not provide any venture capital to the
industry. As in the case of Tamil Nadu, the national firms in the state were focused on
custom software development and IT services and were already internationally
competitive. However, unlike Tamil Nadu, the state did try to facilitate R&D for the
industry to a limited extent by setting up an advanced academic and R&D institute.
2.2.3 Kerala
Unlike Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, Kerala failed to achieve similar success
in this industry during the same time period. The share of the state in the All India
exports for software and services has stagnated at around 0.4% during 1998 to 2005,
though the absolute value of software exports grew from US$ 11.4m to US$102.1m
during the same period. The number of firms in the state grew from 53 to 208 during the
same time.
Unlike the other two states, Kerala did not have a sizable pool of skilled labor and
a diversified industrial base at the start of reforms. The state did not allow the private
sector to open technical institutions until 1992. The state was also known for its militant
labor unions and the government was perceived to be hostile to large private enterprise.
Though the state had an advanced R&D institute for space research established by the
central government, lack of a sizable base of skilled labor, a diversified private sector,
and a hostile policy environment at the start of the reforms contributed to the state
lagging behind the other two states in the growth of this industry during the post reforms
period. Unlike the other two states, this state also did not have a sizable professional
expatriate community who could invest in this industry in the state. The expatriates from
the state comprised mostly of skilled and unskilled workers working in the gulf region.
Type and Structure of the Industry
Unlike Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, Kerala had virtually no exports in
software till the late 1990s. In fact, till 1995, it had just three firms in Trivandrum, which
were members of NASSCOM. Even in January 2007, this number rose to only eight,
against 128 in Chennai and 124 in Hyderabad (NASSCOM, 2007a). Two of these firms
were multinationals, two were foreign-expatriate Indians, and the remaining four were
Indian entrepreneurial firms. None of these firms were among the top 20 leading software
exporters from the country.
State Policies for the Software Industry
Kerala was the slowest among the three states to implement specific policy
initiatives for the industry. This was despite the fact that its capital city, Trivandrum, had
relatively better infrastructure and the cost of operations were comparatively about 30-
40% lower6. The state had also established Technopark in the early 1990s, much earlier
than similar facilities came up in the other two states. The state also had a STPI center
established by the central government in 1992.
Despite having good infrastructure and relatively lower cost of operations, the
state fared poorly in this industry relative to the other two states. The reasons for this lay
in the perception of the state as being hostile to large private enterprise and as a hotbed of
militant labor union activities (Dayasindhu & Pradeep, 2003). The state failed to carry
out effective labor and other policy reforms to attract private capital. The state was ruled
by a left front coalition from 1996 to 2001 that was not perceived to be friendly to large
6 Source: interviews with firms in Trivandrum.
private enterprises. The state also did not have a sufficiently large pool of skilled labor,
which was required for a massive expansion of the industry. In 2000, while Kerala
produced only 3,800 graduates with engineering degrees, Tamil Nadu and Andhra
Pradesh produced 15,500 and 8,100 respectively (Arora & Bagde, 2006). The low turnout
of skilled labor from the state was due to the fact that the state did not permit private
engineering colleges until 1992.
The state also failed to acquire domain expertise and did not involve the industry
adequately in its policy making process. Though the state created a separate department
and a separate directorate for facilitating direct interaction with the industry, they were
not effective as the government itself was perceived to be unfriendly to private enterprise.
The state changed its policies towards this industry after 2001 when a new
congress led government came to power in the state. This government was far more
private investor friendly in its ideology and believed in private and foreign investment as
engines for economic growth (Krishnakumar, 2005). After coming to power, the new
government announced the second IT policy of the state in 2001. This policy sought to
directly address the concerns of the private industry on the labor front. In 2002, the
government permitted the IT firms to file self-certifications for compliance with labor
laws and exempted them from many of its provisions. These measures were similar to
what Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh had done earlier. It also exempted the firms in
7Technopark from the strikes and other disruptions caused due to labor unrest in the state .
After 2001, the state also took specific policy initiatives to attract large
multinational and national firms to the state. It started an annual series of mega
7 This was specifically done to address the concerns raised by the firms in Technopark. The vehicles
ferrying employees in and out of Technopark were provided police protection during the strikes.
exhibitions, called IT Kerala, in 2002 to promote the state and provide a forum for the
firms in the state to showcase their abilities. More importantly, this event served to
project the state as private investor-friendly. The state also allowed a large number of
private engineering colleges to open in the state, thereby increasing the availability of
skilled labor substantially. The number of engineering graduates from the state went up to
over 23,000 in 2006 compared to only 3,800 in 2000. However, delays in consensus
building over crucial decisions continued to hamper the growth of the industry during this
period. One example was the Smart City project in Cochin. This project was mooted in
2003 to attract foreign direct investment in electronics and software industry. However,.
continuous negotiations over the project and political opposition led to prolonged delays
and the project was yet to be finally approved in 2006.
Why were the state policies so different in Kerala when compared to those in
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh? The reasons for this lie in the political economy of
decision making in Kerala. As noted before, scholars have noted the class character of the
Indian state and how constant bargaining by the dominant class coalition consisting of
rich farmers, industrialists, and working class professionals to protect and advance their
interests has affected the actions of the state after independence (Bardhan, 1984, 1998;
Byres, 1994; Chaudhuri, 1995; Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990). While this phenomenon helps to
explain the actions of the state in most parts of the country, in Kerala, the state was
relatively autonomous of the dominant class coalitions (Cairo, 2001; Dre'ze & Sen,
1995). In this state, politics has been marked by mobilization and organization of
traditionally marginalized castes and social groups as a result of many caste and social
movements during the pre-independence era (Cairo, 2001; Desai, 2001). The model of
governance in Kerala thus has been relatively more autonomous of the dominant class
interests unlike in the other parts of the country. The relative autonomous character of the
state in Kerala was partly responsible for its failure to implement policies similar to what
the other two states did.
2.3 Rise of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala - the Argument in Brief
Based on the brief historical description of the three cases in the preceding section,
we can now present the main arguments for the outstanding success achieved by Tamil
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh and the relative failure of Kerala in promoting this industry
during the post-reforms period. In the post-reforms era, these states adopted several
specific macro and micro level policies to attract private investments, both domestic and
foreign, in the software industry. I discuss these policies in brief below.
The first major initiative taken by these states to attract investments was to build
and provide world-class infrastructure in their capital cities. This consisted of dedicated
'plug and play' premises with all infrastructural facilities and dedicated data
communication links where the software companies could just buy or rent built up space
and start operations immediately. Even for those firms wanting to set up their own
campuses, the states offered land at concessional rates and the procedures required for
obtaining approvals were greatly simplified through a 'single window' system.
The second major initiative taken by these states related to providing adequate
skilled labor for these firms. All three states took initiatives to allow privately run
technical education institutions providing undergraduate education in engineering and
computer science disciplines. As the work done by software firms in India consisted
mainly of custom software development and services requiring large numbers of skilled
personnel, availability of adequate skilled labor was a major attraction for them to locate
in these states. Kerala was the last among the three states to allow private technical
institutions. The low turnout of skilled labor in Kerala was a major reason for its failure
in attracting software firms to the state.
Third, these states adopted and implemented far-reaching reforms in their labor
and industrial policies. All three states enacted pro-employer labor policy reforms during
the post-reforms period (Aghion et al., 2006). They also undertook several other pro-
employer industrial policy reforms such as single window clearances, fiscal and tax
incentives for investments, etc. (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999). Kerala was the last among the
three states to implement these reforms (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999) and consequently the
growth of the industry suffered there.
Fourth, these states promoted linkages between the domestic firms and the foreign
markets through multinational clients. Such linkages and leveraging resources such as
knowledge and market access channels through them have been crucial to the Indian
firms in developing process and project execution capabilities (Athreye, 2005b). The
strategies adopted to promote such linkages included holding mega exhibitions in the
state, networking with the expatriate professionals from the state settled abroad to
advance the cause of the state in attracting software firms, and participating in trade
shows and conferences held abroad to showcase the incentives and facilities available in
the state for attracting investments. They also tried to attract these non-resident
professionals to invest in their states. Kerala again was the least successful among the
three states as the state was not perceived to be private capital friendly and it did not have
a sizable professional expatriate community.
Fifth, the successful states, particularly Andhra Pradesh, displayed entrepreneurial
leadership in attracting large multinational and national firms. Entrepreneurial leadership
of the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh was particularly successful in persuading a
number of large multinational firms to open their subsidiaries in the state. This in turn
was helpful in attracting a number of other firms to the state.
Sixth, these states also focused on improving industry-specific domain knowledge
among the bureaucracy and encouraging state-industry interaction in policy making. All
three states created a separate government department headed by a senior government
official to deal exclusively with policy making for this industry. They also formed
separate state level bodies headed by the chief minister with direct representation from
the industry and academia to provide specialized inputs into the policy making process.
Kerala again failed to incorporate the private industry adequately into the policy making
process.
Seventh, these states also benefited from the technological expertise in electronics
and software development already available at the start of reforms in the state within the
public R&D and academic institutions. The presence of a cluster of defense research labs
in Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh and the internationally renowned Indian Institute of
Technology (IT) in Chennai in Tamil Nadu also contributed to make these states
attractive for software firms. Kerala did not have the advantage of this 'prior experience'
and also did not have a sizable base of skilled labor, which possibly contributed to the
relatively slow growth of the industry in that state.
Eighth, these states also adopted pro-active policies for e-governance aimed at
computerizing their government departments and delivering services to the citizens
through online websites. Andhra Pradesh was particularly active in this area with the then
Chief Minister of the state (during 1995-2004) himself displaying entrepreneurial
leadership and taking keen personal interest in implementing e-goverance projects and
promoting the software industry in the state (Ramachandran & Ray, 2005). Though these
policies had only a limited impact on attracting firms to the state as most of the firms
were focused on exports and not on the domestic market, they were still helpful in
projecting the state as friendly to the software industry. Though Kerala also implemented
several e-governance projects, they had only a very limited impact in attracting software
firms to the state as the state was not perceived to be private investor friendly.
Ninth, Andhra Pradesh also provided limited R&D support to the firms by
establishing an advanced technical institution in computer science and information and
communications technologies. This institute was set up in collaboration with the private
industry in 1998. Though Tamil Nadu did not provide any specific R&D support to the
industry, it already had the IIT, Chennai that was engaged in advanced training and
research in software technologies. These institutions have top-class faculty trained abroad
and have established themselves as leading centers in software training and research in
India. Though the linkages between these institutions and the software firms for R&D
have not been strong due to the excessive dependence of the Indian firms on custom
software development and IT services instead of products and cutting edge R&D
(D'Costa, 2006), these institutes still contributed significantly to the growth of the
industry in these states by providing highly skilled professionals. Again, Kerala was the
last to establish such an institution in 2000.
Tenth, these states also adopted a number of other micro (firm) level policies to
attract software firms to their regions. These included specific fiscal and tax incentives
depending on the size of the investment (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999). All these states focused
on attracting large firms (both multinational and national) to their states through specific
incentives. These included specific case by case incentives such as grant of land at
subsidized rates, investment subsidies, and concessional rates for infrastructural facilities
such as electricity, etc. They also provided subsidies to small and medium firms for
participating in trade shows abroad. Though Kerala also offered similar incentives to the
industry, the hostile image of the state towards private capital prevented it from attracting
firms to the state.
Lastly, the influence of dominant class interests in the political economy of the
decision making process in these states was crucial in determining which states were
more successful in adopting and implementing policies to promote this industry. While
the influence of a coalition of industrialists and professionals in the policy making
process of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh ensured the success of these policies in these
states, the relatively autonomous nature of the state in Kerala prevented it from shedding
its anti private capital and pro-labor image and achieving similar success.
The brief analysis presented above points to the importance of regional level
policies in promoting investments in high-technology industries within an overall neo-
liberal policy framework of the central government. More importantly, it shows that the
state retains its relevance as an important actor in the development of high-technology
and export oriented industries in industrially underdeveloped economies even under an
overall neo-liberal economic policy framework.
3 Research Design and Methodology
3.1 Research Design and Methodology
Research Design
I use a multiple comparative case study design for this research (Eckstein, 1975;
Lijphart, 1975; Yin, 2003). This design focuses on explanatory and inductive-iterative
theory building through analytical techniques such as pattern matching, process tracing,
explanation building and cross-case comparative analysis and synthesis (George &
Bennett, 2005a; King et al., 1994; Ragin, 1987; Yin, 1994, 2003). However, before
conducting detailed case studies of these three states, I build a multivariate time-series
regression model using panel data on software exports from all the major states in India
to examine the factors that are associated with the growth in software exports from these
states. Then I conduct detailed case studies of the three states using a multiple
comparative framework. I use crucial and shadow cases to examine and analyze the data
and generalize the results. I examine two states that are highly successful, namely,
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, as crucial cases to build a theoretical model to explain
the role of state policies in the development of innovation based industries at a regional
level under an overall neo-liberal policy framework of the central government. I analyze
Kerala as the shadow case as it has lagged behind its more successful neighbors in
developing this industry. The purpose of selecting a shadow case is to help in testing the
theory and generalizing the findings. The selection of the three states as cases is based on
replication logic where cases are picked up based on either a literal replication or a
theoretical replication or both (Yin, 2003, p.47). The selection of cases in this case is
guided by the initial theoretical framework developed. The criteria in this case are to
select cases that help in building up a theoretical framework for examining the role of the
state in promoting the development of high-technology industries in developing
economies under an overall neo-liberal policy framework. These three states are selected
as they fit well within these criteria.
Figure 3.1 below depicts the research design for this study.
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Figure 3.1: Multiple (comparative) case study design with embedded units of analysis
Selection of States
It is relevant to note here that the three cases in this research are selected
purposefully based on the outcome, i.e., the dependent variable. While Tamil Nadu and
Andhra Pradesh represent the successful cases, Kerala represents the relatively
unsuccessful case that I use as a contrasting case to help generalize the findings. The
three cases selected here do not represent the full range of variation possible on the
dependent variable. Scholars have pointed out that constraining variation on the
dependent variable may induce selection bias and thus may lead to inappropriate
conclusions in establishing causal linkages (Geddes, 1990; King et al., 1994).
However, scholars have noted that with appropriate research design, this issue can
be mitigated adequately. For example, use of a contrasting or negative case in a
comparative framework can make the conclusions more persuasive (Geddes, 1990,
p.142) and can serve to eliminate plausible rival explanations using Mill's methods of
comparative analysis (Collier, 1995, p. 464). In addition to using these methods, in this
research, I also use another technique to introduce variation on the dependent variable.
This is by using different time periods for analyzing the performance of the three states,
specifically that of Kerala. While Kerala lagged behind the other two states upto 2000, it
showed significant success after 2001. Thus, use of two distinct periods to analyze the
performance of the three states in a comparative framework helps us to mitigate the
problems of selection bias as it introduces sufficient variation on the dependent variable.
Scholars have also pointed out that selection bias can be mitigated by introducing
variations in the sub-units of analysis, for example at the level of firms and industrial
sectors (Collier, 1995, p. 464-465). In this research, I use firms and government agencies
as the sub-units of analysis in each state that contain sufficient variation on the outcomes
of interest for those units, namely, the performance of these units. The firms and the
government agencies that I examine in the three states show sufficient variation in their
performance.
Units of Analysis
The unit of analysis in this research is the region or state. However, the research
design consists of multiple cases with embedded units of analysis as shown in the Figure
1. The embedded units are the regional government, its supporting agencies, and the IT
firms in these states. These units are relevant for analyzing the role of the state in the
development of this industry in these regions.
Methodology
As noted before, I use both quantitative and qualitative methods for this research.
I first use a multivariate time-series regression model using panel data for software
exports from all the states in India to isolate the factors that are associated with the
growth in software exports. Then I conduct detailed case studies of the three states in an
explanatory and inductive-iterative theory building framework. The main analytical
techniques that I use are pattern matching, process tracing, explanation building,
chronologies to trace policy interventions over time to establish systematic causal
linkages, and comparative or cross-case analysis and synthesis. The dependent variable in
this case is the growth of the software industry in these states during the post-reforms
period. The main explanatory or independent variables are the government policies
adopted by the regional government in these states. As all the three states are neighboring
states within the same region of the country and as the time period for analysis is the
same for all of them, these factors can be held constant in a cross-case comparative
analysis allowing us to focus on the systematic linkages or covariation between
government policies and the growth of this industry. Cross-case comparison using the
methods of agreement, difference, indirect difference, and congruence (George &
Bennett, 2005b; Mill, 1888) also permit us to analyze and eliminate plausible rival
explanations and validate theoretically relevant linkages between the explanatory and the
dependent variables (Waldner, 1999, p. 235). I attempt to generalize analytically to
theory-building for state intervention for regional development through high technology
industries in developing economies.
Figure 3.2 below depicts the research methodology followed for this study.
Figure 3.2: Research methodology for this study








Analytical Focus of the Study
It is relevant to note here that the analytical focus of this research is to examine
the systematic linkages between regional state government policies and the growth of the
software industry in these states. Though I employ institutional analysis and analyze the
political economy of decision making in these states to examine how the influence of
dominant class coalitions affected the policy context and adoption and implementation of
policies for this industry, I do not focus on explaining the origins of these institutions. I
take these structural and institutional contexts as starting points or given and focus on
examining the systematic linkages between state policies and the growth of the industry.
3.2 Sources of Data
I use both primary and secondary sources of data for this research. The primary
sources of data include detailed interviews with senior government officials concerned
with policy formulation and implementation in the IT sector in these three states and the
firms engaged in software production and exports in these states. A total of 57 interviews
were conducted between September and December 2006. These included interviews with
43 different software firms in the three states and 14 interviews with government
officials. The number of firms interviewed was 18 in Chennai, 15 in Hyderabad, and 10
in Trivandrum. The interviews with the firms were conducted with promoters, CEOs and
senior level managers while the government officials included the senior civil servants in-
charge of policy making in these states and officials in state government agencies dealing
with the software industry. All interviews with the government officials were conducted
face-to-face while most of the interviews with the software firms were conducted over
phone as the interviewees found it to be more convenient for them. The interviews with
government officials took around one hour each, while those with the firms lasted around
30-45 minutes each.
Interviews with the Software Firms
Interviews with the software firms focused mainly on eliciting information on the
major factors that influenced the firm to choose the state for locating its unit and how the
state policies affected that decision, its operational aspects, the relationship of the firm
with the local industry, and its linkages with the international market. It consisted of
questions on the following 11 major aspects:
(i) Location Decision by the Firm
(ii) Impact of Policy Initiatives by the State on the location decision
(iii) Linkages with the State/Central Govt. Owned and Private Local IT Firms
(iv) Involvement of Your Firm in E-Governance Projects of the State/Central
Government
(v) Availability of Skilled Labor in the State
(vi) Labor Relations in the State
(vii) Awareness among Civil Servants about the Needs of the IT Industry
(viii) Involvement of Your Firm in the Policy Making Process of the State/Central
Government
(ix) Linkages with Global Production Networks
(x) Access to Finance by the Firm
(xi) R&D and Technology Upgradation by the Firm
Interviews with Government Functionaries
Interviews with the government officials and agencies were focused mainly on
collecting information on how the state and its agencies had formulated and implemented
policies for this sector and how these policies had evolved over time. They also focused
on how the state had involved the industry in the policy-making process. The interviews
consisted of questions on the following 13 major aspects:
(i) Policy Initiatives by the State for IT/ITES Industry
(ii) Policy Initiatives by the State for Balanced Regional Development of the IT
Industry
(iii) Role of the State in Promoting State Owned and Private Local IT Firms
(iv) Reasons for Preference for the State as an Investment Location
(v) State Policies for Increasing the Availability of Skilled Labor in the State
(vi) State Policies for Labor Relations in the State
(vii) Awareness among Civil Servants about the Needs of the Industry
(viii) Involvement of Outside Experts in the Policy Making Process
(ix) State Policies for Promoting Linkages with Global Production Networks
(x) Role of the State in Provision of Finance for the IT Industry
(xi) Role of the State in Technology Upgradation by the IT Industry
(xii) Policies towards entry of MNCs and FDI in the IT sector
(xiii) Future Initiatives Planned by the State for the IT Industry
Secondary Sources of Data
The secondary sources of data included official documents published by the three
state governments and the central government regarding their IT policies; published
studies and scholarly research done on the IT industry in India and other countries;
statistical data and reports published by the government and other governmental agencies,
the industry associations, and the firms; and reports and analyses published by the
multinational private consulting firms, newspapers, magazines, etc.
3.3 Selection of Firms
Selection of the firms was done using a combination of stratified and convenience
sampling. I first collected the complete list of software and services firms in the capital
cities of the three states using the NASSCOM register of member companies in the
country as on January 1, 2006. This produced a list of 123 companies in Chennai, 110
companies in Hyderabad, and 10 companies in Trivandrum. Then I classified these
companies into different types as per their origin: business house subsidiaries, Indian
entrepreneurial firms, foreign-expatriate Indian firms, multinational companies (MNCs),
joint ventures between an Indian and a foreign firm, public sector firms, and others. For
Chennai and Hyderabad, I randomly selected five firms in each of these categories except
in the categories of joint ventures, public sector firms, and others, where the number of
firms was too low. Then I contacted these firms individually for scheduling an interview.
As not all the firms responded positively, I contacted more firms from the list. For firms
in Trivandrum, as the number of firms in the NASSCOM list was very small, I collected
the list of firms registered with the state government owned Technopark and interviewed
a total of 10 firms using both the lists.
Though the sample of firms selected using the technique described above is not a
fully random sample, I believe this is still a representative sample of the firms in the three
cities and is the best sample that could be obtained given the constraints of time and the
unwillingness of several firms contacted to share information. I believe that the results
based on data obtained from these firms can be generalized to the software industry in
these cities. Though not all firms in these cities are members of NASSCOM, they
represent over 95% of the revenues in the industry (NASSCOM, 2006a, p.8).
4 Evolution of the Software Industry in India - Role of National
Policies
The software industry in India has achieved remarkable success during the last
two decades, especially since the 1990s. The total exports from this industry, consisting
mainly of computer software and services, have grown from a mere US$ 139.4 million in
1990 to US$ 23.7 billion in 2005, including the IT enabled services (ESC, 2006). The
industry has sustained annual growth rates of around 30-40% for well over a decade
(Arora & Gambardella, 2004). Figure 4.1 shows the remarkable growth of this industry in
India since the 1980s. During the same period, the number of firms in the industry grew
from 21 in 1980 to 3,170 in 2004 (Dossani, 2005). In this chapter, I discuss the policy
initiatives by the central government in India that have contributed to the evolution of this
industry in the country.
I---- All India Exports (including ITES) -w- Total (Domestic+Exports)
Figure 4.1: Growth of the software industry in India










4.1 Policy Initiatives by the Central Government
Central government policies towards this industry in India have evolved
continuously since 1970 when it established a separate Department of Electronics (DOE)
and identified computer software as a thrust area for exports. A list of the major central
government policy initiatives that had a direct bearing on the software industry in the
country is presented in the Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Major Central Government Policy Initiatives in India for the Software Industry
Year Policy Initiative Details of the Policy
1970 Department of A separate department was set up to develop the hardware
Electronics and software industry in India
Established
1971 Electronics This body was entrusted with the task of formulating policies
Commission for the hardware and software industry
Established
1972 Software Export Permitted hardware imports with the condition that the
Scheme importing firm earned an equivalent amount of foreign
exchange within five years
1973 Foreign Exchange Had a major adverse impact on presence of MNCs in the
Regulation Act industry as it reduced the foreign equity ownership in Indian
(FERA) firms to 40%, IBM left the country in 1978 as a result
1976 Liberalization of Reduced the import duty on hardware from 100% to 40%;
Policies for export incentives for units in Export Processing Zones
Software Exports (EPZs); incentives for non-resident Indians who were allowed
to import hardware for exporting software with an equivalent
export obligation
1981 Software Export Import duties on hardware raised, but the firms were allowed
Policy, 1981 to use hardware for both domestic and export markets for
software, firms could also use imported 'loaned' hardware
1984 Computer Policy Software was recognized as an industry making them eligible
for bank financing; import duties on hardware and software
was reduced to 60%; access to foreign exchange was made
easier; however, income tax exemption on net export earlings
was reduced from 100% to 50%
1986 Software Policy 100% export oriented units (EOUs) could import hardware
duty free; foreign produced software could be sold in India
1987 AICTE Bill Passed Made the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE)
a statutory body to promote and control the development of
technical education in the country and maintain uniformity in
standards and grant approvals to technical institutions
1988 Software Established software parks with dedicated infrastructure
Technology Parks facilities and satellite communication links to encourage
of India (STPI) small and medium software exporters; granted tax exemption
Scheme for five years to 100% EOUs (later extended to ten years and
now continued till 2009); allowed import of hardware duty-
free and simplified the procedures for customs clearances;
software firms in their own premises could also get
themselves declared as STPs and avail of the benefits
1991 Economy-wide The currency was devalued and made partially convertible;
liberalization of telecom charges were reduced; import duties on application
industrial licensing, software were reduced to 20% and to 65% for system
trade, and foreign software, these were further reduced to 10% for both in 1995;
exchange policies import duties on computers reduced to 15% by 2000 from
55% in 1995 and to 0% for components such as storage
devices, microprocessors, etc.
2000 Relaxation on Rules on extent of equity ownership by foreign firms were
Equity Ownership further relaxed
by Foreign Firms
Source: (Heeks, 1996; Kumar & Joseph, 2004)
From the Table 4.1, three clear phases can be identified in the evolution of the
national policy framework for this industry. The first phase during 1960s and 1970s was
characterized by the goal of achieving self-reliance and import substitution in the
electronics industry. Hence, this phase was marked by very high import duties on
hardware and software (Dossani, 2005; Heeks, 1996). The first clear break in policy came
in 1984 when the central government announced a new computer policy which reduced
the duties substantially and granted a number of other concessions to the industry
(Dossani, 2005). The third phase in evolution of the policy framework started in 1991
when the central government embarked upon wide ranging reforms in trade and foreign
exchange policies, relaxed the industrial licensing system, and eased the restrictions on
the entry of foreign firms. I discuss below these phases in the evolution of the central
government policy in detail and discuss how they affected the development of the
software industry in the country.
4.2 Origins of the Industry - The Early Phase (1960s till 1984)
The origins of this industry in India can be traced to the late 1960s when the
country's first major IT company, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), was set up in 1968
in Bombay by the country's well known diversified business group, the Tatas. It was
among the first firms to export software beginning in 1974 (Heeks, 1996). During the
1970s, a number of other companies started operations. Most notable among them were
Datamatics in 1975 in Bombay, CMC Limited in 1976 in Delhi, PSI data Systems in
1976 in Bangalore, and Tata Burroughs Limited in 1978 in Bombay. The industry during
this period was mainly based in Bombay and exports consisted of supplying programmers
to firms located overseas (Dossani, 2005). By 1980, there were 21 firms in India with
total exports of US$ 4m with another $4m of domestic sales (Heeks, 1996, p.72).
The government policies during 1960s and 1970s were marked by very high
import tariffs on hardware and software and there were strict controls on transactions in
foreign exchange. The government policies also favored state owned enterprises and
discouraged private entrepreneurs in software.
How did government policies affect the development of the industry during this
period? Some researchers have argued that the software industry during this period
benefited from an enlightened "hands off' policy of the central government (Arora &
Athreye, 2002). However, other researchers have argued that the extreme protectionist
policies of the government during this period hurt the industry as it prevented
competition due to high entry barriers and stifled innovation (Dossani, 2005; Saxenian,
2002). This seems to be true as the main exports during this period consisted not of any
software developed within the country but on-site services by sending programmers
abroad (Dossani, 2005; Lateef, 1997). The high entry barriers also permitted the large
domestic firms from large diversified business groups to dominate the industry during
this period (Dossani, 2005).
Another distinct feature of the national policy framework during this time was the
attempt to link the production of software to the production of hardware within the
country, rather than on the basis of imported hardware. This was a specific goal of the
software policy in 1981 (Athreye, 2005b). This policy raised duties on import of
hardware to encourage production of domestic hardware. This slowed down the growth
in the production of software for exports. However, liberalization in policies favoring the
software industry started in the mid-1980s which led to the boom in this industry in the
subsequent years. I discuss this phase next.
4.3 The Steady Growth Phase - 1984 to 1991
The domestic policy framework took a dramatic turn during this period. The first
decisive break from the protectionist policies of the past came with the New Computer
Policy in 1984 when import duties on hardware were reduced from 100% to 60% for
those engaged in software development. Access to foreign exchange was made easier for
the software exporting firms and exports were promoted through satellite communication
links with computers abroad. The national computer network, Indonet, was also made
available for exports by state owned enterprises and small and medium firms.
The second major policy change came in 1986 with the announcement of the new
Software Policy. Import duties on hardware were abolished for software exporters though
export obligations for them were increased. This policy also delinked the development of
the software industry from the growth of the domestic hardware industry. This freed the
domestic software industry and allowed it to grow independently.
Another important policy initiative during this period was bringing uniformity in
standards of technical education in the country, especially in the private sector. The
central government passed the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) Act in
1987 making AICTE a statutory body, though it was established as an organization in
1945 itself. Its primary role was to promote the development of technical education in the
entire country and bring uniformity in standards across all institutions, especially those in
the private sector8.
This period also witnessed the single most important policy initiative taken to
promote the software industry in the country. This was the Software Technology parks of
India (STPI) scheme in 1988. This policy established Software Technology Parks (STPs)
in major urban centers of the country with dedicated infrastructure and satellite
telecommunication facilities for small and medium software exporters. These exporters
were granted five year tax holidays and access to office space, computer, and
communication facilities. The STPs also provided 'single window clearances' for
projects and provided import certification, software valuation certifications, and
marketing support. Firms having their own campuses could also declare their premises as
a STP and avail themselves of the incentives. This scheme dramatically lowered the cost
of operations for the software exporters by lowering the cost of telecommunication and
infrastructure facilities (Athreye, 2005b). The first STP was set up in Pune in 1990 and
during the same year, two more parks came up in Bangalore and Bhubaneshwar (Bajpai
8 Source: http://www.aicte.ernet.in/AboutAICTE.htm (accessed in May 2007)
& Shastri, 1998). STPs were subsequently set up in other major centers of the country
such as New Delhi, Trivandrum, Hyderabad and Chennai.
The policy initiatives noted above had major impacts on the structure of the
industry in the country during this period. Lower hardware costs and freeing of the
software development activity encouraged fresh entry and consequently the number of
firms increased from only 35 in 1984 to over 700 in 1990 and exports increased from US
$ 25.3m to 105.4m during the same period. Majority of these firms were small and
medium enterprises (Dossani, 2005).
This period also saw another important development. This was the entry of MNCs
in India to set up fully owned subsidiaries to develop software for their global operations.
Citibank established a fully owned and export oriented subsidiary for offshore software
development in Bombay in 1985. Subsequently Texas Instruments set up its own
subsidiary in Bangalore in 1986. These fully owned subsidiaries were allowed to be set
up by the government as special cases despite the fact that the rules existing then did not
permit them. This shows that a definite shift was taking place in the mind-set of the
bureaucracy towards liberalization even as early as mid-1980s.
The main reason for the MNCs coming to India during this time despite the
considerable restrictions on foreign investments was to take advantage of the
comparatively much lower cost of Indian software engineers (Athreye, 2005b). Texas
Instruments became the fifth largest software exporter from the country in 1990. Three
other MNCs also figured among the top eight software exporters during 1990. These
were Citibank, DEIL, and Mahindra-British Telecom. However, the other major software
exporting firms during this period were all Indian.
Another major development that took place during this time was the founding of
the National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) in 1988.
Starting with only 38 members, this body played a major role in advocacy with the
central government to further liberalize the economic policies towards the software
industry (Nidumolu & Goodman, 1993). NASSCOM has subsequently grown to have
over 1200 members as on January 2007 covering about 95% of the total revenues of the
industry (NASSCOM, 2007a). It has played a very important role in advising both central
and regional governments on policies for the software industry during the 1990s and
later.
4.4 The Explosive Growth Phase - Post 1991
The central government embarked upon major policy reforms in almost all areas
of economic activity in 1991. These included devaluation of the rupee and making it
partially convertible, reduction in import duties on hardware, abolition of tax on foreign
exchange for travel abroad, and reduction in telecommunication charges. Export
obligations on software technology parks were removed and software exports were
exempted from income tax. Import duties on software were also lowered to 65% on
system software and 20% on application software in 1994. These were further lowered to
10% for both categories in 1995. FDI norms were liberalized and 100% equity ownership
for foreign firms was allowed.
The above initiatives substantially lowered the cost of operations for software
firms and lowered the entry barriers. Consequently the number of firms increased from
700 in 1990 to 6,500 in 2005 (ESC, 2006). Exports during the same period grew from US
9 Source: author's interviews with government officials and firms in Chennai, Hyderabad, and Trivandrum.
$139.4m to 16,941.5m (excluding the IT enabled services exports). Entry of foreign firms
during this period increased the technological sophistication of the software development
work done within the country and also increased competition for specialized labor for
high-end software development (Athreye, 2005b).
The abolition of licensing and removal of incentives for location of investments in
backward areas as a result of reforms created a level playing field for all regions within
the country for attracting investments. Before 1991, licenses were needed for most
investments and it took innumerable trips to New Delhi and upto two years to get a
license. After the reforms, licenses were not needed for most industrial investments and
decision making became much quicker (Borrell, 2000).
Abolition of central government controls on industrial activity also provided the
states with an incentive to create the necessary infrastructure and improve the business
climate within their own regions to attract investments. It was in this overall policy
environment that the southern states surged ahead in attracting investments in hi-tech
industries, particularly software. During this period, three southern states, namely,
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh developed as the most important regions for
software production and exports. The total share of these three states in software exports
from the entire country rose from 9% in 1993-94 to 61.6% in 2005-06 (ESC, 2006).
Kerala lagged behind its more illustrious neighbors but has achieved significant success
after 2001 in attracting software firms. Though Karnataka with its Bangalore cluster had
emerged as the leading center for software exports by the mid 1990s displacing
Maharashtra (with its Bombay cluster), it was the rise of Tamil Nadu with is Chennai
cluster, and Andhra Pradesh with its Hyderabad cluster, and subsequently Kerala with its
Trivandrum and Kochi clusters that was the most important development during this
period. In the next chapter, I examine the determinants of the inter-state variation in
software exports from India using panel data from 1990 onwards. Then in the following
chapters, I explore how these three states succeeded in establishing themselves as the
leading centers for this industry during a relatively short span of less than fifteen years.
5 Determinants of Regional Variation in Software Exports from India
How can we explain the regional variation in the growth of the software industry
in India? As noted before, researchers have attributed the growth of the industry in India
principally to the availability of abundant skilled labor in the country. In this chapter, I
analyze the determinants of growth of this industry in various states in India. First, I build
a multivariate time-series regression model to analyze the factors that may be associated
with the growth in software exports from the entire country as a whole. Then, using panel
data on software exports from 14 major states in India, I build a multivariate time-series
regression model to examine the main factors that are associated with the growth of this
industry in the different states in the country. I use the data on software exports as exports
constitute nearly 80% of the total software industry in the country and reliable data at the
state level are available. The time period that I take for analysis is from 1990 to 2003 as
this represents the relevant period during which the industry witnessed rapid growth in
the country. 2003 is the latest year for which reliable data at state level on different
indicators are available.
5.1 Analysis of Growth in Software Exports from India
Before we analyze the regional variation in software exports, it is useful to
examine the factors that are associated with the growth in total software exports from the
entire country. In particular, it is useful to analyze whether availability of skilled labor in
the country has played a role in the growth of the industry. The basic model that I analyze
here is as follows;
AYt = po+ PIAXit + 2 AX 2 t + .... + Et
The dependent variable in this case is the annual change in total software exports
from the country in various years. The main explanatory variable is the change in the
stock of skilled labor in the country. As the main skilled labor employed by the industry
consists of engineering graduates (Arora et al., 2001), I use the total number of
engineering graduates passing out of all the technical institutions in the country as the
main explanatory variable. These graduates are not only from computer science and
electrical and electronics engineering disciplines but also from other engineering
disciplines involving four years of undergraduate education. Software firms that employ
engineers from other disciplines often provide them with short duration specialized
training in programming and software tools which make them employable in the industry
(Arora & Bagde, 2006). The other explanatory variables that may be associated with the
growth in software exports from the country include growth in the production of the
secondary and the tertiary sectors of the economy. I use growth in the per capita income
in the country as another control variable.
The data on the software exports from India, the total number of engineering
graduates passing out every year, the production in the secondary and the tertiary sectors
in the economy, and the per capita incomes in the country in each year during 1990 to
2003 are given in the Table 12.1 in the Appendix A. For the model specified above, I use
the change in the annual software exports from the country as the dependent variable and
the lagged number of engineering graduates every year as the independent variable. I use
the one year lagged values of the annual changes in the other variables as the other
control factors. The number of fresh engineering graduates every year represents the
change in the stock of human capital in the industry. I use the one-year lagged values of
the number of engineering graduates as change in the number of engineers may lead to
changes in software exports only after a year. A simple time-series regression with the
above model gave the results as shown in the Table 5.1. The DW statistic shows that
serial correlation is not a serious problem in this specification. However, correcting for
serial correlation using the Prais-Winston method and specifying the Cochran-Orcutt
option gives the results shown in the column 3 of the table.
Table 5.1Association between Software Exports and Availability of Skilled Labor in India (1990-
2003)
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable: Annual Dependent Variable: Annual
change in the Software change in the Software
Exports (Rs. Million) Exports (Rs. Million)
Lagged number of fresh engineering 0.833* 0.391
graduates (0.1975) (0.379)
Lagged annual change in per capita 13.99 -20.374
income (22.40) (23.545)
Lagged annual change in secondary -0.0389 -0.077
sector production in the country (0.055) (0.071)
Lagged annual change in services 0.0126 0.0181
sector production in the country (0.0128) (0.0142)
Constant -31997.85 14885.95
(14447.09) (36003.13)
Adj.- R2 0.677 0.313
F-statistic 6.76** 2.14
Mean Variance Inflation Factor 1.39 1.39
(VIF)
Durbin-Watson Statistic (original) 1.94 1.94
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.27
(transformed)
No. of observations 12 12
Standard errors are in parentheses
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
Though the small number of observations and problems due to multi-collinearity
prevent us from using additional control variables in the above regression, the above
result is still useful in that it indicates a possibly significant association between the
annual change in software exports and the additional yearly stock of skilled labor
available in the country, though correcting for serial correlation shows that there is no
significant association between the two variables. We can analyze this association more
closely by examining the inter-state variation in the growth of the industry as that would
give us more observations to yield more robust results. I do this analysis in the next
section.
5.2 Analysis of Regional Variation in Software Exports
We can analyze the regional variation in software exports from different states
within the country using a similar time-series model with the changes in the stock of
skilled labor as the main explanatory variable. The main assumption here is that the
skilled labor is relatively immobile across states. Researchers have noted that the
mobility of skilled labor is in fact relatively low across various states in India (Arora &
Bagde, 2006). As I discuss in a subsequent section below, the relatively small
measurement error due to limited mobility of skilled labor can be addressed by using an
instrumental variable.
Before analyzing the times-series data, it is useful to examine whether the initial
conditions in different states at the start of reforms are associated with the growth in
software exports at a later period. The initial conditions that may affect the subsequent
growth of the industry in a state include the availability of skilled labor in the state at the
start of reforms, literacy rate (which may indicate the prevalence of knowledge of English
in the general population in different states), tele-density in different states indicating the
level of infrastructure, public sector R&D expenditures, population (to control for size
effects), etc. Using the difference in the level of software exports from each state during
2003 and 1992 as the dependent variable, the results of this regression are shown in the
Table 5.2 below. I use the values of explanatory variables as in 1991, thus lagging them
by a year compared to the initial year (1992) for calculating change in software exports.
Table 5.2 Association between Growth in Software Exports during 1992-2003 and Initial Conditions
in 1991 in Various States in India
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable: Change in Software
Exports (2003-1992) (Rs. Million)
Number of fresh engineering graduates in 1991 5 . 880 *
(1.196)
Tele-density in 1991 3064. 868**
(1200.876)
Public R&D Expenditure in 1996' 3 . 975 *
(1.081)
Literacy rate in 1991 -154.798
(198.66)







No. of observations 14
Standard errors are in parentheses
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
+ In the absence of reliable state-wise data for 1991, I use the data for 1996. As the number of public R&D
units remained almost the same between 1991 and 1996, there may not be significant relative changes in
the inter-state variation during this period.
As the results above show, availability of engineering graduates, the public sector
R&D expenditures, and tele-density during 1991 are significantly positively associated
with the increase in software exports between 2003 and 1992. Population during 1991 has
a negative association. Significantly initial literacy rate does not show any association
with the growth of software exports. These results underscore the fact that the states with
relatively better initial conditions, such as large availability of skilled labor, good
infrastructure, and higher public R&D spending performed better in attracting this
industry. Presence of public sector R&D institutions seem to have influenced the growth
of this industry, possibly by generating initial local demand for software and supplying
skilled and experienced professionals to the industry. Researchers have noted that the
presence of a number of higher public academic and R&D institutions in Bangalore
created a trained labor force and spawned a number of software firms. For example,
Wipro Technologies, the third largest leading software firm in India, was founded by a
group of alumni of Indian Institute of Science (IIS) at Bangalore, a premier research
institute in India (Dossani, 2005). It is relevant to note here that all these higher level
academic and R&D institutes in India were established and funded by the central
government.
Analysis of Regional Variation in Software Exports using Panel Data
Though the above analysis shows that initial conditions in different states at the
start of reforms might have played an important role in the subsequent success of some
states in developing this industry, it is helpful to examine whether these factors continued
to be important in explaining the growth of the industry in various states in the country
during the post-reforms period. To examine this, I use a time-series regression model
with the availability of skilled labor in various states as the key explanatory variable. This
model can be specified as follows (Arora & Bagde, 2006):
AYit = ai + yt + p1AXut + p2 AX 2 it + .. . .+ Fit, i= 1,....N
The dependent variable in the above model is the annual change in the software
exports from different states within the country. The main independent variable is the
change in the stock of graduate engineers in each state. The above specification includes
a state fixed effect represented by 'ai' and a time or year fixed effect represented by 'yt'.
Using state fixed effects, we can control for omitted variables that vary across states but
are constant over time. Using the time or year fixed effects, we can control for omitted
variables that vary over time but are constant between cases. If these effects are
significant, they may indicate the presence of omitted variables that are not considered in
the model. These omitted variables may include factors such as policies of the state, etc.
I use the annual changes in per capita income, and secondary and tertiary sectors of the
economy as the additional explanatory variables. Growth in the secondary and the tertiary
sectors of the economy may lead to higher demand for software and thus may attract
software firms to the state. It is relevant to point out here that I do not use the public
sector R&D expenditures as an explanatory variable as reliable state-wise time-series
data are not available and the available data show that there may not have been
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significant changes in the relative inter-state variation in these expenditures'
Though India consists of 28 states in total, there are only 14 major states where
this industry has a significant presence (Arora & Bagde, 2006). These states are
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh,
West Bengal, Orissa, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Punjab, and Rajasthan. These 14
states accounted for 83.5% of the country's population in 2003 and their combined share
in the country's net domestic product was 79.2% in 2001 (Arora & Bagde, 2006). In the
model specification above, I use only these 14 states for analysis. The data for these 14
states on the variables mentioned above are given in the Tables 12.2 to 12.7 in the
Appendix A.
The results of the above time-series analysis are presented in the Table 5.3 below.
The third and the fourth columns show the regression results with both state and year
fixed effects. The fourth column shows the results of regression with the lagged values of
teledensity in different states included as an additional explanatory variable. I show these
results separately as reliable state-wise time-series data for teledensity are available only
for a limited number of years. As we can see from the results, the coefficient on
availability of skilled labor is positive as expected and highly significant. As the results in
10 Source: www.indiastat.com (accessed in May 2007)
the third column (with both state and year fixed effects) show, an increase in the number
of engineering graduates in the state by 1 is associated with an increase of Rs. 426,000 in
software exports (at 1993-94 prices). At current prices, this would be roughly equivalent
to around US$ 20,000. This is roughly consistent with the average revenue per employee
in the industry (Athreye, 2005a).
As the results in this table show, annual growth in the services sector of the
economy also seems to be positively associated with growth in software exports from the
state. Annual changes in the secondary sector of the state's economy and the population
of the state are negatively associated with the growth in software exports from the state.
Teledensity in different states is not significantly associated with growth in software
exports when we consider panel data, though these results are based on data for a limited
number of years only. It is important to note here that the state fixed effects are
significant in all the three specifications, though the time effects are insignificant. The
relatively low value of R2 (ranging from 0.23 to 0.33) also possibly indicates the presence
of significant omitted variables. As noted earlier, these omitted variables may include
other factors that may be related to the growth of the software exports, such as state
policies.
Table 5.3 Regional Variation in Software Exports from Different States in India (1990-2003)
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Annual change in the Annual change in the Annual change in the
Software Exports (Rs. Software Exports (Rs. Software Exports
Million) Million) (Rs. Million)
Lagged number of fresh 0 . 50 3* 0 . 426* 0.469***
engineering graduates in (0.132) (0.158) (0.245)
the state
Lagged annual change in 0.044 0.271 -0.358
percapitaincomeofthe (0.512) (0.534) (0.966)
state
Lagged annual change in -0.0505** -. 059** -0. 085**
secondary sector (0.0234) (0.025) (0.036)
production in the state
Lagged annual change in 0 . 0737* 0.046*** 0.079
services sector production (0.0268) (0.028) (0.054)
in the state
Lagged annual change in -2.585*** -2 . 604*** -2.696
population in the state (1.332) (1.404) (2.181)
Lagged teledensity in the Not included Not included -20 .44
state (264.926)
Constant 1167.505 874.944 724.243
(1580.209) (1740.16) (2608.262)
R2 Within: 0.239 Within: 0.30 Within: 0.257
Between: 0.403 Between: 0.337 Between: 0.330
Overall: 0.256 Overall: 0.276 Overall: 0.272
F-statistic 9.39* 3.70* 2.08**
No. of observations 168 168 98
State Fixed Effects Yes* Yes* Yes*
Year Fixed Effects No Yes (year dummies are Yes (year dummies
not significant) are not significant)
Standard errors are in parentheses
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 10%
Outliers in the Regression Specification
It is possible that there are some high-performing states that are outliers in the
above regression specifications. Outliers are those states that show unusually high values
on the dependent variable given the values on the explanatory variables. Statistically, we
can identify these outlying observations by their relatively high values of residuals.
Using standardized residuals from the specification with both state and year fixed
effects (i.e., with both state and time dummies included), I use a threshold absolute value
of 2.0 of standardized residual in an observation to identify it as an outlier. Summing up
the standardized residuals with an absolute value of 2.0 or above, we find that there are
four states that are outliers in this data set. These states are: Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh,
Delhi, and Tamil Nadu. While Karnataka has six values above 2.0 with a total score of
17.5, Delhi has three values of 2.0 or above with a total score of 8.6, Uttar Pradesh has
two values above 2.0 for a total score of 6.1 and Tamil Nadu has one value at 2.6. None
of the other states is a significant outlier. Significantly, Andhra Pradesh is not an outlier.
To estimate the impact of these outliers on the sign and significance of the
coefficients, we can run the above regressions again by omitting these outlier states. The
regression results, with the outlier states omitted, are shown in the Table 5.4 below. As
we can see, the sign and the significance of the coefficients are unchanged for most of the
variables, though the magnitudes of the coefficients have changed to some extent. The
standard errors are smaller and R2's are higher. The main explanatory variable,
availability of skilled labor, remains positive and highly significant.
Table 5.4 Regional Variation in Software Exports from Different States in India (1990-2003)
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable: Annual Dependent Variable:
change in the Software Annual change in the
Exports (Rs. Million) Software Exports (Rs.
Million)
Lagged number of fresh 0.458* 0.461*
engineering graduates in the state (0 . 084) (0. 096)
Lagged annual change in per 0 .044 0 .366
capita income of the state (0.315) (0.334)
Lagged annual change in -0. 025** - . 027***
secondary sector production in the (0 . 013) (0. 013)
state
Lagged annual change in services 0 . 032* 0 . 019
sector production in the state (0.014) (0.014)
Lagged annual change in -1. 691* -1.526***
population in the state (0.837) (0.842)
Lagged teledensity in the state Not included Not included
Constant 352.285 191.818
(885.555) (946.315)
R2  Within: 0.426 Within: 0.516
Between: 0.700 Between: 0.698
Overall: 0.492 Overall: 0.546
F-statistic 15.56* 6.26*
No. of observations 120 168
State Fixed Effects Yes* Yes*
Year Fixed Effects No Yes (year dummies are not
I_ significant)
Standard errors are in parentheses
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 10%
Endogeneity in the Model Specipcation
Though the results above underscore the importance of availability of skilled
labor in the state in the growth of its software exports, there is a possibility that the
relationship between availability of skilled labor and the growth in the software exports is
endogenous. That is, the production of skilled labor in a state may be influenced by the
expectation of future growth in software exports from that state. Also, as noted before,
there may be a small measurement error due to limited mobility of skilled labor across
various states. To take into account both these possibilities, I use a two-stage least
squares model using an instrumental variable. The choice of a suitable instrument is
important here as a weak instrument may affect the robustness of the results. I use the
plan expenditure by the state on primary education as an instrument as this variable may
be influencing the availability of students for enrolment in technical education after a gap
of seven years after they complete their five years of primary education. As engineering
education takes four years to complete, I use the plan expenditure by the state on primary
education eleven years ago as the instrument. This variable is unlikely to be related to the
growth in software exports from the state as this expenditure was incurred during the late
1970s and 1980s when software exports from the country were very small. The data on
plan expenditures by various states in the country is given in the Table 12.8 in the
Appendix A. Plan expenditure on primary education represents the total expenditure on
creating new primary schools or expanding the existing ones through addition of new
classes, etc.
The results of the two-stage regression using the above instrumental variable are
shown in the Table 5.5 below. Please note that in this specification, I include all the 14
states, including the four outliers identified above. As the results show, availability of
skilled labor is highly significant in the first regression (presented in the second column)
when we consider only the state fixed-effects. However, this variable becomes
insignificant when we consider the time fixed-effects (results presented in the third
column). However, as the time dummies are not significant on the whole, we may
conclude that the results with only the state fixed-effects considered are more significant.
Thus, we may conclude that the availability of skilled labor in a state is significantly
associated with the growth in its software exports.
Table 5.5 Determinants of Regional Variation in Software Exports from Different States in India
(1990-2003)
Explanatory Variable Two-stage LS Two-stage LS
Dependent Variable: Annual Dependent Variable: Annual
change in the Software change in the Software
Exports (Rs. Million) Exports (Rs. Million)
Lagged number of fresh 1.027* 1.822
engineering graduates in the (0.399) (4.783)
state
Lagged annual change in per 0.260 0.392
capita income of the state (0.560) (0.786)
Lagged annual change in -0.042*** -. 043
secondary sector production in (0 . 025) (0 . 063)
the state
Lagged annual change in 0.024 -0.026
services sector production in the (0 . 045) (0 . 249)
state
Lagged annual change in -1.519 -1.013
population in the state (1.594) (5.723)
Constant -1652.597 -4494.054
(2608.536) (18511.94)
R2  Within: 0.159 Within: Not reported
Between: 0.569 Between: 0.593
Overall: 0.301 Overall: 0.289
Wald Chi 2  87.13* 69.86*
No. of observations 168 168
State Fixed Effects Yes* Yes*
Year Fixed Effects No Yes (year dummies are not
significant)
Standard errors are in parentheses
* Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 10%
Importance of Skilled Labor in the Growth of the Industry
Arora and Bagde (2006) have found similar results on the positive association of
availability of skilled labor in various states in the country with the growth in software
exports from those states. Several other researchers have also noted the importance of
abundant availability of skilled labor in the country in the rapid growth of the software
industry (Arora et al., 2001; Arora & Bagde, 2006; Dossani, 2005). As the results in the
preceding sections show, large variation in the availability of skilled labor across the
different states in the country has clearly played a role in the differential growth of this
industry across the different states. The four leading states in software exports in the
country, namely, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh, together
accounted for 70% of the total outturn of fresh engineering graduates in the country in
2003 (Table 12.3 in Appendix A). The share of these four states was 67.9% in 1990. The
share of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh increased from 23.3% in 1990 to 37.5% in
2003. Kerala's share fell slightly from 5.5% in 1990 to 3.1% in 2003.
It is relevant to mention here that a vast majority of the engineering graduates in
these states come from private self-financed institutions (Arora and Bagde 2006). While
the central government funded Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and the central and
state government supported Indian Institutes of Information Technology (IIITs) produce
highly skilled technical professionals who fill the top level research and development and
leadership positions within the industry, bulk of the skilled labor comes from these
privately owned technical institutions. The role of the state governments has been mostly
limited to allowing the private sector to open new technical institutions with control on
the quality of infrastructure and education being imparted by the All India Council of
Technical Education (AICTE). The leading states in this industry had all allowed the
private sector to open engineering colleges much earlier than the other states. For
example, Karnataka had allowed private engineering colleges in 1957, Maharashtra in
1983, Tamil Nadu in 1984, and Andhra Pradesh in 1977 (Arora and Bagde 2006). Kerala
allowed private engineering colleges only in 1992.
Role of IITs and Second Tier Institutions
It is also relevant to emphasize here the distinct roles played by the skilled labor
from the top tier institutions in the country such as the IITs and those from the large
number of private self-financed institutions in these states. As noted before, the top level
leadership and research and development positions in the industry are filled by the
graduates from the IITs. They also form the bulk of the highly skilled immigrants in the
US and other developed countries occupying senior positions in the firms there. It is
mostly these highly placed professionals who have taken the lead in establishing firms
and forging business linkages in India (Saxenian, 2004). These professionals started
coming to the US in the mid 1960s as the IlTs were established in the late 1950s and
early 1960s in different regions of the country. It is also relevant to mention that the
entire southern region (consisting of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and
Kerala) has only one IIT. Hence, in the early decades of migration, the proportion of
emigrating professionals with native linkages from these states is unlikely to be higher
than in the other states in the country. This suggests that the states that have benefited
from these cross-national linkages with expatriates might have taken specific policy
initiatives to attract them back to their native states. I explore these linkages in greater
detail in the three case studies presented in the subsequent chapters.
Type of Skilled Labor in Various States
It is also relevant to note here that in the southern states, majority of the intake in
the private AICTE approved technical institutions are in computer science or related
fields. These disciplines are directly relevant for the IT industry, though firms have been
employing engineers from other disciplines too and imparting them in-house training in
programming skills (Arora & Bagde, 2006). Table 5.6 shows the total and the computer
science related intake in the AICTE approved institutions in the 14 major states in India
in 2003. Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh had the highest proportion of students in IT
related disciplines in 2003.
Table 5.6: Total Intake and Percentage in IT Related Disciplines in Various States in India in
2003
State Total Intake IT related Percentage in IT
disciplines* Related
Disciplines
Karnataka 53,891 18,054 33.5%
Tamil Nadu 101,821 58,455 57.4%
Maharashtra 66,029 28,980 43.9%
Andhra Pradesh 92,397 45,400 49.1%
Delhi 11,108 2,260 20.3%
Haryana 13,954 6,835 49.0%
Uttar Pradesh 42,625 16,394 38.5%
West Bengal 17,333 6,520 37.6%
Orissa 15,624 6,260 40.1%
Kerala 23,071 8,850 38.4%
Madhya Pradesh 23,955 7,320 30.6%
Gujarat 14,911 4,308 28.9%
Punjab 15,276 5,810 38.0%
Rajasthan 14,665 5,668 38.6%
* These disciplines consist of Computer Science and Engineering, Information Technology,
and Electronics and Communication Engineering
Source: www.indiastat.com
Conclusion
The analysis above shows that the availability of skilled labor for the industry has
played an important role in the regional growth of the industry in the country. It is
relevant to mention here that there could be a number of other time-variant factors that
may affect the location of firms and growth of the industry in the state. The likely
influence of these factors is also indicated by the highly significant state fixed effects in
the quantitative analysis presented above. These factors may include availability of
general and industry-specific infrastructure, government policies for incentives and
subsidies, R&D, cross-national linkages with the skilled immigrants abroad, production
and marketing linkages with international markets, role of entrepreneurial leadership by
the state, etc. To understand the importance of these factors in the regional growth of this
industry, I conducted detailed case studies of three southern states using data from
interviews with firms and government agencies. I discuss these case studies in detail in
the following chapters.
6 Development of the Software Industry in Tamil Nadu - Getting the
Basics Right - Focus on Factor Conditions
The software industry has grown remarkably during the last 13 years in Tamil
Nadu. The total value of software and services exports from the state grew from a mere
US $0.6m in 1993 to US $3,188.4m during 2005, showing average annual growth rate of
close to 100%. However, more remarkable has been its rising share in the total software
and services exports from India. This share has grown from 0.2% in 1993 to 13.4% in
2005. Figure 5.1 presents the growth in exports from this industry in Tamil Nadu. During
the same period, the number of software exporting firms in the state grew from only 10 in
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Software Exports from Tamil Nadu -+- Share of TN in All India SW Exports (including ITES)
Figure 6.1 Software and services exports from Tamil Nadu during 1993 to 2005. The years relate to the
financial year in India, which is from April 1 to March 31.
Source: (ESC, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006).
6.1 Development of the Software Industry in Tamil Nadu
The software industry in Tamil Nadu started long after it had taken roots in the
1970s in Bombay. In fact, among the member firms of NASSCOM as on January 2007,
only six software companies were founded in the state before 1990 (NASSCOM, 2007b).
All these companies were established by the local promoters. Interviews with the firms
indicate that they mainly catered to the software operations and maintenance needs of the
local manufacturing firms and businesses during this period. They were small and
relatively insignificant players in software exports. None of these companies were among
the top 20 software exporters from the country in 1990.
The early 1990s witnessed a number of software firms starting their operations in
Chennai. However, still the growth in the industry remained limited till 1995. The
number of software exporting firms had increased to only 10 by 1993 and 34 by 1995
(ELCOT, 2006). The volume of software and services exports grew to US $11.0 m in
1995 from US$ 0.6m in 1993".
Though the growth in the industry remained limited up to the mid 1990s, the
period from 1991 to 1995 saw an important development in the form of multinational
companies (MNCs) starting operations in the state. Two MNCs started operations in
Chennai during this period. However, the growth in the industry during this period within
the state was led by the entrepreneurial firms started by Indian entrepreneurs. Interviews
with the firms in Chennai indicate that these entrepreneurs hailed originally from within
the state. In fact, Indian entrepreneurial firms have led the growth in the industry even
during subsequent periods as the data in Table 6.1 shows, even though MNCs and firms
11 http://www.chennai.stpi.in/perform export.htm (accessed in January 2007)
run by foreign-expatriate Indians entered the state in a big way during 1996 to 2000. This
table shows the distribution of the type of firms that entered Chennai over the last two
decades and their present shares in total employment in the industry. The data covers 117
software and services firms in Chennai who are members of NASSCOM as on January 1,
2007.
Table 6.1 Distribution of the type of firms in Chennai by their establishment year
1991 1996 2001 % in Share in
Upto to to to Total Employment
Type of Firm 1990 1995 2000 2006 Total in 2006
Indian Business House
Subsidiaries 1 1 5 5 12 10.3% 6.5%
Indian Entrepreneurial
Firms 4 13 24 10 51 43.6% 46.6%
MNC 0 3 14 9 26 22.2% 21.6%
Foreign-Expatriate
Indian 1 4 13 7 25 21.4% 24.8%
Joint Ventures 0 0 1 2 3 2.6% 0.5%
Public Sector Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 6 21 57 33 117 100% 100%
Source: Author's calculations based on NASSCOM (2007b), company websites and author interviews.
Foreign-expatriate Indian firm refers to firms in Chennai that have been started by expatriate Indians or
subsidiaries of foreign firms in other countries founded by expatriate Indians in those countries.
Structure of the Firms at State and National Levels
Comparison of the type of the firms in Chennai with that of all the firms in the
country reveals some interesting differences between the structures of the industry at the
two levels. While business house subsidiaries played a relatively more important role at
the national level, their share in the industry within Tamil Nadu is comparatively low.
Also, foreign-expatriate Indian firms played a greater role in the development of the
industry within the state compared to their share at the national level. I present this
comparative analysis in the Table 6.2 below for all the firms in Chennai and for those
within the entire country that were members of NASSCOM during 2001.
Table 6.2: Comparison of the structure of the software industry in Chennai and all India
No. of Firms in 2001 % of Firms in 2001 Share in
Type of Firm Employment for All
Chennai All India Chennai All India India in 2001
Indian Business 8 87 9.0% 15.3% 26.9%
House Subsidiaries
Indian 42 251* 47.2% 44.2% 34.9%
Entrepreneurial
Firms
MNC 19 128 21.3% 22.5% 16.3%
Foreign-Expatriate 19 58 21.3% 10.2% 7.9%
Indian
Joint Ventures 1 44** 1.1% 7.7% 8%
Public Sector 0 0
Firms
Total 89 568
Source: Data for Chennai are based on author's calculations based on (NASSCOM, 2006b). Data for All
India are from Athreye (2005b).
* Includes data on entrepreneurial firms and entrepreneurs with prior IT experience.
** Also includes public sector firms
Leading Firms in the State
Analysis of the leading firms in the state reveals that the industry in the state is led
by foreign-expatriate Indian and Indian entrepreneurial firms. Among the top ten firms in
the state in terms of number of employees, only two are MNCs, while another two are
business house subsidiaries (Table 6.3). Nine of the ten firms are engaged mainly in
customized software development, software management, IT enabled services (ITES),
and business process outsourcing (BPO). Only one firm is involved in software products.
Most of the activities of these firms involve mainly generic software and programming
skills with relatively low intensity of R&D.
Table 6.3 Top Ten Leading Software and Services Firms in Chennai
Sl. Name of the Type of Firm Legal Year Total Main Areas of
No. Company Structure Estd. Employees Business
(2006)
1 Cognizant Indian Pvt. Ltd. 1994 17,050 Applied Custom
Technology Solutions Entrepreneurial Software
India Pvt. Ltd.
2 Sutherland Global Foreign- Pvt. Ltd. 2000 9,070 BPO
Services Expatriate Indian
3 Lason India Ltd MNC Public 1993 6,000 BPO
Ltd.
4 Polaris Software Lab Indian Public 1993 6,000 Software
Ltd Entrepreneurial Ltd. products and
solutions for
Financial sector
5 Covansys India Ltd Foreign- Public 1991 3,800 e-Business, IT
Expatriate Indian Ltd. Consulting
6 Scope International MNC Pvt. Ltd. 2000 3,557 BPO
Pvt Ltd
7 Allsec Technologies Indian Public 1999 3,000 IT Enabled-
Ltd Entrepreneurial Ltd. Services/BPO
8 HTC Global Services Foreign- Pvt. Ltd. 1990 2,370 Custom
(India) Pvt Ltd Expatriate Indian Software
Development
9 Ramco Systems Ltd Business House Public 1989 2,020 Enterprise
Subsidiary Ltd. Solutions and
Services
10 Accel Frontline Business House Pvt. Ltd. 1995 1,700 Enterprise
Subsidiary/Joint Solutions and
Venture Services, ITES
Source: NASSCOM (2006b), interviews by the author, and company websites (accessed in Jan. 2007)
6.2 Policy Initiatives by the State for the Development of the Industry
The state government had virtually no specific policy for the software industry till
the mid 1990s". It was only after 1995 that the government started thinking of the
software industry as an engine for economic development and employment generation in
the state. The state was not on the priority list of even the central government till 1995.
This is evident from the fact that the first Software Technology Park in the state under the
central government's STPI scheme started functioning in Chennai only in 1995, seven
years after it was launched and five years after the first three parks had come up at Pune,
Bangalore, and Bhubaneshwar. The first major policy initiative for this industry by the
state government came only in Nov. 1997 when the government announced its first IT
policy for the state. However, the software firms during this period could avail of the
12 A senior government official stated that the software as a separate industry did not enter the thinking of
the government until 1995.
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general incentives available for all the industries in the state, which included investment
and tax subsidies for mega and super mega projects involving an investment of US $15m
and US $1500m respectively.
Table 6.4 lists the major initiatives taken by the state government during the
1990s and the current decade for the development of the software industry in the state.
After 1995, the state's policies for this industry can be divided into two distinct phases.
The first phase was from 1995-2000 when the main focus was on creating the physical
infrastructure and improving the availability of skilled labor. Another important initiative
during this period was an effort by the state to understand the needs of the industry and
make them stakeholders in the decision-making process of the state concerning the
industry. This was done by involving representatives from the industry and the academia
into the policy making process of the state.
Towards the end of 1990s, the state had started focusing on attracting the large
multinational and national companies and on improving the marketing and production
linkages between the local firms and the global market. This was done through a number
of industry level incentives and initiatives. I discuss these initiatives in detail in the
subsequent sections.
One major feature of the state's policy was to focus more on industry wide
incentives and not on specific firm level incentives. The specific industry wide incentives
included creation of industry specific infrastructure, exemption from some state laws, and
increasing the availability of skilled labor. The specific firm level incentives, such as
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allotment of land and investment subsidies, were aimed at attracting the relatively large
firms. For example, allotment of land was offered to several large national firms'3 .
Table 6.4 Major Policy Initiatives by the State Government for Development of the IT Industry in
the state
Year Policy Initiative What the Policy Did
1992 Policy for Mega Projects Fiscal and tax concessions for mega projects with an investment of
over Rs. 500 million (US $15m); capital subsidy of 20% of fixed assets
subject to a maximum of Rs. 2 million, incentives for locating in
backward areas and for employing women
1992 Other existing incentives No Entry or Purchase Tax, unrestricted movement of capital equipment
1996 Policy for Super Mega Fiscal and tax concessions for mega projects involving an investment
Projects of over Rs. 5000 crores (US $1500m)
1997 Soft Loan to Small scale Initiated a scheme for granting soft loan to small scale and tiny
entrepreneurs entrepreneurs, including in IT industries
1997 Harvard University Government invited HIID to provide policy advice on wide-ranging
invited by the state state-level economic reforms.
1997 State's First IT policy First major policy initiative by the state: IT Parks to be set up at
Chennai and three other cities in association with the private sector;
private ITPs to have the same status as those by the government;
incentives such as exemption from stamp duty and registration charges;
single window clearances to all IT units; stand alone units outside the
govt./private parks also to get the same incentives; no locational
restrictions for setting up of software units; exemption from state
Pollution Control Act; a new venture capital fund; a new institute
(TANITEC) to be set up for specialized manpower and technology
upgradation for the industry; to create centers of excellence in
universities and fund research programs; training institutes for
hardware and software to be deemed as industries making them eligible
for bank finance and registration as SSI; computers to be introduced in
all schools; 50% relaxation in FSI for IT parks; ELCOT to be the nodal
government agency to promote IT industry
1998 State Level Task Force State Level Task Force for Information Technology Industry and a
Appointed Sub-Committee of the Information Technology Task Force were
created incorporating members from the government, industry and
academia; a new Dept. of IT was created
1999 Exemption from statutory IT units granted exemption from the Factories Act, 1948 and later also
Acts and allotment of land from the Shops and Establishments Act; allotment of land to private
firms through ELCOT;
2000 New Policy Initiatives An 'Action Plan' drawn up for both supply and demand side initiatives
for promotion of the IT industry based on report by Harvard university;
a new advisor to Chief Minister appointed
2000 Standards for Local Prescribed standards for Tamil software; created a Tamil Virtual
Language Software, University (TVU), funded by the Govt. and aimed at providing online
creation of a Tamil resources for Tamilians and others living worldwide for learning
Virtual University Tamil, its history, art, literature and culture.
13 The allotment of land by the state government was made to seven large IT companies. Six of them were
large national firms. Only one of them was an MNC.
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2000 Infrastructure Initiatives Private companies allowed to lay fiber optic cables along the highways
and roads in cities; TIDEL Park inaugurated
2001 Annual IT Conference to Annual "Connect" conference series started; organized by the state
promote the state and its government, industry associations, and firms, it aimed at promoting the
industry state and improving the linkages of the state's firms to the international
market
2002 New Infrastructure Announced the creation of an IT Corridor and Knowledge Industry
initiatives Township within the city, fulfilling a major need for additional
infrastructure for IT firms
2002 New IT Policy Continued focus on SMEs; encouraged participation in International!
National events to position Tamil Nadu as the Destination of Choice;
focus on e-Governance and taking IT to the rural areas; focus on
developing R&D.
2002 Policy to attract MNCs Steps to make the state attractive for large MNCs in the face of
competition from other states
2003 Subsidy for SMEs SMEs given subsidy for attending national and international IT
Exhibitions
2003 New communications Setting up of a state-wide area network to connect all government
infrastructure offices in the state including those in small towns
2005 Separate ITES Policy Separate ITES policy to make Tamil Nadu the Global ITES Capital; to
attract higher FDI and create large-scale employment
2005 State Apex Committee for A State Apex Committee and State e-Governance Group set up to
NeGAP Implement National e-Governance Action Plan (NeGAP)
2006 IT Parks in Smaller cities New IT Parks to come up in smaller cities in association with STPI
2006 A new specialized State and central governments to set up a new Indian Institute of
institute for IT education Information Technology, Design and Manufacturing in the state
proposed
2006 Separate Directorate for e- To introduce e-Governance in 12 Government Departments under the
Governance established National e-Governance Program
Source: Author's compilation based on published documents by the state government and interviews with
senior officials
6.2.1 The First Phase (1995-2000) - Focus on Infrastructure and Skilled Labor
During this period, the major thrust of the state's policy was on creating physical
and telecommunication infrastructure, simplifying the procedures for the IT firms to get
various clearances from state government agencies, and increasing the availability of
skilled and trained labor. I discuss these polices in detail below.
Industry Specific Infrastructure
State's first IT policy in 1997 aimed at creating new IT parks in Chennai and
three other smaller cities. It also encouraged private developers to develop IT parks by
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providing incentives like 50% more floor space index (FSI) and single window
clearances for such projects. The infrastructure initiatives resulted in creation of massive
infrastructure for the IT industry in the city. The state government promoted TIDEL park
with a built-up area of 1.3 million square feet was inaugurated in July 2000. However, the
major infrastructure creation came from the private sector in the state after 1997. It was
estimated that 143 IT parks with a built-up area of over 48 million sq. ft. were in various
stages of completion in the city as of September 2006 (ELCOT, 2006). The involvement
of private sector in creating such huge infrastructure happened mainly due to the
increased FSI allowed for these buildings and quicker permissions by the government
agencies.
Increasing the Availability of Skilled Labor
Another important initiative of the state during this period was to increase the
availability of skilled labor in the state that was required for a massive expansion of the
industry. This was done by allowing the private sector to open new engineering colleges
for imparting undergraduate technical education in computer science and other
engineering disciplines. The annual number of new engineering graduates in the state
increased from 6,660 in 1995 to 28,107 in 2003. As noted in the chapter five, the industry
employed not only graduates from computer science and related disciplines, but also
from other engineering disciplines as the firms were focused on mostly custom software
development for which only generic programming skills were sufficient. The firms often
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14provided in-house training to these graduates to make them suitable for employment
As the Senior Vice-President of a major foreign-expatriate firm in the city stated:
"...the quality of the engineering graduates in the state is very good.
However, the firm has to train the graduates. Some kind of pre-
certification system after the graduates leave the university would be
helpful..."
This view was echoed by several firms in the city.
Regulatory Reforms
Another major reform initiative by the government during this period was to make
the procedures for obtaining clearances much simpler for the IT firms. These policies
were aimed specifically at the IT industry and made their operational procedures much
easier. The specific policies included single window clearances, uninterrupted supply of
electricity, and exemption from several state laws such as Pollution Control Act, etc.
Subsequently, the IT firms were also granted exemption from some labor laws, such as
the Factories Act and the state Shops and Establishments Act. These exemptions virtually
eliminated the inspections and harassments by the junior level officials from the state
agencies and eliminated a major complaint by these firms' 5 .
1 Source: interviews with firms in the city.
15 This factor was emphasized in several interviews with the local IT firms. Liberalization by eliminating
the unnecessary provisions under the various Acts was an important factor in reducing the time it took to
start a firm in the state.
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Involvement of Outside Experts and Industry in Policy Making
The state government took another important step during this period to obtain
policy advice from outside experts on policy reforms needed to promote the IT sector.
This was done by involving the Harvard International Institute for Development (HIID)
in 1997 to conduct research and provide policy inputs to the government on economic
policy reforms. HIID conducted research and produced several policy papers to the
government. On the software industry, it advised the government to focus on creating
infrastructure, improving the availability of skilled labor, attracting multination
companies, and providing marketing assistance to the small and medium firms (Bajpai &
Sachs, 1999).
In another important initiative, the state also tried to involve the industry and the
academia into its policy making process. This was an attempt to utilize outside expertise
and sensitize its own bureaucracy to the needs of a new industry in which it had no
previous experience. This was done by creating a state level task force on IT in 1998 by
incorporating high level representatives from the industry (both local and national),
academia, and some senior government officials. Its primary role was to provide policy
inputs to the government on the needs of the IT industry. The government also created a
separate Department of Information Technology in 1998 to focus exclusively on the
industry and for better coordination between the industry and the government.
Incorporation of outsiders into the policy making process of the state did not produce any
resistance from the permanent bureaucracy of the state as these bodies were temporary
and only advisory. The ultimate decision making powers were still vested with the
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government. In 2000, the government also created a separate post of advisor to the
Chief Minister on IT. Involving outside experts in the policy-making process of the state
was an important departure from the traditional mode of governance earlier based on a
top-down approach and little interaction with the industry. In fact, earlier the government
discouraged deep interaction between the bureaucracy and the private industry due to fear
of corruption". In such an environment, the new initiatives of the government to
encourage deeper interaction with the industry for policy making were important signals
to the industry that the state was seriously interested in creating a business-friendly
environment.
6.2.2 The Second Phase (2001-2006) - Going Global
There were important changes in the state's strategy towards this industry during
the current decade. While the focus on creating and expanding infrastructure and
increasing skilled labor continued, the state adopted new policies during this period
aimed at attracting the large firms (both multinational and national) and forming linkages
between the local firms, multinationals, and the international market. This shift in the
state's strategy was due to two major reasons. First, there was a growing realization
within the state's bureaucracy and political leadership that the state was losing out on
investments by the big MNCs and this was hurting the growth in software exports from
the state. The share of the state in all India exports of software and services had declined
in 2002 and 2003 from its high in 2001 (Fig. 6.1). The second reason for this shift in the
16 In this aspect, this model differs significantly from what some other countries have followed in
developing their high technology industries. For example, Israel followed a policy of allowing outside
experts to join the government as decision makers (Breznitz, 2005).
17 Source: interviews with senior government officials.
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state's thinking was the success of the neighboring state of Andhra Pradesh in attracting
several big MNCs to Hyderabad'8.
Attracting Large Firms
The state turned its attention during this period towards attracting large
companies. It announced a specific policy in 2002 to make the state attractive for these
firms, especially the multinationals. The state's second IT policy in 2002 offered a
number of incentives to these firms depending on the size of the investment. It also
offered developed land to these firms. Developed land was allotted to seven companies in
2003 in the Siruseri IT Park in the city.
It is relevant to note here that though this policy aimed at attracting the large
firms, it did not aim exclusively at attracting the large MNCs alone. Though the state
announced a separate policy in 2002 to attract the MNCs, it did not make all out efforts
aimed exclusively at attracting them. Out of the seven firms that were allotted land in the
city, only one was a multinational. This was in sharp contrast to the policies of the
neighboring state of Andhra Pradesh, where the state focused much more on attracting
the large MNCs from the beginning itself. I discuss the policies of that state in more
detail in the next chapter.
18 Competition from Andhra Pradesh in attracting investments in the software industry was one of the main
reasons for the changes in the state's policy during this period. This was confirmed during interviews with
senior government officials in the state. As one senior government official stated: "the state had realized by
the end of 1990's that it was losing out to Andhra Pradesh in attracting large investments in the software
industry, especially from the multinationals. This was the main reason for announcing a specific policy in
2002 aimed at attracting large firms to the state".
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Facilitating Linkages with MNCs, and the International Markets
Another major policy initiative during this period involved efforts to create
linkages between the local firms, MNCs, and the international market. The government
started organizing an annual series of exhibitions called "Connect" in 2001 in association
with the industry associations and the local firms. These conferences were aimed at
projecting the state as an ideal destination for investments in the IT industry and to
provide a platform for the local firms to showcase their capabilities. Large MNCs, their
CEOs and other high ranking executives, and internationally known experts on the
development of the IT industry were invited to participate in these conferences. In
addition to these, the local firms, particularly the SMEs, were encouraged to participate in
national and international exhibitions to showcase their abilities. A specific policy
initiative in 2003 offered 30% subsidy in stall rents to the SM[Es with a turnover not
exceeding Rs. 100 million (approx. US$22 million) to participate in international and
national trade shows and exhibitions. The state government itself started participating in
national and international conferences to promote investments in the state by the large
firms, including both national and multinational firms. This also was one of the main
policy objectives announced in the state's second IT policy in 2002. In another policy
initiative, the state announced a separate policy for the IT Enabled Services (ITES)
industry in 2005, focusing again on attracting higher foreign direct investments (FDI).
Stimulating Local Demand through e-Government Projects
Another major initiative during this time was an effort by the state to introduce
massive computerization in its departments and agencies. All departments were asked to
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formulate action plans for e-governance. A new project was launched in 2003 to set up a
state-wide area network to connect all government offices, including those in small
towns, called Talukas. The new National e-Governance Action Plan announced by the
central government came in handy to secure additional funds from the central
government for computerization of several departments. A new State Apex Committee
was set up in 2005 to oversee this project and a new directorate for e-governance was
created in 2006. Though these initiatives influenced the demand conditions for the IT
industry within the state to some extent, their overall influence in attracting new firms
was limited as the firms were focused far more on the export market than the domestic
market.
6.3 Impact of the State's Policies on the Growth of the Software Industry
How did the policies of the state affect the growth of the industry? What were the
major factors that influenced the software firms to choose Chennai for locating their
units? Did the state help in obtaining finance, upgrading technology, improving linkages
with the international market, etc.? To help understand how exactly the state influenced
the development of this industry, I conducted in-depth interviews with 18 firms in
Chennai during November and December 2006. Seven of these firms were foreign-
expatriate Indian, seven were Indian entrepreneurial, and two each were multinational
and Indian business house subsidiaries. I discuss below the main conclusions from these
interviews.
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Major factors that influenced firms to locate in Chennai
Among the common factors for choosing Chennai that emerged from all the
interviews with firms were good availability of infrastructure and skilled labor, good
international air transportation links due to the presence of an international airport in the
city, competitive costs of living in the city, and supportive state government policies
towards the industry that reduced delays in obtaining clearances. However, while all the
firms said that the government policies were supportive, one multinational firm asked for
more concessions and exemptions from the government, especially on labor laws
concerning conferment of permanent status on workers and declaration of holidays.
For the non-MNC firms in the city, ethnic linkages of the main promoter(s) of the
firm within the state were the most important factor for choosing Chennai. This was true
of all the firms interviewed in the categories of Indian entrepreneurial, foreign-expatriate
Indian, and Indian business house subsidiaries. They said that they chose Chennai despite
its relatively higher costs compared to Hyderabad and Trivandrum because they wanted
to maintain their ethnic and cultural links with their native state and wanted to contribute
to the development of their state. As the Senior Manager of a prominent US-based
foreign-expatriate Indian firm in the city stated:
"The founder of the company that evolved into this firm is from Chennai.
This was the most important reason for locating the firm's operations here.
Second, availability of adequate skilled labor in the state (even during
1994 when the firm opened its center in Chennai)..."
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It is useful to examine the educational background of the promoters of the
foreign-expatriate Indian firms in Chennai. Out of the seven foreign-expatriate Indian
firms interviewed, promoters of five firms graduated from leading public universities of
the state (Anna university, Madras University, and Annamalai university) 9 . Four of them
went on to study and/or work in the US while one went to work in the Gulf. Promoters of
two firms are Indian Americans who hailed originally from the state. These expatriates
left the state in the 1970s and 1980s, i.e., much before the current boom in the industry.
The relevant point to note here is that the international linkages that have helped the
industry to grow in the state have been formed by expatriates from the top public
universities in the state and not by the graduates from the second level private technical
institutions in the state who form the vast majority of the labor force in the industry.
On support from the government, while most of the firms stated that the state
government policies were supportive of the industry, only two of them said that they had
actually availed of a firm level incentive from the state government. This incentive was
allotment of land to them in a state promoted IT park in the city. Interviews with a
government official confirmed that only seven firms had been allotted lands for building
their own campuses in government promoted IT parks in the city. Most of them were
large national IT firms, with only one MNC being allotted land there. These lands were
allotted at prevailing market rates with very little subsidy. This was in line with the state
government's focus on providing industry level incentives rather than firm specific
incentives.
19 Source: interviews with the firms and information from firm websites.
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Linkages with the State Owned and Privately Owned Local IT Firms
Exports were the most important source of revenue for all the firms interviewed.
Most of the firms interviewed said that they virtually had no linkages with the state
owned or local private IT firms. Only two firms stated that they had participated in
tenders floated by ELCOT for some e-governance projects of the state government.
Availability of Skilled Labor in the State
Availability of adequate skilled labor within the state was cited by all the firms as
a major factor for choosing the state for locating their units. However, four of them said
that the graduates passing out of the local technical institutions possessed only generic
skills in applications software and lacked the specialized skills for product development.
These firms are engaged in product development on behalf of their foreign clients. Lack
of labor with specialized skills in the state might be a constraint for growth in the higher-
end of the value chain in the industry.
Labor Relations in the State
Most of the firms said that the state was pro-active in ensuring a business-friendly
environment for the industry. The state has granted exemptions to the software firms
from several provisions of the labor laws that were deemed as not business-friendly.
However, one MNC firm interviewed wanted more exemptions under these laws from
maintaining forms and registers and also from provisions of conferment of permanent
status on workmen.
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Awareness among Civil Servants about the Needs of the IT Industry
Most of the firms interviewed said that awareness among government officials
about the needs of the industry had increased over the last decade and that they had made
increased efforts to support the industry in the state.
Involvement of the Firm in the Policy Making Process of the State/Central Government
Most of the firms interviewed said that they had no direct involvement in the
policy-making process of the state. However, they had periodic interactions among
themselves in forums like NASSCOM on how the government could support the
industry. NASSCOM was represented in the government bodies concerned with policy
making for the industry and this arrangement had served the industry adequately.
Linkages with Global Production Networks
All the non-MNC firms interviewed said that their major clients were firms in
advanced countries who outsourced a part of their work to them. Serving the domestic
market was only a very small fraction of their total activity. This was true of even the
relatively smaller firms as even they are focused mainly on the export market. The MNC
subsidiaries are mostly engaged in serving their parent firms exclusively.
Access to Finance
For most of the Indian entrepreneurial and foreign-expatriate Indian firms, the
main source of finance has been promoters' equity, though some have taken loans from
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Indian banks for construction of buildings and working capital. For the MNC
subsidiaries, finance has come from their parent firms. Significantly, none of the firms
said that they had availed of any venture capital. This was primarily due to lack of
availability of such financing for the local firms.
Significantly, the state's role has been very limited in providing or facilitating
access to finance for these firms20. Even the venture capital fund announced by the
government in 2002 did not succeed. The most important reason for this was the
relatively easy availability of finance for these firms from outside sources, such as banks
and promoters' equity. Moreover, the amount of fund available from the government
promoted venture capital fund was relatively small and the procedures required were
cumbersome. Companies could get amounts only in the range of Rs. 20 million to Rs. 50
million (US $400,000 to US $1 million)21.
R&D and Technology Upgradation by the Firm
All the non-MNC firms said that the main source of R&D for their activities was
from within the firm itself. For the MNC subsidiaries, their parent firms provided the
technology. Significantly, the role of the government has been extremely limited in
providing R&D to the industry. Even the publicly funded higher academic institutions in
the state, such as the Indian Institute of Technology in the city, do not have any
significant linkages with the local firms for R&D.
20 One senior government official stated that "software firms could get finance from outside sources (banks,
promoters' equity, etc.) and did not need financial support or subsidies from the state...". This view was
echoed by several firms, which said that the software firms, especially the large and medium ones, could
take care of themselves and did not need financial sops from the government.
21 http://www.elcot.com/fund.html (accessed May 2007).
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6.4 Analysis of the State Government's Role in the Development of the Software
Industry in the State
What is the best analytical framework that we can use to understand the role of
the state in the development and evolution of the industry within its region? Are the
existing theoretical paradigms sufficient to explain the role of the state in this case? In
this section, I shall try to analyze how the state's policies affected the development of the
industry within its region and how these differ sharply from the dominant existing
paradigms in the literature on the role of the state in industrial development in emerging
economies.
Before trying to analyze how the policies of this state differ from the dominant
existing paradigms, it is useful to briefly recapitulate what the state did to catalyze the
development of this industry. The policies of the state for this industry can be divided
into four main categories: provision of industry-specific factors (physical and
communications infrastructure and increasing the availability of skilled labor); acquiring
industry-specific domain knowledge relevant to policy-making by incorporating
academicians and industry representatives into its policy making process; attracting large
MNCs (to a limited extent); and improving the linkages between the local industry and
their global clients. There were also attempts to influence the local demand conditions by
introducing e-governance projects in several government departments, but they had only
22
very limited impacts on attracting software firms
These policies are in sharp contrast to the dominant thinking within the literature
on the role of the state in industrial development in emerging economies. First, the most
22 This was confirmed during interviews with several firms in the city.
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prominent thinking in the literature on the role of the state in late development pertains to
strategies for technological catch-up based on technologies developed in the advanced
economies. This literature talks about long-term national planning for industrial
development and providing incentives for creation of a few large and vertically integrated
national firms who first operate in the domestic market and then compete internationally
based on incremental improvements in technology through their own R&D. Scholars in
this area also talk about specific state structures that can help implement these strategies.
These specific state structures mainly pertain to creation of a dominant or nodal agency
that has power and control over the industry and other government agencies to force the
implementation of its policies and monitor the results using certain performance
standards.
It is clear that the actions of the state in this case differ sharply from this
paradigm. The state did not try to create or promote large locally owned firms. There was
also no attempt to create state owned enterprises. The state also did not try to control the
industry by providing incentives selectively. Most of the incentives to the industry, such
as creation of physical infrastructure, increasing the availability of skilled labor, etc.,
were general to the industry as a whole and not specific to the firm. Even in cases where
23large firms were given land, the full market cost was recovered from them
The second dominant line of thinking on the role of the state is that of "neo-
developmental state", "flexible developmental state", or "networked state". This literature
suggests that for a state to play an effective role in development of high technology based
industries, it must interact deeply with the industry and be extremely flexible to change
23 Several firms said that the allotment of land by the government benefited them only by cutting down the
time and effort required to purchase the land on their own. It was not a source of financial benefit to them.
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its policies dynamically in line with the changing requirements of the industry. In short, it
calls for an "embedded" state that acts more as a supporter of the industry than as its
controller and leader. The state's success is "defined by its ability to promote post-Fordist
networks of production and innovation, to attract international investment, and to link
these local and global technology and business networks together in ways that promote
development" (O'Riain, 2000a). This model calls for extremely flexible bureaucracies
that understand deeply the constantly changing needs of a technology intensive industry.
However, even the neo-developmental state framework is unable to fully explain
the policies of the state in this case. The state did not try to embed itself deeply into the
industry, though it did make attempts to incorporate them into its policy-making process.
The bureaucracy in the state, styled as it is on the English model with its separation of
general and technical expertise and long and stable career patterns, did not acquire
sufficient domain knowledge to understand deeply the constantly changing needs of a
rapidly growing industry.
The dominant insights from the regional development literature are also unable to
fully explain the role of the state in this case. The main line of thinking on the sources of
regional industrial competitiveness and the role of the state is that of the state influencing
the specialized factor and demand conditions, presence of related and supporting
industries, and competition among local firms. In this case, though the state influenced
the factor conditions by providing industry specific infrastructure and specialized labor,
there was little attempt to influence the demand conditions. Competition among the local
firms was mainly for the local skilled labor and not for the domestic market. Thus even
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this framework is unable to fully explain the role of the state in a hi-tech industry with
global linkages in production and markets.
The discussion above suggests the need for a new analytical framework that
draws on insights from several existing paradigms and provides a new understanding of
the role of regional governments in the development of hi-tech industries in emerging
economies. I attempt to build this framework after presenting the two other case studies
in the next two chapters.
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7 Development of the Software Industry in Andhra Pradesh -
Attracting the Big Multinational Firms and Charismatic Leadership
Like in Tamil Nadu, the growth of the software industry has been spectacular in
Andhra Pradesh too. The total value of software and services exports from the state has
grown from only US $7.1 million in 1994 to US $2,828.3 million in 2005. The annual
average growth rate has been over 75% during this period. Like in Tamil Nadu, this state
has also shown a remarkable rise in its share of software and services exports from the
country. The share of the state has grown from 1.5% in 1994 to 11.9% in 2005 (Fig. 7.1),
only slightly behind that of Tamil Nadu at 13.4%. The number of firms in the state
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Software Exports from Andhra Pradesh -*- Share of AP in All India SW Exports (including ITES)
Figure 7.1: Software and software services exports from Andhra Pradesh.
Source: Annual reports of ESC from 1998 to 2005.
24 http://www.domain-b.com/infotech/itnews/200 2 05may/2 0 0 2 05 0 9 stpi.html
25 Number of companies counted as per the list of registered companies at
http://www.hyd.stpi.in/ehouses/ehouses.html (accessed in January 2007).
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7.1 Development of the Software Industry in Andhra Pradesh
The structure of the industry in the state till the early 1990s closely resembled that
in the neighboring state of Tamil Nadu. The state had seven software firms in 1990
compared to six in Tamil Nadu. Like in Chennai, the firms in Hyderabad also were
relatively insignificant players in software exports. None of the firms in the state were
among the top 20 software exporters from the country in 1990.
However the period from 1991 to 1995 saw a sharp divergence in the growth of
the industry in the two states. While 21 new firms started operations in Chennai during
this period, only 9 firms were established in Hyderabad during the same period
(NASSCOM, 2007a)26 . However, the number of firms in Hyderabad rose sharply after
1995. 51 new firms started operations in Hyderabad during 1996 to 2000 and another 45
firms started during 2001 to 2006. The corresponding numbers for Tamil Nadu were 57
and 33.
The period after 1995 also saw a large number of multinational firms coming to
the state. While there were only 3 MNCs in the state till 1995, 18 new MNCs started
operations during 1996 to 2000 and another 22 MNCs started during 2001 and 2006. The
proportion of MNCs among all software firms in Hyderabad rose to 39.3% in 2006. This
was almost double that of Tamil Nadu. Table 7.1 below shows the distribution of the type
of firms in Hyderabad that were members of NASSCOM as on January 2007 by their
establishment year.
26 The data on the number of firms refer to only those firms that were members of NASSCOM as on
January 1, 2007.
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Table 7.1 Distribution of the type of firms in Hyderabad by their establishment year
1991 1996 2001 % in Share in
Upto to to to Total Employment
Type of Firm 1990 1995 2000 2006 Total in 2006*
Indian Business House
Subsidiaries 1 0 4 2 7 6.3% 20.6%
Indian Entrepreneurial
Firms 3 7 18 11 39 34.8% 41.7%
MNC 1 2 18 23 44 39.3% 22.8%
Foreign-Expatriate
Indian 2 0 11 9 22 19.6% 14.9%
Joint Ventures 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0%
Public Sector Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 7 9 51 45 112 100% 100%
*The employment shares are based on 100 firms whose data were available.
Source: Author's calculations based on NASSCOM (2006), company websites and author interviews.
Foreign-expatriate Indian firm refers to a firm that has been started in the state by expatriate Indians or is a
subsidiary of foreign firms in other countries founded by expatriate Indians in those countries.
Comparative Structure of the Industry in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu
A comparison of the figures in the Tables 6.1 and 7.1 reveals some interesting
facts regarding the structure of the industry in the two states. First, the role of the
multinational firms has been far more important in the growth of the industry in
Hyderabad than in Chennai. The share of the MNCs among all firms in Hyderabad is
almost double that in Chennai. Second, while the share of the foreign-expatriate Indian
firms is almost the same in the two cities, the Indian entrepreneurial firms have played a
significantly lesser role in Hyderabad compared to their role in Chennai. The
significantly higher share of the MNCs in Hyderabad arose due to a conscious policy
decision of the state government to focus on attracting large multinational firms after
1995. I discuss this in more detail in the subsequent sections.
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Structure of the Industry at State and National Levels
Comparison of the structure of the industry at the state and national levels reveals
some interesting differences (Table 7.2). Indian business house subsidiaries form a
comparatively lower proportion of the total firms in Hyderabad than at the national level,
while multinational and foreign-expatriate Indian firms occupy a larger share in the state.
Table 7.2: Comparison of the structure of the software industry in Hyderabad and all India
No. of Firms in 2001 % of Firms in 2001 Share in
Type of Firm Employment for All
Hyderabad All India Hyderabad All India India in 2001
Indian Business 5 87 6.6% 15.3% 26.9%
House Subsidiaries
Indian 31 251* 40.8% 44.2% 34.9%
Entrepreneurial
Firms
MNC 23 128 30.3% 22.5% 16.3%
Foreign-Expatriate 17 58 22.4% 10.2% 7.9%
Indian
Joint Ventures 0 44** 0 7.7% 8%
Public Sector 0 0
Firms
Total 89 568
Source: Data for Chennai are based on author's calculations based on (NASSCOM, 2006b). Data for All
India are from (Athreye, 2005b).
* Includes data on entrepreneurial firms and entrepreneurs with prior IT experience.
** Also includes public sector firms
Leading Firms in the State
Analysis of the top ten leading firms in Hyderabad (in terms of number of
employees) reveals that the industry is led by business house subsidiaries and foreign-
expatriate Indian firms. However, the largest firm is an Indian entrepreneurial firm (Table
7.3). Only two of the top ten firms are MNCs. Seven of the top ten firms are engaged in
IT solutions and services (essentially, customized software development), and business
process outsourcing (BPO). Only three firms are engaged in R&D, engineering design,
and product development.
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Table 7.3: Top Ten Leading Software and Services Firms in Hyderabad
Si. Name of the Type of Firm Legal Year Total Main Areas of
No. Company Structure Estd. Employees Business
(2006)
1 Satyam Computer Indian Public 1987 18,124 IT Solutions
Services Ltd. Entrepreneurial Ltd.
2 Karvy Global Business House Public 1983 6,000 IT
Services Ltd. Subsidiary Ltd. Services/BPO
3 E2E SerWiz Business House Public 2004 4,000 BPO
Solutions Ltd Subsidiary Ltd.
4 Microsoft India MNC Pvt. Ltd. 1997 3200 Software R&D
(R&D) Pvt. Ltd. for parent
company
5 Infotech Indian Public 1991 2,000 GIS, Engg.
Enterprises Ltd. Entrepreneurial Ltd. Design, IT
services
6 GE Consumer MNC Pvt. Ltd. 2005 1,800 BPO
Finance Servicing
7 Nipuna Services Business House Public 2002 1,750 IT Enabled-
Limited Subsidiary Ltd. Services/BPO
8 AppLabs Foreign- Pvt. Ltd. 2001 1,500 IT Services
Technologies Pvt Expatriate Indian
Ltd.
9 Virtusa (India) Pvt Foreign- Pvt. Ltd. 2002 1,500 Technology and
Ltd Expatriate Indian Product
Innovation
10 Intelligroup Asia Foreign- Pvt. Ltd. 1996 1,338 IT Outsourcing
Pvt Ltd Expatriate Indian
Source: (NASSCOM, 2006b), interviews by the author, and company websites (accessed in Jan. 2007)
7.2 Policy Initiatives by the State for the Development of the Industry
In terms of policy initiatives, Andhra Pradesh, like Tamil Nadu, too did not have
any specific policies till 1995. As in the other parts of the country, the first specific policy
initiative for the IT industry in Hyderabad came from the central government. This was
the setting up of a new software technology park under the STPI scheme in Hyderabad in
271991. In 1992, the unit had seven registered software exporting firms in Hyderabad
Thus Hyderabad had a lead in providing infrastructural support to the IT industry over
2 http://www.domain-b.com/infotech/itnews/200205may/20020509 stpi.html
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Chennai where the first STPI unit started functioning only in 1995. However, except for
this STPI unit, there were no other specific government initiatives either from the central
or the state government for this industry until 1995.
Table 7.4 lists the major initiatives taken by the state for the development of the
software industry in the state during 1995-2005. As can be seen from this table, the state
did not have a comprehensive IT policy till 1999 when it announced its first IT policy for
the state. This policy provided a host of incentives to the industry, such as financial
incentives in the form of concessions in the price of land, exemptions from intrusive
provisions under certain labor laws, and single-window clearances for starting new units.
However, it is relevant to note here that though the state did not have a comprehensive IT
policy till 1999, the government was deeply involved in promoting the industry by
creating huge infrastructure in the city and giving case by case incentives to the big
multinational and domestic firms. In fact, the initial strategy of the state during 1996-
2000 was clearly focused on attracting the large multinational and national companies to
the city. I discuss this in more detail below.
It is helpful to divide the policy initiatives by the state into two phases. The first
phase, from 1995-2000, was focused on building infrastructure and attracting the big
multinational and national companies to the city while the second phase, from 2001
onwards, was focused on promoting production and marketing linkages for the local
firms in the international market.
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Table 7.4: Major Policy Initiatives by the State Government for Development of the IT Industry in
Andhra Pradesh
Year Policy Initiative What the policy Did
1997 A New post of Secretary, IT & A new post was created for speedier decision-
Computers created making and better coordination
1998 Exemption to IT units from statutory Ensured uninterrupted power supply to IT units
power cuts
1998 Exemption from AP Pollution Control Faster clearances for setting up a unit
Act
1998 Hitec City at Madhapur, Phase One Largest IT Park in India
opened (Cyber Towers)
1998 IIIT Hyderabad started with seed Involved major national and foreign IT Cos. to set
support from Govt. of AP up specialized centers on campus for advanced
training and mid-level R&D
1999 First IT Policy - Incentives for IT and Exemption from Pollution Control Act and power
ITES Industry cuts, 25% concessional electricity tariff,
exemption from sales tax, rebate on cost of land,
exemption from land zoning regulations, rebate
on registration and transfer of property,
investment subsidy for new firms, special subsidy
for mega projects, etc., focus on creating
infrastructure, e-governance, skilled labor,
establishment of a venture capital fund
1999 New International Airport in Approvals for a new airport obtained and bidding
Hyderabad process started by the state
1999 ISB Hyderabad Founded with support Enhanced the reputation of the city as a major
from the state government international center for higher education
1999 Separate IT Dept. Established A separate department was established for better
coordination and faster decision-making
2000 Policy for Laying Optic Fiber Cables
2000 Constitution of two state level Involved industry representatives and
committees for promotion of IT academicians in the government decision-making
process for the industry
2000 A.P.FIRST, Information Technology Same incentives as in the IT policy of 1999
Policy
2000 Consultative Committees formed A Standing Consultative Committee Comprising
Government Officials and the Industry
Representatives was formed
2000 Launch of MS (IT) program in A new Post-graduate program was launched in
collaboration with CMU, USA collaboration with CMU, USA
2000 Public Sector Venture Capital Fund Jointly promoted by Andhra Pradesh Industrial
Hyderabad Information Technology Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC), Andhra
Venture Enterprises Limited (HIT VEL) Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation
launched (APIDC) and public sector Small Industries
Development Bank of India (Sidbi) in 2000,
HITVEL set up a Rs 150 million IT venture
capital fund. It invested about Rs 125 million in
six IT and ITeS companies till 2005.
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2001 Exemption from Inspections under Allowed the IT firms to file self-certification
Factories Act, Contract Labor Act, under these Acts
Shops and Establishments Act,
Minimum Wages Act, etc.
2001 Conduct of Mega IT Event in Conducted a mega event on the lines of IT.Com
Hyderabad of Karnataka
2002 Second IT Policy Automatic incentives to IT units and some other
incentives on application, single window
clearances; firm level incentives such as
investment subsidies, concessional power tariff,
exemption from zoning regulations, rebate in cost
of land, special incentives for mega projects, etc.;
subsidy to SMEs for participation in international
exhibitions for small and medium IT firms;
promoted e-Government as a major driver for IT
industry by giving preferential treatment to local
IT units.
2002 Special Concessional Land Pricing Land to be given at concessional rates to IT
Policy around Hitec City Companies
2002 Separate Policy for the ITES Sector A New Policy for ITES sector was announced
2002 First Mega ICT event GITEX-India Started an annual series of mega IT events in
Hyderabad in association with GITEX-Dubai
2002 National Institute of Smart Governance Established with NASSCOM (National
(NISG) established Association of Software and Service Companies),
Central and State governments to promote
excellence in the area of e-Governance with focus
on Strategic Planning, developing appropriate
architectures and standards, providing high-level
consultancy services and capacity building at the
national level.
2004 Institute of Electronic Governance To support Electronic Governance initiatives
(IEG) established through a cadre of technical experts whose
services various Departments and Organizations
of the Government could utilize.
2005 Third ICT Policy Focused on e-Governance and Investment
promotion, increasing availability of skilled labor,
and promoting secondary cities for IT industry.
First time focused on providing incentives for
R&D by providing free space to such companies
for five years, venture funding for new IT firms,
closer industry-academia collaboration, etc.
Source: Author's compilation based on published documents by the state government and interviews with
senior officials
7.2.1 The First Phase (1995-2001): Focus on Infrastructure and Large MNCs
The government realized the importance of creating world-class infrastructure for
the industry early. Under the leadership of the new Chief Minister of the state, Mr.
127
Chandrababu Naidu, who assumed charge in 1995, the government started two mega
projects in Hyderabad. The first was Cyber City, a new industrial park on the outskirts of
the city where the firms could get land at concessional rates. The government also
provided basic infrastructural facilities to the park. By early 1997, 12 software companies
had been allotted land in this park. Most of them were Indian entrepreneurial firms, with
only one firm, Intelli Group Asia, being foreign-expatriate Indian. The second initiative
was to build a huge 10 storey tower called Hi-tech City where firms could buy or rent
ready-built space. Built at a cost of US$850 million in association with a leading private
developer, this building is the largest of its kind in India (Kshetri & Dholakia, 2005).
The provision of infrastructure at concessional rates attracted several software
firms to the city. However, the state was still not able to attract the relatively large firms.
It was also losing out to Chennai which was attracting more firms due to higher
availability of skilled labor, presence of relatively better infrastructure at that time, and an
28international airport . That Chennal was still more attractive until 1996 is evident from
the fact that among the member firms of NASSCOM, six and ten new firms started
operations in Chennai during 1995 and 1996 respectively, while the corresponding
figures for Hyderabad were only two and six.
Attracting Large Multinational Companies
In this scenario, the state took a conscious decision to attract large software
companies, particularly the multinationals2. This was done by offering them incentives
on a case by case basis and by taking decisions very quickly on their requests. In the case
28 Source: Interview with firms in Chennai and Hyderabad.
29 Source: Interviews with government officials in Hyderabad.
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of Microsoft, the government responded to its requests within a single day, even on a
holiday (Kshetri & Dholakia, 2005). The Chief Minister himself took personal interest in
meeting top executives of large firms and making presentations on what the state could
offer them if they set up their centers in Hyderabad. In March 1997, when Bill Gates
visited India, Chandrababu Naidu got an exclusive interview with him and discussed his
dream of making Hyderabad as a global center for software development (Kshetri &
Dholakia, 2005). After this meeting, Microsoft seriously considered Hyderabad for
locating its development center along with other Indian cities and ultimately selected it
over seven other Indian cities. Extremely fast and favorable responses to many of the
firm's demands by the state government were a key factor in the firm choosing the city30
Microsoft's entry in Hyderabad in 1997-98 considerably strengthened the city's
reputation as a major emerging IT center in the world. Among the major MNCs that
started their operations in Hyderabad after Microsoft's entry were Oracle, GE Capital,
IBM, Toshiba, Baan, and Ericsson. It probably also attracted the foreign-expatriate Indian
firms to enter the state. In fact, during 1997-2000, 56% of the total 46 firms that started
operations in Hyderabad were either MNCs or foreign-expatriate Indian. The break up
was 37% and 19.5% for MNCs and foreign-expatriate Indian respectively.
Entry of MNCs to Hyderabad, in all likelihood, contributed positively to the
overall growth of the industry in the state. This was because the MNCs and the local
firms essentially operated in different markets. While most of the MNC subsidiaries were
focused on serving their parent firms through R&D in software and product development,
the local Indian and Foreign-expatriate Indian firms were focused on securing
3 Source: Interviews with government officials in Hyderabad. One senior official stated that in several
instances, replies to the requests of the firm would be sent within hours.
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outsourcing deals based on custom software development. They were competing mainly
for the local skilled labor and not in the export markets 1 .
Another major initiative by the state for building infrastructure in the city was to
start construction of a brand new international airport in the city. This was to fulfill a
major demand by the large IT firms for easier and faster international connections to the
city. By 1999, the state had invited bids for the airport and had started acquiring land 32
The actual construction started in 2005.
Provision of Skilled Labor and R&D
Increasing the availability of skilled labor was another major policy initiative of
the state. For increasing the availability of skilled professionals with undergraduate
technical education, the state facilitated the opening of private technical institutions in the
state. As a result of these initiatives, the annual number of new engineering graduates in
the state went up from 5,610 in 1995 to 20,099 in 2003.
In addition to facilitating the supply of more engineering graduates from private
institutions, the state government took another major policy initiative to provide highly
skilled technical and managerial labor for the industry. The first major initiative was the
setting up of the Indian Institute of Information Technology (IIT), Hyderabad in 1998
with seed support from the state government and active collaboration from national and
international IT companies. In November 1997, the state government signed an
agreement with Microsoft to establish the Microsoft School for Software Technology at
this institute (Kshetri & Dholakia, 2005). Other firms that set up corporate schools on the
31 Source: interviews with firms in Hyderabad.
32 Source: http://www.newhvderabadairport.com/media information press coverage aug30 2000.html
(accessed in April 2007)
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IIIT campus were IBM, Signal Tree, Motorola, Oracle and Satyam 33 . The infrastructure
for these firms was provided by the state government through the institute. These
corporate schools were aimed at imparting advanced skills to graduate students in
software technology and were also engaged in mid-level R&D in this area, though the
extent and sophistication of R&D conducted was relatively low34 . It is worth noting here
that the industry in Chennai lacked this level of support from the state in providing highly
skilled professionals and industry supported R&D. The Tamil Nadu government had
started an institute on similar lines in Chennai in 1998, but the school did not succeed and
was wound up in 2004. Though the state had other centers of higher education in
computer science, namely, the internationally renowned Indian Institute of Technology
and Anna University at Chennai, they did not have the same level of industry
involvement as in the case of IIIT, Hyderabad. Hence, the focus of these institutes in
Chennai remained on providing generic programming skills to the students instead of
industry-specific technologies.
Another major initiative of the state that put Hyderabad on the map of
international centers for quality higher education was the setting up of the Indian School
of Business (ISB) in 1999. The school was founded through the initiative of leading
expatriate Indian academicians and business leaders in the US. It also had collaborations
with the leading business schools in the US, such as Wharton and Kellogg's. The chief
minister took personal interest in meeting the founders and convincing them to choose
Hyderabad for locating the school. Starting of this school attracted considerable media
Source: http://www.iiit.ac.in/institute/institute.php (accessed in April 2007)
3 Source: interviews with firms in Hyderabad.
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attention internationally and helped in enhancing the reputation of the state as an
emerging international center for higher education.
Involving the Industry in Policy Making
During this period, the state also took a conscious decision to involve the industry
representatives and academicians in the policy-making process of the state for the
industry. The government had created a separate post of Secretary, It and Computers in
1997 to deal exclusively with the IT industry in the state. It also established a separate
department for IT in 1999. As noted before, the state was already involved in interacting
with the IT firms from 1996 itself as the Chief Minister of the state himself was
personally leading the efforts to attract these firms to the state. The first IT policy of the
state in 1999 formalized these efforts by creating two state level advisory bodies. In early
2000, the government announced the establishment of two state level bodies. The first,
called 'AP First', was aimed at formulating the broad policies for promoting the industry
within the state, and the second, called the 'State Information Technology promotion
Committee', was for implementing and monitoring the infrastructure and other IT
projects in the state, such as for e-governance. The first body consisted of industry
leaders and an academician from the US, while the second body comprised the senior
officials in the state involved with implementation of the projects. It is relevant to note
here that though the formal initiative came only in 2000, the political leadership and the
bureaucracy of the state were already receiving inputs from industry leaders from 1996
itself through their interactions with them for providing incentives for the industry.
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7.2.2 The Second Phase (2001-2006): Local Firms, International Linkages, and E-
Governance
The state had succeeded in attracting a large number of both multinational and
domestic firms by the end of 2000. During 1996-2000, 51 new firms started operations
in Hyderabad, out of which 18 (35.2%) and 11 (21.6%) were MNCs and foreign-
expatriate Indian firms respectively. In terms of number of new firms, it was only slightly
behind Chennai where 57 new firms had started operations during the same period.
However, the proportion of MNCs, at 24.6%, was comparatively much lower in Chennai.
The presence of a relatively large number of MNCs in Hyderabad had helped the city
emerge as a major destination for IT firms internationally.
In this scenario, the second IT policy of the state in 2002 attempted to further
boost the investment climate for IT firms in the state. It focused on four major aspects:
first, providing firm level incentives, such as investment subsidy, rebate in the cost of the
land, concessional power tariff, reduced stamp duty, exemption from zoning regulations,
special concessions for mega projects involving investment of Rs. 500 million (US $10
million) and above; second, it made obtaining clearances from the state agencies faster by
providing exemptions from several state laws and providing for a single window
clearance; third, it promoted the small and medium units in the state by providing them
subsidy for participating in international events; and fourth, it promoted e-government
projects as a major driver for further growth of the industry in the state by giving
preference to state registered units in such projects. In 2001, the state had already
exempted the IT firms from the provisions of several laws such as the Factories Act,
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Contract Labor Act, Shops and Establishments Act, Minimum Wages Act, etc. and had
allowed them to file self-certifications under these Acts without intrusive inspections.
Promoting International Linkages
During this period, the state government consciously tried to promote production
and marketing linkages between the international market and the local firms. It started an
annual series of mega events for the IT industry, called GITEX-Hyderabad in 2002, in
association with the Dubai World Trade Center. This event was aimed at bringing the
Indian and the global IT players on a single platform. The government also started giving
financial subsidy to the small and medium firms in the state (with a turnover of less than
US $ 2 million) to participate in international events.
Promoting e-Governance to Attract Software Firms
The state tried to promote e-governance in a big way during this period to attract
software firms. In addition to promoting e-government projects to improve service
delivery to the public in all its departments, the state took several other initiatives to
promote e-governance. These were establishment of two training and research institutions
to promote e-governance. These institutes were established with strong institutional
support from the industry. The first was the National Institute of Smart Governance
(NISG), established in 2002 in collaboration with NASSCOM and the central
government. This institute aimed at planning, and research and development in e-
governance at national level. The second was the Institute of Electronic Governance
(IEG), established by the state government in 2004 in collaboration with NISG and IT,
35 http://www.,gitexindia.in/index.html (accessed in March 2007)
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Hyderabad. The main purpose of this institute was to train professionals who could work
on various e-government projects of different departments of the state. These two
initiatives of the state helped in establishing Hyderabad as a center for innovation in e-
governance in the country.
The third ICT policy of the state announced in 2005 focused again on e-
governance and investment promotion for the IT industry. However, it went further and
provided incentives for firms engaged in R&D activities. It offered free space to the firms
engaged in high-end R&D for five years in IT parks. However, interviews with the
government officials indicate that very few firms have availed of this incentive so far due
to lack of qualified applicants. Another initiative of this policy was on promoting the
secondary cities in the state for development of infrastructure.
Conclusion
As can be seen from the discussion above, the development strategy of the state to
attract the software firms was focused on five major areas: provision of industry specific
infrastructure and skilled labor, industry wide and firm level subsidies, attracting the
large multinational firms, promoting international production and marketing linkages for
the local firms, and promoting e-governance as a tool to attract software firms. During the
first phase from 1995-2000, the focus was on developing the infrastructure, increasing the
availability of skilled labor, and providing incentives to attract the large multinational
firms. During the second phase from 2001-2006, the state focused on promoting linkages
between the local firms and the international market, provided incentives to the local
small and medium firms, and promoted e-governance in a big way to emerge as a major
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national center in this area. To achieve these goals, the state effected major changes in its
policy-making process. To acquire domain expertise, it incorporated industry
representatives and academic experts in its policy making process and also changed
several existing rules and procedures to make the process of granting approvals for the
firms easier and faster.
7.3 Impact of the State's Policies on the Growth of the Software Industry
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the state adopted a number of
strategies to attract the software firms to Hyderabad. How did these policies affect the
growth of the industry? What were the major factors that influenced the software firms to
choose Hyderabad for locating their units? Did the state help in obtaining finance,
upgrading technology, improving linkages with the international market, etc.? To
understand how exactly the state influenced the development of this industry, I conducted
in-depth interviews with 15 firms in Hyderabad during November and December 2006.
Six of these firms were Indian entrepreneurial firms, six were MNCs, and three were
Foreign-expatriate Indian firms. I discuss below the main conclusions from these
interviews.
Major factors that influenced firms to locate in Hyderabad
The common factors that emerged from all interviews for choosing Hyderabad
were: availability of good infrastructure, especially after 1997, availability of skilled
labor, comparatively lower costs of living in the city, and a pro-active state government
that built infrastructure at great speed, provided land at concessional rates to many large
firms, and eliminated delays in obtaining clearances from various departments and
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agencies of the government. The pro-active role of the government and personal
initiatives and leadership shown by the Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu were
mentioned as major factors by several firms. As the Senior Manager of a prominent
multinational subsidiary in the city stated:
"Hyderabad was coming up fast, Naidu had rolled out a red carpet for all
IT firms, the city has a conducive atmosphere, government subsidies (land
at a concessional rate) were also a big factor...."
For the non-MNCs in the city, ethnic linkages of the main promoters of the firm
with the state were the main reasons for choosing the city. This seemed to be an
important factor even for the relatively smaller MNCs with expatriate Indian staff in high
positions in the management team. They stated that they were looking for a right
opportunity to come back to their native state and the building of infrastructure and a
supportive policy environment after 1995 encouraged them to come here. As the Head of
the Human Resources division of a multinational firm with an expatriate Indian
professional in a high position stated:
"...CEO (of the Indian unit) is from Hyderabad, Hyderabad was booming
in 1997 when the firm started its operations here. This was the main
reason for locating in the city..."
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It is helpful to further examine the background of the promoters of the foreign-
expatriate Indian firms to understand the nature of international linkages that have helped
the industry in the state to grow. Promoters of all the three foreign-expatriate firms
interviewed in the city studied in leading technical institutions in India (Indian Institutes
of Technology at Delhi and Madras and Birla Institute of Technology and Science at
Pilani in Rajasthan) 36 before going to the US to study and work. In the case of one MNC,
there was one Indian staff in high management position who graduated from an IIT. The
educational background of the promoters of these firms indicates that it is the graduates
of leading technical institutes in India with ethnic roots in the state who have been
instrumental in forming the international linkages for the industry in the state. They have
established firms or subsidiaries in the state with deep production and marketing linkages
with firms and markets abroad. These firms in turn have benefited from the wide
availability of graduates from the undergraduate level private technical institutions in the
state.
On the role of government incentives, they seem to have played a more important
role in Hyderabad when compared to that in Chennai. While very few firms have availed
of specific firm level incentives in Chennai, many firms have availed of such incentives
in Hyderabad. Nine of the fifteen firms interviewed said that they had availed of a
specific firm incentive from the state government in Hyderabad. The most important
incentives were the quick allotment of land to several large firms at concessional rates
and investment subsidies. Under the ICT Policy of 1999, 26 firms were given land
investment subsidies till 2001 (Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, 2002). This allowed the firms to
36 Source: interviews with firms and company websites (accessed in March 2007).
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start operations quickly. However, these incentives were aimed at attracting the relatively
large firms and small and medium firms did not benefit from them.
Linkages with the State Owned and Privately Owned Local IT Firms
Like in Chennai, exports were the most important source of revenue for almost all
the firms interviewed. The lone exception was one firm focused on developing software
systems for the Indian Railways. Most of the firms interviewed said that they virtually no
linkages with the state owned or local private IT firms. They had no subcontracting
relationships with the other local firms in Hyderabad.
Availability of Skilled Labor in the State
Like in Chennai, all the firms interviewed stated that availability of adequate
skilled labor within the state was a major factor for choosing Hyderabad. Regarding
quality and availability of labor, there was no significant difference between Chennai and
Hyderabad. Like in Chennai, the engineering graduates in Hyderabad possessed only
generic programming skills and the firms needed to train them in specific skill areas.
Labor Relations in the State
Like in Chennai, most of the firms said that the state was pro-active in ensuring a
business-friendly environment for the industry. The state had granted exemptions to the
software firms from several provisions of the labor laws that were intrusive and not
business-friendly.
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Awareness among Government Officials about the Needs of the IT Industry
Unlike in Chennai, the bureaucracy in the state has been far more pro-active in
Hyderabad. All the firms interviewed said that the government was very business friendly
and were taking decisions quickly on demands put forth by the industry. They all said
that this had happened due to the pro-active leadership of the chief minister, Mr.
Chandrababu Naidu.
Involvement of the Firm in the Policy Making Process of the State/Central Government
Most of the firms interviewed said that they had no direct involvement in the
policy-making process of the state. However, unlike in Chennai, the firms in Hyderabad
are more organized. They have formed an association, called HYSEA (Hyderabad
Software Exporters' Association), of all the local software firms in the city. This
association conducts periodic meetings and interacts with the government on all issues
concerning the industry. The firms said that also had periodic interactions in forums like
NASSCOM on how the government could support the industry. Representatives of the
industry are also represented in AP-FIRST, the apex government body concerned with
policy making for the industry. The firms said that this arrangement had served the
industry adequately.
Linkages with Global Production Networks
Like in Chennai, all the non-MNC firms interviewed said that their major clients
were firms in developed countries who outsourced a part of their work to them. Serving
the domestic market was only a very small fraction of their total activity. This was true of
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even the relatively smaller firms as even they are focused mainly on the export market.
The MNC subsidiaries are mostly engaged in serving their parent firms exclusively.
Though firms in both Chennai and Hyderabad are focused on serving the
international market, the linkages with global production networks are stronger in
Chennai as most of the firms there are local and foreign-expatriate Indian. In Hyderabad,
as most MNC subsidiaries are engaged in serving their parent corporation, the linkages of
the local industry with the global production networks are relatively weak.
Access to Finance
Like in Chennai, most of the Indian entrepreneurial and Foreign-expatriate Indian
entrepreneurial firms obtained finance from their promoters' equity and banks. The MNC
subsidiaries stated that they obtained finance from their parent firms. Significantly, none
of the firms said that they had availed of any venture capital due to lack of availability of
such financing for the local firms.
Like in Chennai, the state's role has been very limited in providing or facilitating
access to finance for these firms, though the state did make some efforts to launch a
venture capital fund for local entrepreneurs in its third ICT Policy in 200537. Like in
Chennai, the most important reason for this is the relatively easy availability of finance
for these firms from outside sources, such as banks and promoters' equity.
37 The Third ICT Policy launched a scheme of 'Andhrapreneurs' to encourage entrepreneurship among
local technical graduates. It also provided for allotment of space in IT parks to start-ups at concessional
rates and tie-ups with venture capitalists for providing venture capital to local firms. However, interviews
with government officials indicate that these provisions are yet to be fully implemented.
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R&D and Technology Upgradation by the Firm
The level of technological sophistication of the work being done by the industry
in Hyderabad is higher when compared to that in Chennai. This is due to the presence of
a relatively large number of MNCs in Hyderabad that are doing relatively more
sophisticated work (such as product development or working on specific technologies or
components for new products) for their parent companies. However, the nature of work
for the other firms is almost the same in both cities.
Like in Chennai, all the non-MNC firms said that the main source of R&D for
their activities came from within the firm. For the MNC subsidiaries, their parent firms
provide the technology. However, the government in Andhra Pradesh seems to have
played a bigger role in providing R&D to the industry than in Tamil Nadu. This is due to
several initiatives taken by the government in Andhra Pradesh to provide R&D support to
the industry. The most important initiative was the establishment of advanced schools
within IIT Hyderabad aimed at specific technologies in association with large
multinational firms. Though these schools worked mainly on the technologies being used
by the sponsoring firms, they also imparted training in these technologies to students and
other professionals who were then free to go out and employ it in their own firms. This
helped in improving the technical skills of the professionals. Unlike in Chennai, the
linkages of the industry with the IIIT in Hyderabad are relatively stronger for training
professionals in high-end technologies.
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7.4 Analysis of the State Government's Role in the Development of the Software
Industry in the State
How can we understand the role of the state in the development of this industry in
this region? In this section, I try to analyze how the state's policies affected the
development of the industry and how they differ sharply from the existing dominant
paradigms in the literature on the role of the state in industrial development in emerging
economies.
It is useful to briefly recapitulate what the state did to promote the development of
this industry within its region. The policies of the state in this case can be divided into six
main categories: provision of industry specific factors (physical and communications
infrastructure and increasing the availability of skilled labor); acquiring industry-specific
domain knowledge relevant to policy-making by incorporating industry representatives
and academicians into the policy making process; attracting large MNCs; improving the
linkages between the local industry and their global clients; provision of R&D (to a
limited extent); and influencing the demand conditions using e-government as a tool to
attract software firms to the state.
It is clear from the discussion in the preceding sections that the actions of the state
in Andhra Pradesh differ from those in Tamil Nadu in four crucial aspects. First, the state
in Andhra Pradesh clearly focused its strategies on attracting the large multinational firms
right from the beginning and its policies of providing firm level incentives were clearly
geared towards this goal; second, the state here used firm level incentives much more
than in Tamil Nadu to attract firms; third, the state here focused on supply of R&D to the
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industry significantly more than in Tamil Nadu; and finally, the state here promoted e-
governance as a tool to encourage the growth of the industry.
It is interesting to note that the policies of the state in this case too differ sharply
from the dominant paradigms within the literature on the role of the state in industrial
development in developing economies. As discussed in the previous chapter, the most
prominent model in the literature on the role of the state in late development pertains to
strategies for industrial development based on technological catch-up with the advanced
countries. This model argues that developing countries need long-term planning for
industrial development and need to provide incentives for creation of a few large
vertically integrated national firms. These firms first operate in the domestic market and
then compete internationally based on incremental improvements to technology based on
their own R&D. Theorists in this area also talk about specific state structures that can
help implement these strategies. These specific state structures mainly pertain to creation
of a dominant or nodal agency that has power and control over the industry and other
government agencies to force the implementation of its policies and monitor the results
using certain performance standards.
It is clear that the policies of the state in Andhra Pradesh differ sharply from this
model in several aspects. First, the state did not try to create large locally or state owned
firms, though it made serious efforts to attract large multinational firms. Though the state
already had a relatively large locally owned firm38 before it started its own strategies to
attract more firms, it was clearly focused on attracting the large multinational firms.
Hence, the dominant agent for industrialization here was the multinational company. It
must be noted, however, that the direct impact of the MNCs on the growth of the local
3 This firm was Satyam Computers Ltd. that was started in 1987 in the city.
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firms has been very limited as these MNC subsidiaries are mostly engaged in
development work for their own parent firms with little linkages with the local firms. It
must be stated, though, that they probably contributed positively to the overall growth of
the industry in the state as the MNCs and the local firms operate in two distinct markets.
Second, though the state did try to influence the growth of the industry by selectively
providing incentives to the large multinational firms to enter the state, its role was far
more limited in other areas relevant for the development of the industry, such as
technology acquisition and access to finance. It was left to the industry to develop or
acquire specific technologies and get finance.
The second dominant line of thinking on the role of the state is that of "neo-
developmental state", "flexible developmental state", or "networked state". As discussed
in the previous chapter, this model calls for extremely flexible bureaucracies that
understand deeply the constantly changing needs of a technology intensive industry.
It is clear that the role of the state in this case differs sharply from this model too.
Though the state in Andhra Pradesh interacted far more deeply with the industry than in
Tamil Nadu, it was not an 'embedded' or a 'networked' state. It had the same
bureaucratic structure as in Tamil Nadu with little domain knowledge of the industry or
specific technologies. However, the bureaucracy in the state tried harder to understand
the needs of the industry as the Chief Minister himself was leading the efforts to attract
the software industry to the state.
The regional development literature is also unable to fully explain the role of the
state in this case. As in the case of Tamil Nadu, the state influenced the factor conditions
by providing specialized infrastructure and improving the availability of skilled labor.
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Similarly, like in Tamil Nadu, competition among the local firms was for the skilled labor
and not for the domestic market. However, in Andhra Pradesh, the state did try to
influence the demand conditions by making e-governance as one of the major goals of the
state government. Though this did attract some firms to the state that were focused
mainly on providing e-governance solutions, its overall impact on the growth of the
industry was limited as most of the firms in the industry are focused on exports and not
on the domestic market.
The discussion above suggests the need for a new analytical framework for
explaining the role of regional governments in the development of hi-tech industries with
global linkages in production and markets. I develop this framework in the chapter ten
after analyzing the third case of the state of Kerala in the next chapter.
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8 Development of the Software Export Industry in Kerala - Reining in
Labor and Shedding the Leftist Image
Unlike in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, the growth of the software industry in
Kerala has been much less than spectacular. The total value of software and software
services exports grew from US$11.4m in 1998-99 to US$ 102.1m in 2005-06, averaging
an annual growth of just over 39%. However, the share of the state in the exports of
software and services from the country has stagnated at around 0.4% during this period
(Fig. 8.1). The number of firms in the state registered with STPI, Trivandurm grew from
53 in 1998 to 208 as on January 200739. One remarkable feature of the growth of this
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Figure 8.1: Growth of software and software services exports from Kerala
Source: (ESC, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006)
39 Number of companies counted as per information available at: www.stpt.soft.net (accessed February
2007)
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8.1 Development of the Software Industry in Kerala
Kerala has been the slowest among the three states to develop its software
industry. Unlike Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, it had virtually no exports in software
till the late 1990s. In fact, till 1995, it had just three firms in Trivandrum, which were
members of NASSCOM. Even in January 2007, this number rose to only eight, against
128 in Chennai and 124 in Hyderabad (NASSCOM, 2007b). Two of these were
multinationals, two were foreign-expatriate Indian, and the remaining four were Indian
entrepreneurial firms. None of these firms were among the top 20 leading software
exporters from the country.
Unlike in the other two states, almost the entire growth in the industry in Kerala
has taken place after 1995. Seven out of the eight NASSCOM firms in Trivandrum were
established after 1995. Similarly, MNCs started coming to the state only after 2000, i.e.,
much later compared to the other two states. Table 8.1 below shows the distribution of
the type of firms in Trivandurm which were members of NASSCOM as on January 2007
by their establishment year.
Table 8.1 Distribution of the type of firms in Trivandurm by their establishment year
1991 1996 2001 % in Share in
Upto to to to Total Employment
Type of Firm 1990 1995 2000 2006 Total in 2006
Indian Business House
Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0%
Indian Entrepreneurial
Firms 1 1 2 0 4 50.0% 25.8%
MNC 0 0 0 2 2 25.0% 3.1%
Foreign-Expatriate
Indian 0 1 1 0 2 25.0% 71.1%
Joint Ventures 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0%
Public Sector Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 2 3 2 8 100% 100%
Source: Author's calculations based on NASSCOM (2007b), company websites and author interviews.
Foreign-expatriate Indian firm refers to firms in Trivandrum that have been started by expatriate Indians or
subsidiaries of foreign firms in other countries founded by expatriate Indians in those countries.
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Structure of the Industry at State and National Levels
Table 8.2 presents a comparative analysis of the structure of the industry at the
state and national levels. Though it is difficult to draw conclusions from a comparative
analysis of the structure of the firms at the state and national levels due to very small
number of firms in the state, we can still gain some insights as to how the structure of the
industry differs in the state. While there were no Indian business house subsidiaries and
MNCs in Trivandrum in 2001, they had a much larger presence at the national level. The
industry in the state is almost entirely dominated by Indian entrepreneurial and foreign-
expatriate Indian firms.
Table 8.2: Comparison of the structure of the software industry in Hyderabad and all India
No. of Firms in 2001 % of Firms in 2001 Share in
Type of Firm Employment for All
Trivandrum All India Trivandrum All India India in 2001
Indian Business 0 87 0 15.3% 26.9%
House Subsidiaries
Indian 4 251* 66.7% 44.2% 34.9%
Entrepreneurial
Firms
MNC 0 128 0 22.5% 16.3%
Foreign-Expatriate 2 58 33.3% 10.2% 7.9%
Indian
Joint Ventures 0 44** 0 7.7% 8%
Public Sector 0 0
Firms
Total 6 568 1
Source: Data for Trivandrum are based on author's calculations based on (NASSCOM, 2006b). Data for
All India are from (Athreye, 2005b).
* Includes data on entrepreneurial firms and entrepreneurs with prior IT experience.
** Also includes public sector firms
Leading Firms in the State
Table 8.3 presents the details of the eight NASCOM firms in Trivandrum. The
leading firm in the state is a Foreign-expatriate Indian firm. Most of the firms are
engaged in IT services, custom software development, and BPO.
149
Table 8.3 Top Ten Leading Software and Services
Si. Name of the Type of Firm Legal Year Total Main Areas of
No. Company Structure Estd. Employees Business
(2006)
1 US Technology Foreign- Pvt. Ltd. 1999 3,500 IT Services
International Pvt. Ltd. Expatriate Indian
2 IBS Software Indian Pvt. Ltd. 1997 760 Software
Services Pvt. Ltd. Entrepreneurial Development and
Consulting
3 Network Systems and Foreign- Pvt. Ltd. 1995 460 Software Engg,
Technologies (P) Ltd. Expatriate Indian Hardware, Products
4 IVL India Private Ltd. Indian Pvt. Ltd. 1995 400 ERP and eBusiness
Entrepreneurial
5 Suntec Business Indian Pvt. Ltd. 1990 240 Software for BPO
Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Entrepreneurial
6 RM Education MNC Pvt. Ltd. 2003 137 Educational
Solutions India Pvt. Software
Ltd.
7 MDI Datanet India MNC Pvt. Ltd. 2004 37
Pvt. Ltd.
8 I Scribes India Pvt. Indian Pvt. Ltd. 2000 35 BPO
Ltd. Entrepreneurial I I
Source: (NASSCOM, 2006b), Company websites (accessed in March, 2007)
8.2 Policy Initiatives by the State for the Development of the Industry
Kerala was the last among the three states to adopt specific policy initiatives for
the industry. The state did not have any industry-specific policy initiative till 1998.
However, it was the first state among the three to build good infrastructure for the
industry. The state had established Technopark in the early 1990s, much earlier than
similar parks came up in Chennai and Hyderabad, with excellent infrastructure facilities.
The park offered both developed land and ready-built facilities for firms at about half the
cost of similar facilities in the other two states40 . The first firms moved in Technopark in
1994-95. The city itself had relatively good infrastructure and the cost of living was about
40 Source: Interview with government officials in Trivandrum.
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Firms in Hyderabad
30-40% lower than in the other two metros. The city also had an STPI center established
by the Government of India in 1992.
However, despite having good infrastructure and lower cost of operations, the
state fared poorly relative to the other two states in attracting software firms till the end of
1990s. What were the reasons for this failure? To answer this question, it is helpful to
analyze the policy measures adopted by the state in two phases: 1995-2000 and 2001-
2006. Table 8.4 lists the major initiatives taken by the state for the development of the
software industry in the state during 1995-2006.
Table 8.4: Major Policy Initiatives by the State Government for Development of the IT Industry
in Kerala
Year Policy Initiative What the Policy Did
1988 Technopark established, companies Provided specialized infrastructure for the
started moving in from 1995-96 industry
1992 STPI Trivandrum Established by Provided dedicated infrastructure and tax
the Central Government concessions to the firms
1998 First IT Policy of the State Provided a host of concessions: exemptions
from sales tax for seven years and from
Pollution Control Act, priority to IT industry
for power, 50% subsidy for captive power
generation, 20% subsidy on capital
investment subject to a maximum of Rs. 2.5
million
1998 State Advisory Council on IT Incorporated industry representatives and
academicians into the policy making process
of the state
2000 New Department of IT Created Facilitated direct interaction and coordination
with the industry
2000 IIITM-K established Specialized academic institution was
established to provide advanced training and
R&D support to the industry
2001 Second IT Policy of the State Provided incentives to Kerala based IT units
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in Government purchases and for creating
skilled labor, proposed reforms in labor laws
2002 IT Kerala started Annual exhibitions on the IT industry in the
state aimed at showcasing the state and
attracting potential investors
2002 Akshaya Project Launched A major e-government project launched
aimed at providing universal computer
literacy in the state
2002 Self-certification for compliance Allowed the IT firms to file self-certification
with labor laws for IT units for compliance with labor laws, thus
implementing similar labor reforms in the
state as in TN and AP
2005 Asian School of Business Established on the lines of the Indian School
established of Business in Hyderabad, it was aimed at
providing professionals with advanced skills
in business management
Source: Interviews with government officials and published government documents and
reports
8.2.1 The First Phase (1995-2000) - Failure to Rein in Labor and Shed Leftist
Image
One of the major problems that the state faced in attracting private enterprise was
the perception that the labor in the state was militant and the government was hostile to
capitalists. The state was considered to be a hotbed of trade union activities (Dayasindhu
& Pradeep, 2003). The state was ruled by a left coalition from 1996 to 2001 and it was
not considered to be friendly to large private investors (Krishnakumar, 2005). Unable to
shed its pro-labor and anti-private sector image, the state took only hesitant steps to
attract software firms during this period. Even these steps were taken more in response to
the rapid progress being made in developing the IT industry by its neighboring states of
152
Tamil Nadu and Kerala, rather than in any genuine belief in the role of large private
capital as a vehicle of economic development.
The first specific policy initiative of the state was to announce its first IT policy in
1998. This policy gave a number of fiscal and tax incentives to the industry to attract
them to the state: exemptions from sales tax for seven years and from the Pollution
Control Act, priority to the industry for power and 50% subsidy for captive power
generation, and 20% subsidy on capital investment subject to a maximum of Rs. 2.5
million. The state also formed a new department of IT in 2000 to deal exclusively with
policy making for the industry. It also established an Indian Institute of Information
Technology and Management (IIITM-K) in the same year to cater to the growing need
for specialized professionals for the industry.
Though these policies were on similar lines to those announced by Tamil Nadu
and Andhra Pradesh, they did not lead to any major inflow of new investments to the
state. There were several reasons for this. First, these policies were brought in
considerably later than in the other two states . Second, and more importantly, the prime
reason for the relative failure of the state to attract IT firms, as noted before, was the
perception of the state as a hotbed of trade union activities and the image of the state as
hostile to private enterprise (Dayasindhu & Pradeep, 2003; Tharamangalam, 1998). This
view was echoed by a senior government official in the state, who mentioned that "labor
is a concern here despite attempts by the government to exempt the IT firms from strikes,
etc....". Third, the state was also way behind its neighbors in the availability of skilled
labor, which was required to support a massive expansion of the software sector. In 2000,
4 As one senior state government official stated: "Kerala is a much later entrant compared to its
neighboring states in attracting the IT industry.."
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while Kerala produced only around 3,800 undergraduates with engineering degrees,
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh produced 15,500 and 8,100 respectively (Arora &
Bagde, 2006). Perceived problems due to hostile trade unions and unfriendly climate
towards private investments, coupled with inadequate availability of skilled labor in the
state, were the major reasons for Kerala lagging behind the other two states in attracting
investments in this industry during this period.
Another reason for the failure of the state in attracting big investments in the IT
sector during this period was its relatively greater focus on using ICT as an enabler of
social and economic development rather than promoting it as a production sector42 . The
state started a number of initiatives for e-governance and improving computer literacy in
schools and rural communities. Though this in itself was a noble objective, it did not help
in attracting the big software firms to the state.
Another reason was the failure of the state in acquiring domain expertise and
involving the industry in policy making. While industry representatives had been
incorporated in specific agencies for providing policy inputs in the other two states, this
did not happen in Kerala. The government's apathy towards the industry during this
period was apparent from the fact that the first visit by a president of NASSCOM to the
state was only in 2000 (Dayasindhu & Pradeep, 2003). Though the state created a
separate agency (the Kerala State IT Mission) to incorporate the representatives from the
industry and academia into policy making, this agency was not effective as the
government did not see large private firms as vehicles of economic growth.
42 One official said that this focus was due to the anti-private capital stance of the government.
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8.2.2 The Second Phase (2001-2006) - Shedding the Leftist Image and Reining in
Labor
Second IT Policy in 2001: Addressing Concerns on Labor
In 2001, a new congress led government was voted to power in the state. This
government was more private investor friendly in its ideology and believed in private and
foreign investment as engines for economic growth (Krishnakumar, 2005). After coming
to power, the new government announced the second IT policy of the state in 2001. This
policy sought to directly address the concerns of the private industry on the labor front. In
2002, the government permitted the IT firms to file self-certifications for compliance
with labor laws and exempted them from many of its provisions. These measures were
similar to what Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh had done earlier. It also exempted the
firms in Technopark from the strikes and other disruptions caused due to labor unrest in
the state".
Attracting FDI and Expatriate Professionals
It was only after this policy that the state government started to promote the state
actively to attract the software firms. It tried to attract the expatriate professionals from
the state living in the Gulf and the western countries to invest in the state. In 2002, it
started IT Kerala, an annual series of exhibitions aimed at showcasing the facilities and
incentives offered by the state and attracting the big software firms to the state. More
importantly, it projected the state as investor friendly and free from labor problems for
the firms in the hi-tech industry.
43 This was specifically done to address the concerns raised by the firms in Technopark. The vehicles
ferrying employees in and out of Technopark were promised police protection during the strikes.
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It also tried to attract foreign direct investment to the state. In 2003, it started a
new IT park in Kochi, another major city in the state. In the same year, it approved a
major proposal for foreign direct investment by Dubai Internet City for setting up a Smart
City in Cochin. However, the project suffered delays due to continuous negotiations over
it due to political opposition. Delays in decision making over major investments
contributed to slow growth of the industry in the state44 . With the change in government
in the state in 2006, decision over this project was further delayed as the new Left Front
government was ideologically opposed to this project.
Increasing the Availability of Skilled Labor
During this period, the state also took steps to improve the availability of skilled
labor in the state by allowing a large number of private engineering colleges to open in
the state. The number of technical graduates coming out of technical institutions from the
state went up to over 23,000 in 2006 from only 3,800 in 2000. It also started a specialized
institution, called the Asian School of Business, in collaboration with the private sector in
2005 to cater to the need for specialized management professionals for the industry.
Improving Linkages with the International Market
During this period, the state also made efforts to improve production and
marketing linkages of the local firms with the international market. The annual series of
44 One senior official remarked that consensus building took a long time in the state and delayed decisions
over crucial projects: "there is a delay in decision making due to consensus building. Negotiations for the
Smart City project took one year almost. Now the govt. has changed (a left front government took charge in
2006) and they want to renegotiate on that...".
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exhibitions, called IT Kerala, was aimed at achieving this goal. The state also tried to use
these events to showcase its investor-friendly policies to the potential investors.
Making the Bureaucracy more Responsive
The state also tried to make its bureaucracy more responsive through frequent
interactions with the potential investors in the IT industry. Kerala IT Mission, a
government sponsored agency consisting of government officials and industry
representatives set up by the previous government, was given a much greater role in
providing inputs for policy making to the government.
Conclusion
As can be seen from the discussion above, this state lagged behind the other two
states in the development and growth of this industry. The state was slow in
implementing policy reforms in key areas, such as labor reforms, increasing the
availability of skilled labor, promoting production and marketing linkages between the
local firms and the international market, and in attracting investments from the expatriate
professionals. It has also failed to involve the industry in its policy making process. The
state tried to follow the policies adopted by the other two states, but it lagged behind in
implementing the necessary reforms. The state did try to attract the software firms to the
state by implementing e-governance initiatives in several areas, but they had very limited
impact in growth of the industry. As noted before, the focus of the state during the first
phase (1995-2000) was more on utilizing ICT as an enabler of socio-economic
development rather than on promoting it as a production sector as was done in the other
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two states. It was only after 2001 that the government focused more on promoting the IT
industry in the state as a production sector.
The state was also relatively slow in acquiring domain expertise in its policy
making process for the industry. Though it established a state level advisory council on
the IT industry in 1998 that included industry experts, this had only a limited impact on
the policy making process of the state 45. The prevailing conditions of labor problems in
the state and lack of an investor friendly climate prevented the state from attracting a
larger share of the investments in the IT industry coming to the other two states in the
region. This was further compounded by the fact that the state did not have adequate
availability of skilled labor to support massive expansion of the industry to catch up with
the other two states. The leftist political leadership of the state was also not pro-active in
attracting the big players in the industry to the state before 2001, as was the case in
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. It was only after 2001, when a new party came to
power, that the state started promoting the industry actively. As noted before, the growth
of the industry picked up in the state during this period, especially after 2002.
8.3 Impact of the State's Policies on the Growth of the Software Industry
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the state has achieved only a limited
success in the development of software industry within its region. However, the state did
attract a number of firms to start operations in the state, including several multinationals.
What were the major factors that influenced the software firms to choose the state for
locating their units? Did the state help in obtaining finance, upgrading technology,
improving linkages with the international market, etc.? To help understand how exactly
45 One government official said that this was mainly due to the prevailing distrust of the private industry
among the leftist political leadership of the state.
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the state influenced these firms to locate there, I conducted in-depth interviews with 10
firms in Trivandurm during November and December 2006. As NASSCOM list
contained only eight firms in Trivandrum, I collected the list of the other firms from
Technopark, Trivandurm. Out of the ten firms interviewed, four were Foreign-expatriate
Indian firms, three were MNCs, and three were Indian entrepreneurial firms. I discuss
below the main conclusions from these interviews.
Major factors that influenced firms to locate in Trivandrum
For the local and the foreign-expatriate firms, the most important factor that
influenced them to choose the state was the ethnic origin of the founders or promoters of
the firm. The common factors cited by all the firms included much lower cost of
infrastructure and rented space, and significantly lower overall cost of operations.
Availability of land and rented space in Technopark was also cited by several firms. The
firms said that the cost of infrastructure and rented space in Technopark was almost one
third of that in Chennai and Hyderabad and one-fourth of the same in Bangalore. For the
multinational firms, the significantly lower cost of infrastructure and operations were the
main reasons for choosing the state. Significantly, the one time fiscal and tax concessions
offered by the state were not cited by the firms as the major factors influencing their
decision to locate in the state. As the company secretary of one Indian entrepreneurial
firm stated:
"..the promoters are mainly from this state and wanted to build an IT
corridor in this state. This was the main reason. State incentives were not
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the deciding factor. In fact, the firm did not avail of any major incentive,
except locating in Technopark.."
Significantly lower cost of operations in the city appeared to be an important
factor for location even for firms whose promoters were not from the state. In one
particular case of an Indian entrepreneurial firm, the CEO hailed from a north Indian
state. However, he stated that had chosen Trivandrum to locate his firm due to almost one
third lower costs of operations in the city compared to Chennai46.
It is useful to further examine the background of the promoters of the foreign-
expatriate Indian firms to understand the different roles played by the leading universities
in the state and the second level private technical institutions in forming the international
linkages. Of the five foreign-expatriate Indian firms interviewed in the city, promoters of
three are graduates of leading universities in the state and country (Madras University
and Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore) 47. They emigrated to the west in the 1970s
and 1980s and went on to work in leading firms in the US and Canada. Promoters of the
remaining two are Indian Americans with ethnic origins in the state. As noted in the other
two case studies, this again underscores the important role played by the graduates of the
leading universities in the state and the country in forming international production and
marketing linkages for the industry in the state. These expatriates provided the
entrepreneurial and technical leadership by establishing firms in the state. These firms in
turn employed the skilled graduates from the undergraduate level private institutions in
the state.
46 As the CEO of the firm stated: "rental rates are much cheaper, availability of talent, and the quality of life
is better.... The promoter is not from this state and hence that was not a factor.."
47 Source: interviews with firms and company websites (accessed in March 2007).
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Linkages with the State Owned and Privately Owned Local IT Firms
Like in the other two states, exports are the main source of revenue for almost all
the firms interviewed. The firms here have virtually no linkages with the state owned or
other local IT firms.
Availability of Skilled Labor in the State
Most of the firms stated that skilled labor was not adequately available in the
state. This was particularly true at middle and senior levels where the firms were often
forced to hire from Tamil Nadu or Andhra Pradesh to make up for the shortfall. They also
mentioned that this was a constraining factor for expansion of the industry in the state.
Labor Relations in the State
Several firms mentioned that labor militancy was an issue in the state. However,
they said that the government had taken steps to exempt the firms in Technopark from
strikes etc. by the labor unions. However, strikes in the city or the state did affect the
firms in Technopark as many workers were unable to come due to lack of transport
facilities. On the days of strike, the attendance was usually 20-25% lower compared to
the same on normal days. A senior executive of a foreign-expatriate firm stated that the
firm lost productivity due to strikes on around 10 days in a year when around one-fourth
of the employees would be absent and the clients would not be able to come to the office.
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Awareness among Government Officials about the Needs of the IT Industry
Most of the firms stated that though the state had taken steps to involve the
industry in providing inputs for making policies, the bureaucracy in the state was not very
quick and pro-active in addressing the concerns of the industry. This was due to the fact
that the political leadership in the state was not seen as very friendly towards private
industry till 2001. However, with the change in the political leadership in 2001, the
bureaucracy was more pro-active in involving the industry in policy-making. However,
there were some problems again on this front after the Left Front came back to power in
2006.
Involvement of the Firms in the Policy Making Process of the State/Central Government
Most of the firms interviewed said that they had no direct involvement in the
policy-making process of the state. However, since a large proportion of the firms in
Trivandrum were located inside Technopark, they interacted frequently with the officials
of the Technopark on issues relating to infrastructure, etc.
Unlike in Chennai and Hyderabad, NASSCOM has not made any major efforts to
interact with the state government on policy issues for the industry. In fact, till 2000,
when the Left Front government was in power, NASSCOM did not have even a single
48
meeting with the top political leadership of the state . It was only after 2001, when a new
government came to power and implemented several pro-industry policy reforms that
NASSCOM started interacting actively with the state on these issues.
48 This was confirmed by a senior government official in the state.
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Linkages with Global Production Networks
All the firms interviewed said that they were almost exclusively engaged in
exports. Export orientation of the firms here is much more than in Chennai and
Hyderabad. The domestic market in the state is miniscule. The MNC subsidiaries are
mostly engaged in serving their parent firms. However, as most of the firms are Foreign-
expatriate and Indian entrepreneurial, the linkages of these firms with the global
production networks are relatively stronger.
Access to Finance
Like in the other two cities, for most of the Indian entrepreneurial and Foreign-
expatriate Indian entrepreneurial firms, the main source of finance is promoters' equity.
For the MNC subsidiaries, finance has come from their parent firms. Significantly, none
of the firms said that they had availed of any venture capital. This was due to lack of
availability of such financing for the local firms.
Like in the other two states, the state's role has been very limited in facilitating
access to finance for these firms.
R&D and Technology Upgradation by the Firm
All the non-MNC firms interviewed said that they conducted all their R&D in-
house. The MNC subsidiaries received R&D from their parent firms. The state's role in
providing or facilitating R&D has been very limited. Even the IIITM-K does not have a
strong collaboration with the industry for R&D.
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8.4 Analysis of the State Government's Role in the Development of the Software
Industry in the State
This state is an example of a shadow case where the development of this industry
was comparatively much less successful when compared to the other two states. In this
section, I discuss how the state's policies affected the growth of this industry in the state.
It is useful to briefly summarize the state's policies to promote the development
of this industry within its region and why they failed during the first phase (1995-2000).
As discussed in the preceding sections, during this phase, the state clearly failed to
establish itself as a major destination for the software industry. This was despite the fact
that the state had created a good infrastructure, had relatively lower cost of operations,
and had announced its first IT policy in 1998 almost simultaneously with the other two
states. This was due to several reasons. First, there was a strong perception among the
firms that the labor in the state was militant and that the firms faced frequent difficulties
due to numerous strikes, both within firms and city or state wide shutdowns due to
political agitations, etc. Though the software firms generally did not face problems from
their own workers, they suffered on the days of general city or state wide strikes as the
workers were not able to come to office. This was true of firms even in Technopark
where the government had given assurances that the workers would be given adequate
protection on the days of strikes. Even here, around 15-20% of the employees would not
be able to come to office on the days of general strikes in the city of the state. The state
evidently failed to carry out the necessary labor reforms to assure the private investors
that labor problems would not be allowed to disrupt their operations.
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Second, the ruling leftist government in the state during this period was not
supportive of the software industry due to its deep distrust of large scale private capital. It
instead focused more on using ICTs as a tool for social and economic development in the
rural areas by opening computer kiosks in villages and providing government services
online. Though this policy had a very noble objective as it aimed at providing
information and services to the rural population, it was not effective in attracting firms
engaged in software production and exports.
Third, the state did not have adequate availability of skilled labor which was
required for a massive expansion of the industry. As noted before, the number of
technically qualified graduates passing out each year in the state was much less than in
the other two states till the early 2000's.
Fourth, the state failed to involve the industry in policy making. It was not until
2000 that a president of NASSCOM visited the state (Dayasindhu & Pradeep, 2003).
Though the state created a separate agency (the Kerala State IT Mission) to incorporate
the representatives from the industry and academia into policy making, this agency was
not effective as the government did not want to be seen as promoting large private firms
in the state.
Fifth, the state also failed to promote linkages between the local firms and the
international market. There was little attempt to market the capabilities of the local
industry in the international market. The state also made little attempt to involve the
expatriate community from the state either to invest in the state or to promote the local
industry abroad.
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The state did try to influence the local demand for software by investing in e-
governance projects and by opening computer kiosks in villages. However, it had only a
marginal impact on attracting software firms and certainly failed to attract firms in
software production for exports.
During the second phase (2001-2006), the state tried to adopt policies similar to
what the other two states had done. The major policy initiatives during this period
included implementing labor reforms and exempting firms from the provisions of several
state laws, promoting linkages between local firms and the international market,
attracting large multinational and nationally owned firms, increasing the availability
skilled labor by allowing private technical institutes to produce more graduates, involving
the industry more closely in policy making, and attracting expatriates from the state to
invest in the state. These initiatives resulted in a significant increase in software exports
from the state during this period.
Political Economy of State Policies in Kerala
As the state policies in Kerala differ sharply from those in the other two states, it
is useful to analyze the institutional factors and the political economy reasons for the
relative failure of the state in developing this industry. As mentioned in the literature
review in chapter 2, scholars have noted the class character of the Indian state and how
constant bargaining by the dominant class coalitions consisting of rich farmers,
industrialists, and working class professionals to protect and advance their interests has
affected the actions of the state after independence (Bardhan, 1984, 1998; Byres, 1994;
Chaudhuri, 1995; Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990). While this phenomenon helps to explain the
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actions of the state in most parts of the country, in Kerala, the state was relatively
autonomous of the dominant class coalitions (Cairo, 2001; Dre'ze & Sen, 1995). In this
state, politics has been marked by mobilization and organization of traditionally
marginalized castes and social groups as a result of many caste and social movements
during the pre-independence era (Cairo, 2001; Desai, 2001). The communist party in the
state played an active role in this mobilization and organization. The empowerment of
these groups exerted pressures on the state for distributing the economic and social
benefits widely. This has resulted in the state focusing on distribution rather than capital
accumulation and growth (Cairo, 2001). The model of governance in Kerala thus has
been relatively more autonomous of the dominant class interests unlike in the other states
of the country.
The relatively autonomous character of the state in Kerala has been partly
responsible for its failure in implementing policies similar to what the other two states
did. The ruling left coalition during 1996-2001 could not have ignored the political
implications of being seen in league with the big private capitalists and implementing
labor reforms and acting tough with trade unions which were its major support bases. Its
defeat in the 2001 elections and coming into power of a more private capital friendly
government led to significant changes in the state's policies for the industry and
contributed to its relatively higher growth during this period.
167
9 Comparative Analysis of the States' Role in the Development of the
Software Industry in the Three States
From the discussion in the preceding chapters, it is clear that the strategies
adopted by the state in the three regions for developing their software industries differ
sharply from the dominant paradigms in the literature. Two of the cases (Tamil Nadu and
Andhra Pradesh) examined are successful examples of how a pro-active government
succeeded in attracting software firms to its region and in increasing its share
dramatically in the national exports of software. The third case (Kerala) is an illustration
of a relatively unsuccessful case where the state's share in the national exports stagnated
during the same period, though it showed some signs of success after 2001.
Though each of the cases examined here present useful illustrations of what
worked and what did not in those states, it is helpful to conduct a comparative cross-case
analysis of the three cases to analyze the systematic linkages between government
policies and the growth of this industry in these states. In this chapter, I try to do this
analysis using the analytical techniques of 'method of agreement' and 'method of
difference' (Mill, 1888), pattern matching (Yin, 2003), and method of congruence
(George & Bennett, 2005b). These methods allow us to analyze the covariations between
the explanatory and the dependent variables, help us in understanding the causal
mechanisms behind these relationships, and also help us in eliminating the plausible rival
explanations. With the help of techniques such as process tracing for analyzing within
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cases, we can also understand how interaction effects among the explanatory variables
affect the outcome.
I conduct the comparative analysis separately for the two major sub-units
examined in this research: government policies and firms in the three states. While a
comparative analysis of government policies in the three cases would give us an idea of
which policies were effective in developing this industry in these regions, analyzing the
firm level responses would help us in understanding the reasons behind the firms'
choosing these states and in supporting and validating the overall conclusions drawn from
the analysis on government policies. In the next chapter, I draw common strands from
both analyses and present an analytical and theoretical framework for successful regional
development strategies in developing regions for high technology industries such as
software.
9.1 Role of Government Policies
As noted before, I examine the regional government policies for this industry in
the three states under the following nine major categories: provision of industry specific
factors (physical and communications infrastructure and increasing the availability of
skilled labor); labor reforms; subsidies and tax incentives; acquiring industry-specific
domain knowledge relevant to policy-making by incorporating industry representatives
and academicians into the policy making process; attracting large firms (MNCs and
nationally owned); improving the linkages between the local industry and the
international market; provision of R&D; providing or facilitating access to finance; and
influencing the demand conditions using e-government as a tool to attract software firms
to the state. In addition, in this analysis, I also use 'prior' experience of the state in
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academic and R&D capabilities and availability of skilled labor at the start of reforms as
an explanatory variable as it may help to explain why two of the states succeeded while
the third one did not.
It is helpful to examine how and to what extent the three states adopted and
implemented these policies. In the Table 9.1 below, I present a comparative picture of
how the three states implemented these polices during the two phases after 1991: 1991-
2000 and 2001-2006.
Table 9.1: Comparative analysis of the states' policies for the software industry after 1991
Explanatory Tamil Nadu Andhra Pradesh Kerala
Variable
Physical and Yes Yes Yes
communications
infrastructure
Availability of skilled Yes Yes No (first phase*)
labor Yes (second phase**)
Labor reforms Yes Yes No (first phase)
Yes (second phase)
Subsidies and tax Yes Yes Yes (limited during
incentives first phase)
Industry-specific Yes Yes No (first phase)
domain knowledge Yes (second phase)
State-industry Yes Yes No (first phase)
interaction Yes (second phase)
Attracting large firms No (first phase) Yes No (first phase)
Yes (second phase) Yes (second phase)
Promoting linkages Yes Yes No (first phase)
between local industry Yes (second phase)
and global market
Influencing local Yes Yes Yes
demand conditions
Provision of R&D No Yes (to a limited No
extent)
Provision of Finance No No No
Prior Experience at Yes Yes No
the start of reforms in
1991 1
* First phase: 1991-2000
** Second Phase: 2001-2006
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Policies of the different states had significant impacts on the development and
growth of the industry within these states. Employing a cross-case comparative analysis, I
discuss below which of these policies significantly affected the growth of the industry in
these states.
Physical and Communications Infrastructure
This emerges as one of the most important policy initiatives that all the three
states implemented. All the three states built industry-specific physical and
communications infrastructure to attract the software firms. As discussed in the
individual case studies, availability of good infrastructure was one of the most important
factors that attracted software firms to all the three states, though, as noted earlier, Kerala
lagged behind due to its inadequate availability of skilled labor, lack of labor and other
policy reforms, and its distrust of large private enterprises.
Availability of Skilled Labor
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh took major policy initiatives to increase the
availability of skilled labor for the industry. This was done mainly by allowing the
private sector to open new technical institutions for providing undergraduate technical
education. This improved the supply of qualified technical graduates to the industry.
Andhra Pradesh also started an advanced technical institute (1IIT Hyderabad) to impart
advanced post-graduate training to students and provide limited R&D support to the
industry. Tamil Nadu also started an advanced institute for training, but it did not succeed
and was later merged with a leading state university. However, it already had an
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advanced national level institute (IIT Madras) in the city for advanced education and
research.
Kerala lagged behind in this aspect upto 2000 and consequently suffered in
attracting firms. However, it subsequently allowed a number of new private colleges to
open and the availability of technical graduates in the state increased.
Labor Reforms
Both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh implemented pro-employer labor reforms.
They exempted the software industry from provisions of several labor laws, which
permitted them flexibility in their operations. Kerala lagged behind in implementing
these reforms till 2001. It also suffered from a poor reputation among investors due to a
long history of labor problems and militant trade unions. The ruling left party in the state
was also not seen to be supportive of large private enterprise. As interviews with the
firms indicate, these factors adversely affected the growth of the industry in this state.
Subsidies and Tax Incentives
All the three states provided investment subsidies and tax incentives to attract
firms. These included subsidized cost of land and/or built-up space, rebate on registration
charges, one time subsidies depending on the size of investment being made, subsidized
power, etc. In granting these subsidies, all the three states imposed monitorable
performance standards to discourage fly-by-night operators.
However, with the exception of allotment of land, these subsidies and incentives
had only a minimal impact on attracting firms. Even in the allotment of land and built-up
172
space, the chief attraction for the firms was not the subsidy, but the ease of starting
operations immediately. As interviews with firms in all the three states indicate, the
industry did not need these one-time incentives as it was already internationally
competitive at prevailing market prices.
Industry-specific Domain Knowledge and State-Industry Interaction
Both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh tried to acquire industry-specific domain
knowledge to be able to frame better policies for the industry. This was done by
involving the industry and academicians into the policy making process. The role of these
outside experts was to provide specific advice on the support that the government could
give to the industry. Both governments created new state agencies to achieve this. The
state level bodies were headed by the chief minister of the state and had representatives
from the industry and the academia. They also created a separate government department
headed by a senior government official for dealing exclusively with policy making and
implementation for this industry and responding quickly to their needs. They also
permitted long tenures (usually three-five years) for these career bureaucrats to enable
them to acquire industry-specific domain expertise for policy-making. The government
officials were encouraged to interact with the industry frequently to understand the issues
that the industry was facing. However, it is relevant to note here that the involvement of
industry representatives and academicians in these new bodies was only in an advisory
capacity, they were never made in-charge of policy formulation or implementation. That
task remained with the permanent bureaucracy of the state.
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Kerala also created separate agencies for involving outside experts in policy-
making. However, these were ineffective till 2001 as the political leadership of the state
did not want to be seen promoting large private investments in the state. It was only after
2001 that the state started interacting with the industry closely. On the other hand, the
Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh displayed exceptional entrepreneurial leadership in
interacting with the industry and involving them closely in the policy-making process of
the state.
Attracting Large Firms
Both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh focused on attracting large firms to their
state. Andhra Pradesh adopted a specific strategy to attract large multinational firms right
from the beginning. Getting Microsoft to open a development center in Hyderabad in
1997 was a big success for the state and it facilitated the entry of several other large
MNCs to the city. Tamil Nadu adopted this strategy during the second phase after 2001
but it did not focus specifically on large multinationals. The strategy to attract these firms
in both states was based on providing them with subsidized land and/or ready built space
with all infrastructure, investment and tax incentives, and 'single window' clearances to
allow them to start operations immediately. Again, Kerala failed to attract large firms
despite having good infrastructure and land as the other conditions were not in place:
chiefly, pro-employer labor reforms, adequate availability of skilled labor, and
willingness of the state's political leadership to market the state as friendly to private
capital.
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Promoting linkages between local industry and global market
Both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh tried to promote linkages between the local
industry and the international market. The linkages that they tried to promote were
mainly of two kinds: production linkages in outsourcing relationships with firms and
marketing linkages to showcase the abilities of the state and the firms to attract more
customers. They tried to promote the production linkages with firms in the developed
countries by tapping into the huge network of expatriate community of professionals
from the state working in those countries. The promotion of marketing linkages was
mainly through organizing mega exhibitions in the state, and holding road shows abroad
and participating in trade and industry exhibitions, etc.
Kerala was again relatively slow in this regard. It did not make any specific and
concerted efforts till 2001 to promote linkages between the local industry and the
international market.
Influencing local demand conditions
All three states tried to influence the local demand conditions for the industry by
initiating government sponsored projects for e-governance in various government
departments and agencies. However, they had only limited impacts in an industry where
almost 80% of revenues came from exports. As interviews with the firms indicate, they
were focused almost exclusively on exports and had little incentive for participating in
government projects that often required tedious and lengthy tender procedures that were
awarded on lowest cost.
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Provision of R&D
Only Andhra Pradesh made some notable efforts to provide and subsidize R&D
for the firms. This was done by setting up exclusive firm-sponsored R&D centers within
IIIT-Hyderabad. However, the government did not decide on the type of R&D for the
industry. The sponsoring firms were free to conduct R&D on a technology of their choice
at the institute. These firm sponsored centers produced a cadre of skilled engineers
trained in advanced technologies being developed by the firm. The sponsoring firms for
R&D were mostly MNCs. Though it is too early to say whether R&D support by the
government had any impact on attracting firms to the state, interviews with the firms
indicate that it did increase the supply of engineers with advanced and specialized skills
to the market. This definitely was an attraction for the firms doing advanced work on
developing new technologies.
Tamil Nadu did not provide any significant support to R&D for the industry,
though it did help the industry by increasing the supply of engineers with generic skills
by involving the private sector in opening new technical institutions. Kerala failed even
in this regard till the turn of the century as noted before.
Provision of Finance
None of the states provided any significant support to the firms in accessing
finance. Both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh tried to set up a separate venture capital
fund for the industry, but they did not succeed. Interviews with the firms indicate that the
main reason for this was the fact that the demand for venture capital by the firms from the
government was low as the firms were generally able to get finance from their promoters
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or from the banks. Moreover, the amount available from the government promoted
venture capital fund was relatively very low.
Prior Experience at the Start of Reforms
It is important to analyze whether 'prior experience' of the states at the start of the
reforms in 1991 mattered in the development of the industry. Both Tamil Nadu and
Andhra Pradesh had several local leading software firms in 1991. Tamil Nadu had an
advanced academic and R&D institute, the IIT, in Chennai. Both states had permitted the
private sector to open technical institutions much before the start of reforms. These
institutions provided the bulk of the skilled labor for the industry, while the IIT graduates
provided the technical leadership for the industry. As many graduates from the IIT and
other engineering colleges had emigrated to the west in search of better career
opportunities during the 1970s and 1980s, both states also had very sizable immigrant
professional communities living abroad. As noted before, these immigrants contributed
significantly to the growth of the industry in both these states.
Tamil Nadu also had a diversified industrial base at that time which had attracted
a number of hardware and software firms to provide services to them. Andhra Pradesh
had a network of defense R&D labs in the city that employed technical professionals with
advanced skills. Many of these professionals later went on to work with local software
firms that were coming up in the city. Hyderabad was also home to a number of major
pharmaceutical firms in the country at that time. Probably these factors contributed to the
growth and development of the software industry in these two states subsequently as they
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already had advanced skilled labor, and the basic technical and analytical skills and
experience prior to reforms.
Though Kerala also had good technical institutions at that time, they were very
few in number as the state did not permit the private sector to open technical institutions
till 1992. Kerala also did not have a diversified industrial base in the state as the state did
not encourage large private enterprises. The state also had a history of labor problems and
militant trade unions, which did not encourage private investment in the state. Though the
state had a significant presence in advanced R&D as it was home to an advanced space
research center established by the government of India, it did not contribute to the growth
of the private software industry in the state as the state did not encourage private
investment. This is evident from the fact that the state did not have any local leading
software firms before the start of reforms.
In conclusion, we can say that the presence of a sizable base of skilled labor, a
large pool of immigrant professionals abroad, and a diversified industrial and R&D base
prior to the start of reforms contributed to the success of these states in developing the
software industry during the post-reforms period.
Conclusion
From the discussion in the preceding sections, we can see that the following
government policies contributed to the success of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh in this
industry: provision of industry-specific factors (physical and communications
infrastructure and supply of skilled labor); labor reforms; acquiring industry-specific
domain knowledge and state-industry interaction; attracting large firms (MNCs and
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nationally owned); improving the linkages between the local industry and the
international market; and provision of R&D (to a very limited extent). Prior experience at
the start of the reforms mattered as the state already had some leading local firms and a
pool of skilled labor. What did not succeed were attempts by the state to influence the
local demand conditions through government projects, providing venture capital, and one
time subsidies and incentives.
9.2 Impact of the States' Policies on the Growth of the Industry
To examine the extent to which the government's policies helped in the growth of
the industry and influenced the firms to locate in the state, it is useful to conduct a
comparative analysis of the responses from the firms in the three states. I present this
comparative analysis in the Table 9.2 below.
Table 9.2: Comparative analysis of the impact of the states' policies on the software industry after 1991
Explanatory Variable Firms in Tamil Nadu Firms in Andhra Firms in Kerala
Pradesh
Major factors that influenced
firms to locate:
Availability of infrastructure Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic linkages of Promoters Yes Yes Yes
Availability of skilled labor Yes Yes Yes (to a limited extent)
Quality of Skilled Labor Yes Yes Yes (to a limited extent)
Subsidies/incentives from No No No
Govt.
Entrepreneurial leadership of No Yes No
the Govt.
Linkages with the local IT
firms:
State owned No No No
Private firms No No No
Govt. support for labor reforms Yes Yes Yes (after 2001)
in the State
Awareness among government Good Good Low before 2001
officials about the needs of the Improved after 2001
IT industry
Involvement of the firm in the No direct involvement No direct involvement No direct involvement




linkages with global clients
Firm's own efforts Yes Yes Yes
Govt. support Yes Yes Yes (after 2001)
Access to Finance
Promoters' equity Yes Yes Yes
Venture capital No No No
Parent firm Yes (where applicable) Yes (where applicable) Yes (where applicable)
Banks Yes Yes Yes
Govt. No No No
R&D and Technology
Upgradation by the Firm
Own R&D Yes Yes Yes
Academic/R&D Institutions
Public No Yes (to a limited extent) No
Private No No No
Source: Author's compilation based on field research
Major factors that influenced firms to locate in the state
Availability of infrastructure and ethnic linkages of the main promoters of the
firm emerged as the common factors that were cited by firms in all the three states.
Availability and quality of skilled labor were cited by firms in the two successful states of
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh while they were of limited attraction for the firms in
Kerala. Several firms in Kerala said that lack of adequate skilled labor in the state was a
constraint on their further expansion. This was due to the fact that though availability had
increased during the recent years, many graduates from the state did not want to work in
Kerala as it lacked sufficient opportunities for career advancement.
One time subsidies and tax incentives from the state government were not a major
attraction for firms in any of the states, though allotment of land and/or built up space
was a big attraction in all the three states. However, what attracted the firms was not the
subsidized cost of land by itself, but the ease of starting operations immediately when
land and space were made available immediately by the government. Moreover, the
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subsidized land was mostly offered to large firms (both multinational and national) and
not to small and medium sized firms who could have benefited from the subsidy. The
large firms did not need the subsidy as they were already highly profitable and
competitive in the international market.
Entrepreneurial leadership of the political executive was a significant factor in
attracting firms in Andhra Pradesh, particularly the multinationals. Personal initiative
shown by the Chief Minister of the state along with very quick decisions on allotment of
land and other regulatory approvals was an important factor for the MNCs to choose the
state.
Linkages with the local ITfirns
Significantly, firms in all the three states said that they had virtually no linkages
for production with the other local firms. They are almost exclusively focused on the
export market and the only linkages they have with the other firms are in terms of sharing
a common labor pool and interacting in common forums for providing policy inputs to
the government. There is virtually no sub-contracting to other local firms due to
restrictions placed on them by their clients. Some of the larger domestic firms have set up
their own subsidiaries to take up the IT services/BPO work instead of subcontracting to
others.
Govt. support for labor reforms in the State
Firms in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh said that the government was pro-active
in implementing pro-employer labor reforms, while those in Kerala said that while they
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faced no labor problems in their own firms, the frequent city wide and state wide strikes
called by trade unions affected them as a large number of their employees were unable to
attend office on those days. They said, however, that the government in Kerala had
implemented a number of reforms in labor laws concerning the software industry after
2001 that had eased the procedural difficulties they faced in compliance with the local
labor laws.
Awareness among government officials about the needs of the IT industry
Though the firms in all the three states were not directly involved in interacting
with the government, in both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, they said that the
government officials were generally aware of the needs of the industry and what the
government should be doing to promote it. This awareness had come about due to the
efforts of the government to have regular interactions with the industry. The state had
created specific agencies to involve the industry in the policy-making process and this
had helped in creating more awareness about the industry among the government
agencies and officials.
The firms in Kerala had a different experience. They said that while the state had
created separate agencies for dealing with the industry and had involved them in
interactions with these agencies, the political leadership in the government was not very
enthusiastic about promoting the industry. As there was no clear leadership from the
government, the officials felt handicapped in responding quickly to the needs of the
industry. However, this had changed after 2001 and the new government was very
supportive of the industry.
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Involvement of the firm in the policy making process of the state/central government
Firms in all the three states stated that they were not involved directly in the
policy making process of the state or the central government. However, the larger firms
said that they interacted regularly through industry associations at state and national
levels on the needs of the industry and what the government should do. At the state level,
Andhra Pradesh and Kerala have city level associations that interacted with the
government regularly. At the national level, NASSCOM represented the industry before
the central government. NASSCOM also interacted with the state governments, though
less frequently. In Kerala, NASSCOM had virtually no interaction with the government
till 2000.
Govt. support for marketing and production linkages with global clients
Firms in both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh said that most of the production
and marketing linkages that the firm had were developed by their own with the help of
promoters' contacts or through existing relationships with multinational clients.
However, the governments in both states had played a supportive role in promoting these
linkages. This was done by the government through organizing mega exhibitions in the
capital city periodically and also by holding road shows and taking part in exhibitions and
trade shows abroad. However, this had benefited mainly the large and the medium firms.
The government had also tried to involve the non-resident professionals from the state in
the development of the industry by encouraging them to invest in the state.
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Firms in Kerala said that the government had not done much till 2001 to promote
these linkages. However, after 2001, the government had become more pro-active and
was following polices similar to those by the other two states in this regard.
Access to finance
Domestic firms in all the three states said that their main sources of finance were
promoters' equity and loan from banks for creating infrastructure and working capital.
None of the firms interviewed had availed of venture capital. For the multinational firms,
the finance came from their parent firms. Significantly, none of the firms had availed of
any direct financial support from the government either in the form of venture capital or
other loans.
R&D and technology upgradation by the firm
Domestic firms in all the three states stated that they conducted almost all their
R&D within the firm. The MNC subsidiaries engaged in IT services stated that they got
their R&D from their parent firms. The captive development centers of the MNCs said
that were engaged in conducting R&D on developing new technologies or products for
their parent firms. There is virtually no government support for R&D, except in Andhra




From the analysis in the preceding sections, it is clear that the major factors that
attracted firms to the two successful states were availability of infrastructure, ethnic
linkages of the promoters or founders, availability of skilled labor, pro-employer labor
policies of the government, and pro-active and entrepreneurial leadership of the
government. The firms are mostly focused on exports and have virtually no linkages with
the other local IT firms, except for sharing a common labor pool and interacting in
common forums like industry associations for providing policy inputs to the government.
The firms have developed marketing and production linkages with their global clients
mostly on their own, though the process has been facilitated by the government. The
firms access finance mainly from their promoters' equity, from their parent firm, or from
banks. They have not availed of venture capital. The governments have not played any
significant role in providing finance. R&D is mostly done by the firms themselves or is
provided by their parent firms in case of multinational subsidiaries. The government's
role in supplying R&D has been very limited, except in Andhra Pradesh, where the
government made efforts to promote linkages between the industry and an advanced
technical institution for R&D.
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10 Competitive Flexibility: A New Theoretical Framework on
Development Strategies for Hi-tech Industries in Developing
Regions
From the discussion in the preceding chapters, we can now see the broad outlines
of the development strategies adopted by the two successful states to promote their
software industries. The comparative cross-case analysis of the three cases in the last
chapter also gives us insights into why Kerala failed to emulate its more successful
neighbors in promoting this industry. In this chapter, I attempt to distil the essential
elements of the development strategies adopted by these states to succeed in this industry
and then discuss their broader implications for developing regions in general.
10.1 Regional Development Strategies in these States
It is useful to briefly recapitulate the strategies adopted by these states that proved
successful in attracting software firms to their regions. These strategies can be divided
into the following five major categories: provision of specialized factors of production
(industry-specific infrastructure, skilled labor); pro-employer regulatory and labor
reforms; attracting leading firms to the region; improving industry-specific domain
knowledge among the bureaucracy and encouraging state-industry interaction in policy
making; and promoting production and marketing linkages between the local industry
and the international market. I briefly summarize below what these strategies were and
how they helped these states to attract these firms.
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10.1.1 Successful State Policies
Provision of specialized factors of production
The most important strategy that all the three states adopted was to provide
specialized factors of production for the industry. This consisted of industry-specific
infrastructure such as land and ready-built "plug and play" facilities, and provision of
professional skilled labor. Most of the infrastructure was created through a novel public-
private partnership model where the direct financial subsidy from the government was
relatively quite low. The main idea behind creating the industry specific infrastructure
was to make it easy for the firms to start operations immediately in the city. This became
a major attraction for the firms as the general perception was that it could take several
months for a firm to build its own premises or rent one before it could start operations.
Scarcity of adequate built up facilities in the private sector suitable for the IT industry
was another reason why the government provided infrastructure became a big attraction
for these firms.
Another major factor was the adequate availability of skilled labor in Tamil Nadu
and Andhra Pradesh. Both these states had permitted the private sector to open
undergraduate technical institutions much before the start of reforms. This had helped
them in building a sizable base of skilled labor at the start of the reforms when they
started attracting the software firms. Kerala was the last to permit the private sector to
open technical institutions in 1992 and thus did not have adequate availability of skilled
labor during the 1990s to allow a massive expansion of the industry.
It is relevant to point out here that all these private colleges had to follow national
guidelines from the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) for ensuring
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quality of education. This ensured that the quality of graduates from these colleges was
good and met the requirements of the industry for skilled professionals. This ensured a
steady supply of well-trained professionals to the industry. Andhra Pradesh also started
an advanced training and research institution, called the Indian Institute of Information
Technology-Hyderabad, to cater to the demand for highly skilled professionals for the
industry. Tamil Nadu also started a similar institute, but it did not take off due lack of
commitment on the part of the government. However, it already had two advanced
institutions: the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) and Anna University at Chennai that
supplied highly trained professionals to the industry. As noted before, Kerala lagged
behind in these initiatives. The number of trained engineers coming out of the institutes
in this state was much lower compared to the other two states. This adversely affected the
development of the industry there.
It is important to note here that these states did not make any notable efforts to
provide R&D for the industry, except for some limited support by Andhra Pradesh.
Andhra Pradesh established specialized R&D centers at IIIT-Hyderabad in partnership
with some leading multinational and domestic firms. However, these centers were
engaged more in specialized training for the students on the technologies they were
working instead of high-end R&D. However, these centers helped in creating a pool of
highly trained professionals who were available to the local firms for employment. Thus
they did help the local industry to some extent.
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Pro-employer regulatory and labor reforms
Both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh implemented pro-employer regulatory and
labor reforms. This included simplification of procedures for getting statutory approvals
for starting a firm through a 'single window system' and implementing pro-employer
labor reforms. The labor reforms included granting exemption to the firms from
compliance with the provisions of several labor laws, such as Factories Act, Shops and
Establishments Acts, etc., and allowing them to file self-compliance reports under other
laws. They specifically prohibited government inspectors from inspecting these units for
compliance with these laws. However, it must be said that generally these firms did not
face any contentions issues with the labor as the demand for labor was high and they
were competing for attracting the best skilled workers.
Kerala was relatively slow in adopting these reforms. The perception among the
firms that Kerala was not private investor friendly and the trade unions were not
supportive of large scale private investments contributed to the relatively slow growth of
the industry in that state.
Attracting Leading Firms to the Region
Both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh adopted strategies to attract large firms to
their regions. These strategies included specific case-by-case discretionary investment
and tax incentives depending on the size of investments, allotment of land, and provision
of infrastructure. However, the focus of the two states varied considerably. While Tamil
Nadu did not specifically focus on multinational or national firms, Andhra Pradesh
focused specifically on attracting the large multinational firms. The chief minister of the
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state himself displayed entrepreneurial leadership in personally interacting with the CEOs
of leading multinationals and convincing them to invest in the state. However, it should
be noted that the state first quickly developed the necessary infrastructure, increased the
supply of skilled labor, and implemented pro-employer labor and regulatory reforms to
make the region attractive for the firms. These factors were more important in attracting
the firms to the region than the tax incentives and subsidies. Kerala lagged behind in
implementing these reforms and hence was unable to attract large firms despite having a
good infrastructure.
Industry-specific Domain Knowledge and State-Industry Interaction
Encouraging bureaucracy to acquire industry-specific domain knowledge was a
major policy initiative by all the three states, though Kerala was slow in this aspect too.
This was done by encouraging deeper state-industry interaction on issues affecting the
industry and posting competent and knowledgeable officials in departments and agencies
dealing with the industry. All the three states created a separate department for dealing
exclusively with policy making and implementation for this industry. They also allowed
relatively long tenures for officials in these departments to develop a deeper knowledge
of the industry. These polices represented a major departure from the established practice
in India of discouraging close interaction between government officials and private
industry due to fear of corruption.
All these states also designated a separate public agency as the nodal agency for
dealing with the industry on a more regular and sustained basis. These agencies were also
headed by government officials. However, the task of these agencies was to interact with
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the industry regularly and provide inputs for policies to the government. They were also
involved in implementation of certain policies of the government, such as assessing and
recommending firms for grant of subsidies and statutory approvals, etc. However, they
did not exercise control or power over other government agencies. Other government
agencies dealing with the industry functioned as per their own rules and regulations in
implementing decisions of the government.
Another strategy to improve the industry-specific domain knowledge within the
government and use it for policy making was to involve industry experts and
academicians in the policy making process. This was done by creating new state level
advisory bodies that had representatives from the industry and academia along with
politicians and government officials. The highest level body in the state was headed by
the chief minister, the highest political executive in the state. These bodies were outside
the traditional bureaucratic structure as the civil service structure in India does not permit
recruiting outside experts in traditional government departments.
The role of the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh was particularly important in
bringing the state and the industry closer. He displayed exceptional entrepreneurial
leadership in interacting with the industry and involving them in policy making by the
state. His persuasive skills succeeded in attracting several large multinational firms to the
state. This acted as a catalyst in attracting other firms subsequently and also helped in
attracting and retaining highly skilled labor within the state.
Kerala also created separate agencies for involving outside experts in policy-
making. However, these were largely ineffective till 2001 as the political leadership of
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the state did not want to be seen promoting large private investment in the state. It was
only after 2001 that the state started interacting with the industry more deeply.
Promoting linkages between the local industry and the international market
Promoting production and marketing linkages between the local firms and the
international market was another important initiative taken by these states. This was done
by attracting the huge expatriate community abroad from these states to start new firms or
subsidiaries in their regions. Ethnic linkages of these expatriate Indians were a major
factor in these firms' location decisions. These states also organized annual mega
exhibitions in the state to showcase the abilities of the local firms and promote the state
as an investment destination. Leading firms and industry leaders from India and abroad
were invited to participate in these events. The state also organized road shows and
participated in trade and industry exhibitions abroad to promote these firms and the state.
The state worked closely with industry associations such as NASSCOM for organizing
these events.
Kerala was again relatively slow in this regard. It did not make any specific and
concerted efforts till 2001 to promote linkages between the local industry and the
international market.
10.1.2 Ensuring the Success of Policies
What ensured the successful adoption and implementation of the above policies in
these states? As noted before, influence of dominant class coalitions consisting of
industrialists and professionals in the political economy of decision making in Tamil
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh played a crucial role in successful adoption and
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implementation of policies for promoting the industry. The state in Kerala has been
relatively more autonomous of the dominant class interests due to its history of labor,
caste, and social mobilizations. The relatively autonomous nature of the state in this state
prevented it from implementing these policies due to its deep suspicion of large private
enterprises, failure to carry out genuine labor and other policy reforms to support the
growth of the industry, and its focus on redistribution rather than growth.
10.1.3 Policies that did not work
It is important to note here the policies that did not seem to have any significant
impact on the growth of the industry. The most important policy that did not succeed in
attracting these firms was the numerous subsidies and tax incentives offered by these
states (the long-term tax incentives offered by the central government, such as the ten
year tax holiday, were available to all the firms irrespective of location). For most of the
firms, these subsidies were not a major factor in choosing the state. The firms in this
industry are competitive at international prices and did not need these relatively small
subsidies and grants. The more important factors for them were their expectations of long
term operational costs, finding adequate skilled labor, and the ease of starting and
running a business in a particular state. Ethnic linkages of the promoters of the firms were
also very important in choosing location. However, this factor was probably
comparatively less important than the other factors just mentioned and worked after the
state had already provided the necessary infrastructure and skilled labor. This is
supported by the fact that the number of firms started by foreign-expatriate Indians is
very low in Kerala. Though the state does not have a big professional expatriate
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community like the other two states, still it has a sizable community abroad with ethnic
roots in the state that should have allowed it to attract more investment from them.
The second policy that did not prove effective was the effort by the state to
stimulate the local demand through government projects. All the three states tried to
attract firms by offering e-government projects. However, these efforts did not succeed as
most of these firms were export-oriented and the relatively small domestic projects were
not attractive for them.
The third policy that did not work was the provision of finance. Both Andhra
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu tried to set up separate venture capital funds to provide financial
support for new entrepreneurs. However, they were not successful as the amount
provided was small and the firms could get finance from their promoters' equity and
working capital loans from the banks more easily. For the multinational subsidiaries, their
parent firms provided the finance.
10.2 Differences between the Strategies of these States and the Existing Paradigms
in the Literature
It is clear from these three case studies that the strategies adopted by these states
differ sharply from the dominant paradigms within the literature on the role of the state in
late industrialization in developing economies. It is helpful to discuss these differences
analytically to build a new framework for understanding the role of the state in regional
development through high technology industries.
Researchers have argued that successful strategies for late industrialization in
developing countries have been based on technological catch-up with the advanced
countries through learning (Amsden, 1997; Amsden, 2001; Waldner, 1999). This thinking
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is based on the theory that firms in the latecomer countries lack pioneering technology
and hence must catch-up by borrowing technology and then making incremental
improvements. However, this need not be the case in all latecomer industries as this
research shows. This is dependent on how far the domestic industry is from the
technological frontier globally. In the case of the Indian software industry, the domestic
firms have developed technological capabilities on their own through improvements in
software development processes and project execution capabilities (Athreye, 2005b).
Hence, in terms of their technological capabilities for providing software services, they
are close to the technological frontier. Hence, the state did not need to provide incentives
for technology transfer and upgradation as the domestic firms already had pioneering
technology in software services.
Scholars have also suggested the need to promote large national firms in the
specific target industries and then providing incentives to them to become internationally
competitive (Amsden, 2001). These firms first start selling in the domestic market and
when they acquire sufficient experience and achieve good quality, they start exporting.
This again is based on the premise that the domestic firms lack a pioneering technology
to compete internationally. In the Indian case, this was largely not true as the firms were
competing internationally right from the beginning based on the unique onshore and
offshore delivery model that they had developed (Dossani 2005). Hence, the state did not
need to promote large national firms by giving specific incentives. When these states
started attracting these firms in the mid 1990s, the domestic firms were already growing
at a very high pace and there were several relatively large domestic firms in the market.
The state also did not need to provide any protection from competition for these firms as
195
they were already competitive in the international market. Hence, the strategies by these
states to attract large firms (both national and multinational) rested on different premises.
The main reason behind efforts to attract large firms in these states was to use them as
catalysts for growth of the industry by attracting other firms. This strategy was
particularly successful in Andhra Pradesh where the state tried and succeeded in
attracting several large multinational firms in the early stages of the growth of the
industry.
Scholars have also noted that latecomer states need to develop specific state
structures to implement these strategies. For example, creation of a dominant or nodal
agency with power and control over the industry and other government agencies for
implementing policies and monitoring the results using performance standards can help
in improving the performance of the firms (Johnson, 1982). This is largely based on the
premise that a nodal agency would be better able to coordinate the actions of diverse
firms and control the development path of the industry. However, in the Indian states,
there was no single dominant agency that had power and control over the industry. These
states had multiple agencies that interacted with the industry on different aspects, though
they had all formed one separate department for overall coordination.
Scholars have also noted the vital role that developmental states have played in
providing R&D and technology to the latecomer firms (Amsden & Chu, 2003). This is
based on the theory that these firms lack access to the latest technologies and hence the
state needs to provide support for the development of technology due to the public good
nature of R&D (Waldner, 1999). However, the regional governments in India (and even
the central government) made little effort to provide R&D to the industry with the
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exception of Andhra Pradesh, which made some efforts in this direction. This was mainly
because the firms did not need state intervention in this area as they had mostly
developed the technology on their own and were already competitive in the international
market. However, it must be stated that non-provision of state support for R&D (by both
central as well as the state governments) probably locked the industry in its present
trajectory of growth through providing software services and custom software
development, which are considered to be relatively low value added segments of the
industry (Dossani 2005; Athreye 2005b).
Researchers have also pointed out the importance of state support in providing
venture capital and subsidized finance to the latecomer firms (Amsden, 2001; Breznitz,
2006; O'Riain, 2000a). Though the firms in these states had access to working capital
from the nationalized banks, these states did not provide venture capital. Even the finance
from banks was not subsidized. This was mainly because these firms were earning huge
profits and did not need state subsidies. These firms also had access to finance from their
promoters' equity and the banks were willing to provide the working capital.
The strategies of these states also differ from that of the 'neo-developmental' or
'flexible developmental states' (O'Riain, 2000a). This model calls for extremely flexible
bureaucracies that have adequate domain expertise and can understand deeply and
respond to the constantly changing needs of a technologically sophisticated industry in a
globalizing market. This is based on the premise that the traditional bureaucracies with
long and secured tenures and little involvement of outside experts in policy making are
too rigid and inflexible to respond to the constantly changing technology and market
conditions. In the case of East Asia, researchers have noted the 'embedded' nature of the
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state where the state was embedded in the industry through multiple networks and yet
retained sufficient autonomy to implement policies in the national interest (Evans, 1995).
However, the experience of the Indian states suggest that there are alterative ways in
which even traditional bureaucracies can acquire industry-specific domain knowledge
and respond quickly to the constantly changing needs of the industry. Faced with the
challenge of quickly catching up with their highly successful neighboring state of
Karnataka, these states quickly adopted novel strategies to make their bureaucracy
perform without changing its fundamental structure. They quickly created extra-
bureaucratic agencies to involve the industry in the policy making process at the highest
level. These agencies had representatives from the industry and the academia and were
headed by the chief minister, the highest elected head of the state. They also created
separate departments to deal exclusively with policy making for this industry and make
and implement decisions faster. However, these departments and other state agencies
responsible for providing policy inputs and for implementation were all headed by career
bureaucrats. There was no involvement of outside experts in implementation. This differs
sharply from the experiences of Ireland, Taiwan, and Israel, where the involvement of
industry was much deeper in the state structure (Breznitz, 2006; S. O'Riain, 2000a).
Even in Andhra Pradesh, where the state interacted with the industry far more deeply
with the chief minister himself taking the lead, it was not an 'embedded' or a 'networked
state'. It had the same bureaucratic structure as in the other states with little domain
knowledge of the industry or specific technologies. However, the bureaucracy in the state
tried harder to understand the needs of the industry as the Chief Minister himself was
leading the efforts to attract leading software firms to the state.
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The actions of these states also differ sharply from the dominant thinking in the
regional development literature. Scholars have noted that the main roles of the state in
enhancing regional industrial competitiveness relate to influencing the specialized factor
and demand conditions, presence of related and supporting industries, and competition
among local firms (Porter, 1990, 1998). In this case, though these states influenced the
factor conditions by providing industry specific infrastructure and specialized labor, there
was little attempt to influence the demand conditions, except in a limited sense through e-
government projects. However, the government sponsored projects had a very limited
impact on attracting software firms as these firms were focused mainly on the export
market. Competition among the local firms was mainly for the local skilled labor and not
for the domestic market. Thus even this framework is unable to fully explain the role of
the state in a hi-tech industry with global linkages in production and markets.
The policies of these states also differ from the dominant thinking in literature on
national and regional innovation systems that emphasizes the importance of local
linkages among firms and public and private institutions, and the role of the regional
knowledge system and the knowledge creating and diffusing organizations as the major
sources of competitiveness in the industry (Edquist, 1997; Freeman, 1995). The related
literature on industrial districts emphasizes the role of knowledge diffusion through
policy networks of private and public entities (Scott, 1996; Storper, 1995), while the
literature on industrial clusters emphasizes the importance of proximity of firms and the
agglomeration economies. As this research shows, while local linkages have certainly
been important in the development of the software industry in these states, these linkages
have played a significant role mainly for accessing the local skilled labor pool.
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Knowledge creation and diffusion through linkages with the local public and private
institutions have not been significant. The reasons for the relatively weak local linkages
in the Indian software industry are two fold. First, the industry has been focused on the
export market almost from the beginning, and second, the firms have developed most of
their technology and process and project execution capabilities on their own. These two
factors have contributed to the weak local linkages within this industry.
While these states did try to focus on developing local linkages for enhancing the
competitiveness of this industry, it is clear from this research that their major focus was
on facilitating external linkages for the industry with the global production networks and
the international market. To develop a more coherent account of these policies, we need
to draw on another strand of literature on the global production systems and value chains,
international geography of innovations, and mobility of knowledge through vertical
specialization. This literature emphasizes the importance of international linkages among
firms in global production and distribution systems in industrial upgrading and improving
technological competitiveness (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi & Kaplinsky, 2001; Gereffi &
Korzeniewicz, 1994). In addition, we also need to understand the role of ICT-enabled
information exchange and cross-national networks of immigrant communities in transfer
of knowledge across national boundaries. Scholars have pointed out the role of these two
factors in knowledge transfer in the case of the Indian software firms (Saxenian, 2004;
Taeube, 2004). As the case studies in this research show, the professional expatriate
community from these states played a very significant role in the growth of this industry.
From the discussion above, we can now begin to see the basic building blocks for
a new framework for understanding the role of the state in regional development in an
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industry where the firms are at or near the technological frontier and where the markets
are mainly foreign. I present this framework below.
10.3 Competitive Flexibility: A New Theoretical Framework for Regional
Development in Hi-Tech Industries
As this research shows, regional governments can use multiple strategies to attract
firms in a technologically advanced and export oriented industry such as software.
However, the actions and strategies of the state are dependent on the stage of
development (in terms of technological, financial, and organizational capabilities) of the
industry at national level at the time at which they start industrializing. They are also
dependent on the stage of economic development of the region, especially in terms of
availability of infrastructure, skilled labor, presence of advanced academic and R&D
institutions, etc. As these states began to develop their industries in the mid 1990s, they
had the example of Karnataka to follow and quickly devised their own strategies to attract
firms to their regions. However, their strategies were affected crucially by two critical
factors: level of development of the industry and their own level of economic
development. Competition to attract investments with Karnataka forced them to devise
flexible state structures that could acquire industrial domain expertise quickly and
respond fast to the constantly changing needs of an industry that was focused mostly on
exports in a rapidly globalizing market. In short, the 'competitive flexibility' of the state
in these regions was crucial in attracting software firms.
It is useful to discuss how the stage of development of the industry in India
affected the policies of these states. The software industry in India has been focused
mainly on custom software development and software services that require considerably
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less investments in R&D. The focus of these firms is much more on developing
capabilities for process improvements and project execution rather than on R&D for
developing advanced technologies (Athreye, 2005b). Hence, the requirement for skilled
labor is mainly for software programmers with strong programming and coding skills and
not for highly advanced professionals engaged in developing cutting edge technologies
and products. As this research shows, this crucially affected the state policies at regional
level where the emphasis was on supplying more and more engineers with undergraduate
degrees rather than on advanced R&D. The finance for the industry during the early
1990s came mainly from their parent business houses as many firms were business house
subsidiaries, from the promoters for the new entrepreneurial firms, and from the
nationalized banks (in the form of loans for developing infrastructure and working
capital). Venture capital was virtually unheard of. This again affected the policies of
these states as they did not make any efforts to provide capital for the industry. Though
the proportion of entrepreneurial firms has increased substantially during the 1990s and
later, the pattern of financing has remained broadly similar, with little direct role being
played by the state in providing capital.
It is also helpful to examine how the central government policies affected the
strategies adopted by these regions. Central government had embarked upon a massive
economic liberalization program in 1991 and had already liberalized the trade, exchange
rate, and foreign direct investment policies by the time these regions started devising their
own strategies for promoting this industry. The licensing and location controls had been
abolished and entry of multinationals was made much easier. The central government had
also provided several incentives for the software industry till the early 1990s which were
202
available to all states irrespective of location. These included establishment of dedicated
software technology parks starting in 1990 and financial incentives such as a ten year tax
holiday on export income. These policies constituted the overall national regulatory
framework within which the different states had to compete for attracting investments to
their region.
Competitive Flexibility: Regional Development Strategies for Hi-Tech Industries in a
Rapidly Globalizing Market
Among the most important factors that affect the attractiveness of a region for
high-technology industries such as software are the availability of specialized
infrastructure and skilled labor. This includes not just the general physical infrastructure,
but also industry specific infrastructure such as designated campuses, ready-built
facilities, and communications infrastructure. Availability of adequate skilled labor is
another extremely important factor. The regions aiming at developing high-technology
industries in developing countries need to focus on these two crucial factors right from
the beginning when starting to industrialize. Both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh
focused on providing these two factors in a big way from the beginning. Kerala provided
physical infrastructure but lagged much behind in increasing the availability of skilled
labor. This in turn adversely affected the growth of the industry in that state.
It is important to note here that development of infrastructure by these states need
not entail heavy financial burden on their public finances. Creation of infrastructure can
be done by involving the private sector. As the firms in this industry are highly profitable,
the cost of the infrastructure can be recovered easily from them when they are allotted the
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space. In all the three states, it was the private sector that provided most of the capital for
development. Where the governments spent the money upfront, it was mostly recouped
from the private firms buying or renting the facility. Even for providing skilled labor, it
was the private sector that established most of the new technical institutions in these
states with little financial burden on the state.
Second, pro-employer regulatory and labor reforms are crucial for attracting
investments in high-technology industries. These include quicker regulatory approvals for
starting a business and flexibility in labor regulations that allows firms to adopt flexible
working hours, easier compliance with statutory requirements, protection against general
strikes, etc. Though the firms in this industry in India do not face labor problems
internally as they have to compete for recruiting and retaining skilled labor, perception of
the state as being prone to frequent labor problems and general strikes, etc. can have a
significant deterrent effect on attracting private firms. This was one of the major reasons
for Kerala lagging behind in attracting these firms. The states that implemented these
reforms were far more successful in developing this industry.
Third, developing regions need to acquire industry-specific domain knowledge
and encourage closer interaction and networking between the state and the industry. This
helps the state in formulating appropriate policies for the industry and in responding
quickly to the changing needs of the industry in a rapidly changing international market.
There are multiple ways to achieve this objective. While at the basic level, this requires
flexibility in the state bureaucratic structure that allows for closer interaction and
networking with the industry, entrepreneurial leadership of the state in pro-actively
projecting the state and attracting the leading firms is also very important. While both
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Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh devised similar state structures for interaction and
networking with the industry, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh displayed
exceptional personal commitment and entrepreneurial leadership in attracting the big
MNCs to his state.
The experiences of these states also show that it is possible to make even
traditional Weberian-style bureaucracies flexible and responsive without changing its
fundamental structure. All the three states formed a separate department headed by a civil
servant but under the overall control of a political executive to deal exclusively with the
IT industry. However, they all established separate public agencies that interacted and
networked with the industry more closely and on a regular and sustained basis. They also
formed separate advisory bodies not under the regular bureaucratic structure of the state
to involve the industry experts and academicians in the policy-making process. However,
the role of these outside experts was mainly advisory. Implementation of the policies was
still in the hands of the permanent civil service. This sharply differs from the experiences
in countries like Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland, where the state structures were far more
flexible in terms of much deeper involvement of outside experts in both policy
formulation and implementation (Breznitz, 2006; O'Riain, 2000b). For example, in
Ireland, the nodal development agency, the Industrial Development Agency (IDA), is
headed by an industry expert and not by a permanent civil servant (O'Riain, 2000a).
Fourth, developing regions attract leading firms to their regions in a bid to attract
other firms and highly talented labor. Scholars have noted that these leading firms act as
'gatekeepers of knowledge' (Allen, 1977) and as magnets for attracting other firms and
highly talented and skilled labor (Lazerson M.H., 1999; Lissoni, 2003). Regions have
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multiple choices in devising strategies in this regard. At a broader level, policies can
focus explicitly on attracting large multinationals and/or large national firms. As this
research shows, while Tamil Nadu did not explicitly focus on attracting MNCs, Andhra
Pradesh focused specifically on attracting large MNCs. As noted before, successful
policies for attracting these firms focused on providing specialized infrastructure and
skilled labor and pro-employer regulatory and labor reforms. These states also
successfully exploited cross-national networks of expatriates from their regions to attract
them to invest in the state. It must be noted here that one time financial incentives, such
as investment and tax subsidies, seem to have little impact on the location decisions of
relatively large firms. As this research shows, the firms are guided more by prospects of
long-term growth and profitability in a region rather than by these incentives. The major
location specific factors that seem to affect the long-term growth and profitability in this
industry are availability of infrastructure and highly skilled labor, and pro-employer
regulatory and labor reforms.
Fifth, in an export oriented and rapidly globalizing industry, developing regions
promote production and marketing linkages between the local industry and the
international market. The states again have multiple choices in adopting strategies to
achieve this objective depending upon their unique strengths and weaknesses. The states
with sizable and professionally qualified expatriate communities are in a unique
advantageous position in this industry as they can promote networking with the
expatriates to attract them to start new firms or establish subsidiaries in their regions and
also use them to promote marketing and outsourcing deals between foreign and local
firms. The second strategy to promote these linkages is to encourage firms to network
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with foreign firms and the market through participating in international trade shows and
exhibitions and showcasing their capabilities. The state can play an active role in this by
organizing such exhibitions within the state and inviting leading firms and industry
leaders to interact with the local industry. The sate can also actively participate in such
events abroad to promote the state as an investment destination. Another strategy for the
state is to actively involve the industry associations in promoting these linkages. As this
research shows, both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh adopted these strategies and also
actively involved the national association, NASSCOM, in all such events.
Key Differences between the Earlier and the New Model
Discussion in the preceding sections indicates several key differences in the
regional development strategies pursued by the earlier traditional bureaucratic states and
those pursued by these states for developing this industry. I present these key differences
on certain key parameters in the Table 10.1.
Table 10.1: Comparative analysis of regional development strategies by the traditional
bureaucratic states and the new "competitive flexible" states
Area Traditional Bureaucratic "Competitive Flexible"
States States
State structure Classic "Weberian", little Flexible institutions, more
interaction with industry interaction with industry
Planning Centralized planning Flexible and dynamic
Development Institutions Provide subsidies and monitor Facilitate linkages with global
performance production networks and
international market
Finance Subsidized finance Market finance
R&D State support through public R&D mainly by the industry
R&D institutions
Control over Industries Centralized control and Autonomous and flexible
targeted development development
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Domain expertise Little efforts to acquire Actively acquire domain
domain expertise expertise
Involvement of industry in Little involvement Deeper and more direct
policy making involvement
Style of Functioning Bureaucratic control Entrepreneurial leadership
Source: Author's compilation based on literature review and this research
Conclusion
This research shows that regional development strategies retain their relevance
even in modem knowledge-based economies where national boundaries have
increasingly become irrelevant due to increasingly global flows of capital and
information, and where production is organized in highly globalized production and
commercial networks. These global networks are marked by cross-national flows of
capital, information, technologies, and people. Globalization of the economy has been
marked by a new spatial organization of innovation, production, and consumption that are
not necessarily linked by geographical proximity. This new spatial organization is
characterized by virtual and real transport and communication links mediated by the new
information and communication technologies. These new technologies facilitate
communication at great distances forging new links between distant communities,
consumers, and producers.
In high technology and knowledge-based industries such as software, firms
increasingly operate across national boundaries and aim at the global market for their
products and services. However, even with increasing globalization of capital,
information, and flows of people, firms do not spread out their operations homogeneously
across the world. Developing regions still have their relevance in these global networks,
where, as this research shows, appropriate development strategies can attract firms to
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locate to take advantage of local resources and capabilities. These local and regional
clusters utilize these capabilities and forge links with the wider international networks to
gain access to knowledge, technologies, and foreign markets. Successful regions aim at
developing these capabilities and facilitating the insertion of the local and regional
clusters into the wider international networks of production and innovation.
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12 Appendix A
Table 12.1: Total Software Exports from India
(At constant 1993-94 prices)
Software Secondary Tertiary
Exports Sector Sector Number of
(Rs. million) Per Capita Production Production Engineering
Year Income (Rs.) (Rs. m.) (Rs. m.) Graduates
1990 3422.0 7345.0 1740968 3735246 42022
1991 6124.9 7251.0 1690108 3874257 44281
1992 8174.0 7424.0 1796882 4078163 46762
1993 10200 7690.0 1850700 3342160 48281
1994 13447.5 8080.4 2060717 3555727 52905
1995 22238.6 8516.9 2320499 3930770 56181
1996 31993.1 8995.1 2438137 4198818 57193
1997 49526.9 9254.9 2513440 4549338 61353
1998 82916.2 9549.3 2572862 4856147 67548
1999 111148.2 10038.7 2661774 5424262 75030
2000 168274.3 10187.0 2820216 5679901 79343
2001 217802.7 10621.6 2918073 6159061 97942
2002 259474.9 10545.8 2995708 6367165 107720
2003 313159.2 11303.9 3255053 6901808 128432
Source: Software exports data is from ESC (2006). Data on per capita income and secondary
and tertiary sector production come from www.indiastat.com and the data on number of
engineering graduates in the country is from (Arora & Bagde, 2006).
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Table 12.2: Software Exports at Constant 1993-94 prices (Rs. in.)
Year KA TN MH AP DL HA UP WB OA KL MP GJ PN RJ
1990 626 374 1571 127 301 0 129 80 0 2 0 0 0 0
1991 1189 489 1774 158 430 0 188 94 0 6 0 0 0 0
1992 1595 654 2521 242 387 119 248 143 0 13 0 0 0 0
1993 2235 1124 3836 277 986 170 385 251 3 17 0 2 0 0
1994 3079 1800 4771 511 2849 248 541 319 4 19 0 10 0 0
1995 4386 2725 6321 857 3459 458 770 410 9 29 0 12 0 0
1996 7609 4563 9764 1813 5493 745 1288 465 15 62 0 30 0 0
1997 12630 7502 12751 2127 9458 1442 1644 743 28 196 0 40 0 0
1998 24347 9174 14114 4587 17643 7763 7057 1411 565 374 106 93 56 26
1999 29158 13171 18703 7037 26027 6448 8255 2434 726 442 239 183 99 99
2000 48681 24435 26853 12103 23869 9108 21935 2946 1256 706 314 641 314 188
2001 71786 36465 37866 18052 14215 17923 15451 4363 1545 909 544 754 433 278
2002 81834 43529 40754 22001 17121 20377 17992 7545 1741 958 604 609 406 269
2003 107598 44925 54921 28152 19412 27732 19689 8874 1803 1212 693 782 1009 277
Source: Arora and Bagde (2006)
KA: Karnataka, TN: Tamil Nadu, MH: Maharashtra, AP: Andhra Pradesh, DL: Delhi, HA: Haryana,
Bengal, OA: Orissa, KL: Kerala, MP: Madhya Pradesh, GJ: Gujarat, PN: Punjab, RJ: Rajasthan
UP: Uttar Pradesh. WB: West
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Table 12.3: Annual Number of Fresh Engineering Graduates in Different States
Year KA TN MH AP DL HA UP WB OA KL MP GJ PN RJ
1990 9015 5861 9575 3927 630 235 2412 1857 723 2325 1940 2137 331 1054
1991 8663 6147 10900 4368 846 465 2412 1959 824 2319 1798 2164 307 1109
1992 9169 6349 12339 4385 900 547 2412 1587 805 2161 2268 2372 337 1131
1993 7665 6595 14323 4367 994 533 2502 2106 845 2246 1823 2742 429 1111
1994 11494 6669 14742 4405 847 625 2502 2304 870 2157 1651 2852 522 1265
1995 11611 6660 15283 5610 940 621 2610 2301 851 2547 2123 3132 554 1338
1996 12182 7835 13772 6298 910 683 2886 2241 901 2441 1849 3087 679 1429
1997 11977 9111 16812 5900 1160 662 2749 2439 913 2795 1647 3158 813 1217
1998 12036 11941 19516 5390 1097 657 3294 2432 994 3001 1763 3168 816 1443
1999 12259 13452 20534 7817 1085 1004 3323 2518 1181 3571 2287 3851 679 1469
2000 12526 15524 19706 8102 1103 1120 3552 2644 1498 3877 2158 4723 1365 1445
2001 14173 16670 26341 12171 974 1788 4822 2754 2950 4126 2727 4762 1991 1693
2002 14195 20550 26791 14680 1160 2225 6703 3459 3259 3764 2050 4902 2081 1901
2003 14550 28107 27157 20099 1089 1950 8083 3834 4316 3944 3439 6944 2944 1976
Source: Arora and Bagde (2006)
KA: Karnataka, TN: Tamil Nadu, MH: Maharashtra, AP: Andhra Pradesh, DL: Delhi, HA: Haryana, UP: Uttar Pradesh. WB: West
Bengal, OA: Orissa, KL: Kerala, MP: Madhya Pradesh, GJ: Gujarat, PN: Punjab, RJ: Rajasthan
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Table 12.4: Secondary Sector Production in Different States (at constant 1993-94 prices, Rs. m.)
Year KA TN MH AP DL HA UP WB OA KL MP GJ PN RJ
1990 92610.0 182220.0 342620.0 119280.0 42876.1 51730.0 158631.8 116180.0 41578.8 41960.0 83304.3 151010.0 54270.0 78030.0
1991 101970.0 170210.0 344330.0 128370.0 45644.3 52050.0 165104.4 123240.0 42745.5 43510.0 76357.4 139530.0 55250.0 77260.0
1992 102960.0 182600.0 371010.0 123940.0 50924.6 50830.0 167001.4 127500.0 44465.7 47510.0 84844.9 185570.0 60890.0 85970.0
1993 104354.6 193896.7 371333.8 126839.9 52885.9 58062.0 172593.9 122977.1 36663.6 54271.6 80295.9 175951.3 65830.6 82292.3
1994 113431.9 224355.0 380032.1 158328.5 62900.6 63345.0 197107.7 128459.0 41029.5 60022.2 91944.0 202175.7 68983.1 99867.7
1995 121067.3 244186.7 438658.5 182087.8 53396.9 68620.8 208311.5 143074.6 42348.1 63951.5 99430.7 232549.1 75084.7 107846.4
1996 132436.8 248965.7 458797.9 201409.2 55458.4 73316.0 239017.5 150522.6 37730.0 63774.3 103344.7 259540.9 77369.2 108870.2
1997 151102.4 253771.7 513177.6 227383.0 65454.2 78015.5 239695.3 160989.2 40370.6 65833.1 112358.5 259619.9 85533.4 131520.8
1998 178933.3 255345.7 491994.3 256239.2 68212.0 83495.9 244521.8 170111.6 43926.0 71999.3 123167.8 281185.2 94639.5 135952.5
1999 170800.5 282943.7 521799.0 277858.2 65233.4 88206.6 244786.4 184280.3 50713.0 73230.4 153011.9 309390.0 93919.2 159755.4
2000 177493.4 305421.1 455668.5 294001.8 90102.2 93247.7 246974.8 189369.1 46340.2 79908.1 144937.2 300110.0 97983.5 145787.6
2001 196227.3 276107.2 460516.1 320400.0 87945.9 98519.8 252378.6 198007.0 43298.7 79237.9 145284.7 304010.0 98607.2 149461.4
2002 209807.8 301756.9 499103.9 367870.0 88182.9 102540.6 270112.6 209440.7 45093.3 86302.7 135267.2 355580.0 104216.3 156163.1
2003 228917.5 294624.9 553857.2 403490.0 91936.5 110427.7 285212.4 217788.8 54683.9 97270.3 145385.7 382640.0 108969.2 168536.8
Source: www.indiastat.com (retrieved May 2007) and Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, Govt. of India
KA: Karnataka, TN: Tamil Nadu, MH: Maharashtra, AP: Andhra Pradesh, DL: Delhi, HA: Haryana, UP: Uttar Pradesh. WB: West Bengal,
Kerala, MP: Madhya Pradesh, GJ: Gujarat, PN: Punjab, RJ: Rajasthan
OA: Orissa, KL:
220
Table 12.5: Tertiary Sector Production in Different States (at constant 1993-94 prices, Rs. m.)
Year KA TN MH AP DL HA UP WB OA KL MP GJ PN RJ
1990 131690.0 193300.0 420560.0 210130.0 105016.5 60700.0 253081.1 192440.0 51699.2 110980.0 91511.0 158510.0 86260.0 118040.0
1991 143120.0 207500.0 457690.0 226910.0 120778.4 65920.0 256198.7 202210.0 60553.4 108890.0 92316.9 160750.0 88480.0 116930.0
1992 147960.0 219080.0 511180.0 223970.0 135312.8 65280.0 262860.2 211960.0 61019.2 120200.0 89615.5 182350.0 92800.0 129180.0
1993 157221.3 238946.0 533375.8 245074.1 148941.9 69315.3 311751.8 230461.0 65376.5 128473.1 135417.3 190739.9 97101.1 127809.2
1994 171683.6 264791.3 556726.9 263028.5 167663.9 73078.5 323953.0 247255.1 70351.7 136790.2 138169.1 207933.5 100023.8 139179.1
1995 188520.3 287266.3 620799.1 279228.6 184109.5 78361.4 337723.1 270476.5 75836.5 146488.8 149962.0 228010.1 106788.3 150137.2
1996 211093.5 316802.9 629692.0 299907.6 213907.3 91437.0 370136.2 294312.0 78491.2 155557.9 164040.1 242223.1 118343.9 166538.9
1997 230808.0 357956.4 686470.8 314238.3 245368.1 98920.5 386343.5 320948.0 86669.7 166860.9 174197.3 272308.4 127504.7 186251.4
1998 254448.7 378936.0 742142.3 340580.9 256849.0 105391.5 396713.4 362350.9 88817.4 180859.3 187860.5 292248.1 134001.0 201825.2
1999 279033.2 407809.8 837675.5 370807.7 276206.8 118278.0 419359.3 394147.7 98874.2 203012.0 199515.9 322040.0 145134.4 208871.8
2000 3097856 4426552 8528765 4022362 2989404 1317066 4306011 4340491 1057678 2277313 1986665 3324100 1503034 2276310
2001 3339008 4518348 9107894 4319500 3168363 1439664 4477387 4607843 1102718 2380059 2108282 3562700 1568982 2374404
2002 3641824 4871384 10136262 4658300 3357890 1584014 4820616 5291168 1192301 2623434 2151900 3843000 1673608 2469112
2003 4036077 5289214 11150105 5045500 3742870 1725772 5102937 5814670 1295972 2936783 2364606 4183500 1797979 2816914
Source: www.indiastat.com (retrieved May 2007) and Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, Govt. of India
KA: Karnataka, TN: Tamil Nadu, MH: Maharashtra, AP: Andhra Pradesh, DL: Delhi, HA: Haryana, UP: Uttar Pradesh. WB: West Bengal, OA: Orissa, KL:
Kerala, MP: Madhya Pradesh, GJ: Gujarat, PN: Punjab, RJ: Rajasthan
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Table 12.6: Population in Different States ('000)
Year KA TN MH AP DL HA UP WB OA KL MP GJ PN RJ
1990 44696.9 55536.0 78152.0 65912.0 9263.8 16300.5 130482.0 67411.9 31408.0 28987.0 46891.0 41043.8 20123.0 43621.0
1991 45405.7 56196.0 79843.0 67218.0 9615.1 16682.9 133185.0 68766.0 32006.0 29378.0 48387.0 41757.1 20507.0 44573.0
1992 46132.5 56767.0 81425.0 68433.0 9958.0 17058.5 135735.0 69963.0 32606.0 29775.0 49772.0 42522.5 20898.0 45550.0
1993 47183.0 57670.0 83531.0 69652.0 10441.0 17530.0 140030.0 71637.0 33055.0 29879.0 51547.0 43447.6 21296.9 46874.0
1994 48065.6 58340.0 85326.0 70763.0 10856.0 17964.0 143274.0 72964.0 33584.0 30132.0 52720.0 44304.6 21703.2 48039.0
1995 48964.7 58992.0 87128.0 71805.0 11283.0 18410.0 146597.0 74255.0 34105.0 30388.0 53904.0 45178.5 22117.4 49238.0
1996 49760.7 59624.0 88930.0 72767.0 11722.0 18870.0 150001.0 75502.0 34618.0 30646.0 55095.0 45926.5 22539.4 50474.0
1997 50465.9 60235.0 90729.0 73639.0 12172.0 19344.0 153487.0 76697.0 35118.0 30906.0 56293.0 46588.4 22969.5 51751.0
1998 51152.1 60821.0 92519.0 74409.0 12632.0 19833.0 157057.0 77831.0 35606.0 31168.0 57494.0 47267.0 23407.8 53072.0
1999 51817.6 61381.0 94296.0 75067.0 13103.0 20337.0 160715.0 78895.0 36079.0 31432.0 58696.0 49003.0 23854.4 54439.0
2000 52414.1 61913.0 96053.0 75604.0 13584.0 20859.0 164463.0 79881.0 36534.0 31699.0 59898.0 50104.0 24309.6 55858.0
2001 53191.3 62416.0 97786.0 76008.0 14074.0 21398.0 168289.0 80778.0 36971.0 31968.0 61102.0 51267.0 24359.0 57331.0
2002 53854.2 63104.0 99201.0 77152.0 14494.0 21745.0 171703.0 81989.0 37463.0 32357.0 62395.0 51892.0 24621.3 58430.0
2003 54541.5 63749.0 100670.0 78118.0 14940.0 22136.0 175271.0 83079.0 37940.0 32711.0 63692.0 52840.0 25076.5 59629.0
Source: www.indiastat.com (retrieved May 2007) and Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, Govt. of India
KA: Karnataka, TN: Tamil Nadu, MH: Maharashtra, AP: Andhra Pradesh, DL: Delhi, HA: Haryana, UP: Uttar Pradesh. WB: West Bengal, OA:
Orissa, KL: Kerala, MP: Madhya Pradesh, GJ: Gujarat, PN: Punjab, RJ: Rajasthan
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Table 12.7: Per Capita Income in Different States (at constant 1993-94 prices, Rs.)
Year KA TN MH AP DL HA UP WB OA KL MP GJ PN RJ
1990 7739 8785 12356 7600 12229 12343 6333 6645 5019 7696 10097 10346 13022 7573
1991 8535 8938 12130 7880 15483 12366 6285 7014 5503 7775 9245 9510 13415 6963
1992 8631 9321 13598 7630 17076 12114 6271 7113 5351 8190 9634 11990 13785 7750
1993 8706 9979 13566 8308 20105 12625 5745 7458 5608 8811 7366 11323 14203 7034
1994 9027 11105 13620 8636 21650 13189 5940 7820 5815 9459 7411 13104 14348 8045
1995 9429 11361 14871 9015 21368 13186 6019 8254 6022 9803 7692 13556 14664 8169
1996 10109 11797 15310 9456 23263 14359 6515 8683 5652 10080 8017 15234 15448 8867
1997 10656 12635 15841 9216 25878 14207 6361 9253 6303 10284 8239 15335 15614 9627
1998 11851 13105 16056 10229 26141 14627 6388 9698 6369 10917 8596 16200 16178 9765
1999 12322 13779 17288 10604 26410 15356 6585 10226 6611 11642 9305 15785 16770 9721
2000 13326 14700 16306 11443 29037 15997 6499 10745 6506 12009 8230 15157 17031 9268
2001 13371 14261 16811 11935 29137 16441 6539 11369 6788 12207 8773 16047 17367 9879
2002 13779 14532 17954 12207 29612 16987 6777 12044 6742 13064 8048 17040 17596 9027
2003 14259 14896 19091 13138 31549 18129 6944 12729 7675 14306 9158 19265 18364 11142
Source: www.indiastat.com (retrieved May 2007) and Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, Govt. of India
KA: Karnataka, TN: Tamil Nadu, MH: Maharashtra, AP: Andhra Pradesh, DL: Delhi, HA: Haryana, UP: Uttar Pradesh. WB: West Bengal, OA:
Orissa, KL: Kerala, MP: Madhya Pradesh, GJ: Gujarat, PN: Punjab, RJ: Rajasthan
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Table 12.8 Primary School Plan* Expenditures in Different States (Rs. '00,000)
Year KA TN MH AP DL HA UP WB OA KL MP GJ PN RJ
1979 198.0 23.8 168.3 201.2 286.1 112.4 375.6 1591.0 226.1 364.6 112.4 155.0 18.2 348.0
1980 277.3 777.3 98.6 340.1 378.7 197.2 570.8 1668.9 269.7 267.2 151.4 252.4 20.9 437.7
1981 373.2 968.0 181.3 394.7 504.1 336.9 825.3 1931.7 300.4 375.4 260.2 307.1 9.1 728.4
1982 684.6 1569.8 489.7 3024.2 560.4 394.6 1047.5 137.5 343.5 435.5 656.9 689.6 10.2 860.0
1983 1116.1 362.3 670.5 4791.7 685.6 718.2 1267.7 2644.3 418.4 593.2 667.8 826.7 11.0 1436.4
1984 1588.6 1133.3 1235.5 3221.4 947.3 1108.1 2616.9 2493.0 598.3 898.9 1381.8 939.7 34.6 2257.8
1985 889.6 3642.1 617.5 1655.2 193.8 529.3 2470.3 968.6 684.3 259.8 1592.2 5127.1 35.8 1571.8
1986 701.4 3712.7 1804.8 2463.5 2300.9 875.4 3120.3 3359.2 863.5 1149.2 756.0 440.2 68.8 1960.6
1987 1686.2 4277.3 961.3 2621.1 1213.3 1356.3 3423.8 3015.9 1236.7 1423.7 1661.2 1447.5 314.6 3086.2
1988 1326.8 3967.8 1190.1 3864.8 278.8 1451.5 7291.2 3517.9 2365.5 2736.8 2689.3 1463.3 117.6 4850.5
1989 1893.4 4807.3 2443.4 8979.2 1693.8 2310.0 13223.0 3405.7 3778.2 2043.2 5506.7 1954.8 568.7 6287.7
1990 3335.8 4121.1 964.8 3390.4 2120.9 1185.0 10093.4 1419.8 4212.8 166.8 5799.0 1273.0 51.5 4152.6
1991 5787.8 4107.6 2641.8 4872.9 3033.3 1499.2 8586.6 1096.0 3901.3 146.5 5586.5 1614.9 42.2 6488.5
1992 13515.2 3223.8 5323.2 8696.9 3446.0 2492.4 10035.3 1476.1 6501.6 301.0 5524.1 1464.2 1349.0 6301.6
* Plan expenditures refer to expenditures on new facilities or expansion of existing facilities
Source: www.indiastat.com (retrieved May 2007).
KA: Karnataka, TN: Tamil Nadu, MH: Maharashtra, AP: Andhra Pradesh, DL: Delhi, HA: Haryana, UP: Uttar Pradesh.
Kerala, MP: Madhya Pradesh, GJ: Gujarat, PN: Punjab, RJ: Rajasthan
WB: West Bengal, OA: Orissa, KL:
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